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INTRODUCTION
In the traditional story of immigration to America (the "assimila-
tion story"), the most motivated, talented, and intelligent of the
world's dissatisfied people-our ancestors-came here to seek success
in the world's largest, freest, and deepest national marketplace. The
American system, we are told, was demanding but fair, holding out
equal economic opportunity in exchange for two things. First, the
system required hard work on the job. Second, the system required
hard work on the identity: to avoid consignment to America's lower
economic caste, immigrants had to root out the linguistic and cultural
components of their old-world selves and substitute the less affected,
more facilitative incidents of American identity. Eventually, the immi-
grants' self-reliant efforts would bring the reward of Americanization.
1 We refer to the norms implicit in the assimilation story as "assimilation norms."
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This transformation, however, called for patience. Only the most
clever and ambitious could reconstruct themselves completely within
a few years of arrival. The rest had to be content with life as quasi-
Americans of foreign origin. Their children, however, would go on to
achieve a full American identity and its accompanying economic op-
portunity.2 The third generation would complete the process of
Americanization; internal ties to the antecedent language3 and cul-
ture4 would not burden the immigrants' grandchildren.
The assimilation story, while always normative, 5 has taken a par-
ticularly sharp normative edge in recent tellings. These versions set
the assimilation pattern of early twentieth-century European immi-
grants as a standard against which one should measure the social suc-
2 See Stanley Lieberson et al., The Course ofMother-Tongue Diversity in Nations, 81 AM. J.
Soc. 34, 55 (1975) (asserting that the first generation's loyalty to ancestral language gives
way to a preference for English among their children); Alejandro Portes & Richard
Schauffler, Language and the Second Generation: Bilingualism Yesterday and Today, 28 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 640, 643 (1994) (noting that "the first generation [learns] enough English
to survive economically; the second... speak[s] the parental tongue at home, but English
in school, at work and in public life").
3 See Portes & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 643. The results of a recent generation of
empirical studies of immigrant income make for an interesting comparison with this tradi-
tional three-generation acculturation story. Barry R. Chiswick, The Effect of Americanization
on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men, 86J. POL. EcoN. 897, 919 (1978), using the 1970 census,
finds that foreign-born white men achieve income equality after approximately 13 years,
implying that they successfully assimilate after sufficient education about the labor market
and in the English language. Later studies suggest a much slower rate of convergence,
partly due to lower skill levels in immigrants admitted in recent decades. See, e.g., GeorgeJ.
Borjas, Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality, and the Earnings of Immigrants, 3J. LAB. ECON.
463, 465 (1985) (arguing that declining skill levels among immigrants arriving since 1950
partly explain slow rates of earnings growth among recent immigrants); George J. Borjas,
The Economics of Immigration, 32J. ECON. LITERATURE 1667, 1713 (1994) ("The relative skills
of successive immigrant waves declined over much of the postwar period...."). ROBERT F.
SCHOENI ET AL., THE MIXED ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF IMMIGRANTS 8, 24-25 (1996), studies
California and segments immigrants by countries of origin using data from the 1970, 1980,
and 1990 censuses. The study shows that convergence trends depend on the group-the
wage gap in California was eliminated across the 20 years for Japanese, Korean, and Chi-
nese immigrants; for Filipinos it was reduced from 64% to 74%; for Mexicans it increased
from 60% to 50%. See id. at 24 tbl.3.7. For more on these statistics, see infra Part II.C.1.
4 The immigrant groups' patterns of fertility, language, residence, and socioeco-
nomic status increasingly would resemble those of the natives. See Douglas S. Massey, The
New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States, 21 POPULATION & DEy. REv. 631, 640-41
(1995). Intermarriage also becomes more common as the generations pass and income
and education levels incrementally rise. See id.
5 Noting that an assimilation norm has been held out through American history, this
Article should not be taken to imply that American history stands alone in this respect.
Indeed, by holding out the very possibility of assimilation on the part of new arrivals, the
United States has displayed a commendable and comparatively rare pluralism that con-
trasts with stronger strains of ethnic exclusivity, marring the records of other countries.
See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.
81, 90-92, 96 (1996) (showing that Canada admits higher skilled immigrants due to more
restrictive screening for skills and money to invest); Turkish Germans? , ECONOMIST, Jan. 9,
1997, at 17 (discussing proposed legislation changing a 1913 citizenship law that makes it
difficult to become a citizen without a German bloodiine).
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cess of more recent arrivals. This usage of the early twentieth-century
pattern, not coincidentally, has accompanied a thirty-year decline in
the proportion of immigrants coming from Europe and a concomi-
tant increase in immigration from Latin America and Asia.6 Critics
argue that new arrivals of Latin American origin, hereinafter "Latinos
and Latinas," or in abbreviated form, "Latinos/as, '7 in particular have
fallen short of this standard because too many have remained in a
handful of large, Spanish-speaking enclave communities and have
failed to disperse across the continent.8 Critics contend that the re-
sulting concentration of non-English speech and other incidents of
foreignness pose a threat to the nation's social, economic, and polit-
ical cohesion.9 Among other remedies, 10 proponents advocate regula-
tion to protect and enhance the status of the English language and
6 The watershed events in modern immigration law were the repeal of the Chinese
Exclusion Acts by the Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600, and the Act of Oct. 3,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. These ended the ban on Asian immigration, shifted
entry requirements to favor members of families of present residents, and imposed annual
limits on the number of people admitted from both the Western and Eastern Hemi-
spheres. The limits on entries from the Western Hemisphere were the first in history. See
Massey, supra note 4, at 637-38. Entries from Mexico were not previously unregulated,
however. See id. at 635-36. Although they were not subject to a numerical cap, entrants
had to satisfy substantial visa qualification requirements. See id. There were, as a result,
hundreds of thousands of illegal Mexican entrants during the 1950s and 1960s. See GREc-
oRY DEFREIrAs, INEQUALITY AT WORK: HIsPANics IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 17 (1991).
7 Latinos/as are not identifiable by application of a generally accepted bright-line
test. For the purposes of this Article, the category will include persons born in or de-
scended from Americans born in Spanish-speaking countries in North and South America,
in addition to the descendents of the Mexicans native to the southwestern states. We dis-
tinguish "Latinos/as" from "Anglos," by which we mean native-born, English-speaking
United States citizens. Within the category of Anglos we distinguish "white Anglos" when
the context demands. In our usage, Latinos/as and Anglos are all American, whatever
their citizenship or residence. Ideally, we would have a system of more particular refer-
ence to country of origin.
We use "Latinos and Latinas" and the abbreviated form "Latinos/as" to avoid the ge-
neric masculine. For use of a similar abbreviated form, see, for example, Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MiAMi INTER-AM. L. Rxv.
177 (1996-1997). We note that most of the Latin writers we rely on throughout this Article
still use "Latinos." But anyone who is a feminist must analyze that usage. Luce Irigaray has
been one of the most eloquent critics of the designation of human beings (as well as ob-
jects) through the differentiation of the masculine and the feminine in Romance lan-
guages. See LuE IRIGARAY, I LoVE TO You 79-95 (Alison Martin trans., 1996). The
language, she tells us, differentiates in such a way as to perpetuate fantasies of the mascu-
line and the feminine and thereby has the masculine stand in for the universal human. See
id.
We do not, however, take the further step of coining a word "Angla" to correspond to
"Latina," even though this causes one of us to disappear in the description "Anglo."
8 See infra Part II.B.1.
9 See, e.g., Economic and Demographic Consequences of Immigration: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Econ. Resources, Competitiveness, and Sec. Econ. of the Joint Econ. Comm., 99th Cong.
359 (1986) (statement of Gov. Richard Lamm) ("English [is] one of the common threads
that hold us together. We should be color blind, but we can't be linguistically deaf.").
10 One advocated remedy is revision of the immigration laws. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea,
Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official Eng-
[Vol. 84:595
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thereby hasten (or force) the assimilation of Latinos/as and other for-
eign-born and foreign-language residents.
The American public has heard similar "scare talk" before. Nativ-
ists" have been characterizing foreign-language speech as a threat for
as long as non-English speakers have been settling in this country in
large numbers.' 2 Despite American civilization's unscathed survival,
the nativist impulse powerfully continues to influence law and pol-
icy,' 3 even in sophisticated quarters where skepticism usually greets
such predictions of social disaster.
Nativism derives part of its power from the negative reactions that
some English-speaking Americans ("Anglos") experience upon en-
countering foreigners in traditionally Anglo neighborhoods.14 Its re-
maining power derives from the widely held assimilation norm. The
assimilation story ties the English language to American national iden-
tity, asserts the primacy of both, and implies a concomitant duty of
submission for this country's non-English speakers.
The assimilation story also asserts that two factors-cost and voli-
tion-strictly delimit the permissible scope of non-English speakers'
claims for equality of treatment. As to cost, there is a broad zone of
economically justified discrimination against non-English speakers.
Since communication is costly, an otherwise qualified immigrant who
speaks no or little English lacks a legal claim to equal consideration
for most jobs in the United States. Similarly, cost considerations dic-
tate that foreign-language taxpayers have no general claim of right to
public services in their own languages, even though they receive less
lish, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 332-47 (1992) (discussing the history of and advocating reforms
for the current literacy requirement of immigration laws).
11 The use of the term "nativism" implies a normative repudiation of the point of view
denoted thereby. See Linda S. Bosniak, "Nativism" the Concept: Some Reflections, in IMMI-
GRANTS Ourl 279, 290-91 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
12 The notion that common language defined the nation and its people, substituting
for a common culture and history, gained currency during the Colonial and Early Inde-
pendence eras. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION 28-46 (1990). Benjamin
Franklin provides an example, expressing concern in 1751 about the number of German
immigrants in Pennsylvania and their failure to adopt "our Language or Customs." 4 BEN-
JAMIN FRANKIN, Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLN 234 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1961).
13 The mid-1990s have seen a resurgence of nativist sentiment. Thomas Muller, Nativ-
ism in the Mid-1990s: Wy Now?, in IMMIGRANTS OuTr!, supra note 11, at 105, 106-14, attrib-
utes this resurgence to economic and job insecurity among natives, cultural and social
disparities, and continued inflows of immigrants. For a well-known text that expresses con-
temporary nativist sentiment and quite explicitly focuses on race and ethnicity, see PEmE
BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABouT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTRE at xvii,
10, 57, 117, 129 (1995). Daniel Kanstroom, Dangerous Undertones of the New Nativism: Peter
Brimelow and the Decline of the Wes4 in IMMIGRANrs Outr!, supra note 11, at 300, provides a
useful discussion of Brimelow's work, reviewing the dangerous history of racist discourse.
14 For a recounting of the history of nativist animus, see Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in




value for the same tax contribution because the services are inaccessi-
ble. As to volition, the assimilation story argues that foreign-language
speakers who suffer discrimination have a self-help cure that is un-
available to victims of race and gender discrimination. Like previous
generations of immigrants, they can learn English and cannot deny
that they were aware of the desirability of doing so upon entry to this
country.
Together, these two factors suggest a general bar to all language-
related claims of right for non-English or bilingual speakers: the
claims' very existence signals a failure of diligence and threatens to
impose an avoidable cost. The full-blown nativist expedient of prohib-
itive legislation is a short step away. Regulations that create English-
only zones ("English Only") that exclude newcomers encourage
non-English speakers to "get with the program."
In this Article, we challenge the assimilation norm's economic,
cultural, and ethical presuppositions, 15 marshaling a new case for in-
validating English Only regulations. We take up two classes of regula-
tion that the assimilation norm supports, one from public law and the
other from private law. On the public side lie statutes, widespread in
the states and now often proposed at the federal level, that elevate
English to "official" status as the language of government ("Official
English").16 On the private side lie employer regulations, widespread
in American workplaces and sustained by federal courts, that mandate
English speech at all times on pain of termination ('Workplace Eng-
15 We join a distinguished body of race critical literature in doing so. See, e.g., Bill
Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of
Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863
(1993); MariJ. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and aJurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991); Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American
Criisi of Citizenship, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 503 (1998); Perea, supra note 10; Juan F. Perea,
Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY
L. RE:v. 571 (1995);Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. NewYork: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of
Spanish, 21 HorsTRA L. REv. 1 (1992);Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisi-
ble People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965 (1995); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, DeconstructingHomo[geneous]
Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TuL. L. REv.
1493 (1998).
16 For antecedent treatments in the legal literature, see, for example, Jos6 Roberto
Juirez, Jr., The American Tradition of Language Rights: The Forgotten Right to Government in a
"Known Tongue" 13 LAw & INEQ. J. 443 (1995); Perea, supra note 10; Leila Sadat Wexler,
Official English, Nationalism and Linguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71 WAsH. L. REV. 285
(1996). These articles question the legitimacy of these statutes.
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lish").17 We focus throughout this Article on Latinos/as,18 who com-
prise the largest foreign-language group among the recent generation
of immigrants. 19 As such, they are the most prominent nativist
targets.2 0
17 For antecedent treatments in the literature, see Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners:
Nativism and Workplace Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849 (1995); Alfredo Mirand6,
'En La Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey" ("In the Land of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is
King"): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. L. Rv. 75 (1996); Cam D. Helper, Comment,
Enforcing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
National Origin: The Overextension of English-Only Rules in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 79 MINN.
L. REv. 391 (1994);Jeanne M.Jorgensen, Comment, "English-Only" in the Workplace and Title
VII Disparate Impact: The Ninth Circuit's Misplaced Application of "Ability To Comply" Should Be
Rejected in Favor of the EEOC's Business Necessity Test, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 407 (1996);Jeffrey D.
Kirmer, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73 TEx. L. REv.
871 (1995). These authors advocate the application of Title VII to English Only workplace
regulations. We join them in doing so, offering an expanded theoretical basis of support.
18 This simplifying limitation also enables us to cast the starkest possible light on the
assimilation norm's invidious nature. We show that the refrain of threat, cost, and volition
permits legislators andjudges to avoid confronting the fact of persistent economic discrim-
ination against Latinos/as based not on English-language disability but ethnic, and in
many cases, racial origin.
We note that the limitation also carries the important cost of omission of the particu-
lar experience of Asian immigrants.
19 Massey shows the trend by comparing the region of origin of immigrants for the
period 1983-1993, based on U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service sources. See Mas-
sey, supra note 4, at 634 tbl.i. Of the nearly 9.3 million arriving, 54.0% came from the
Americas, 32.7% from Asia, and 10.2% from Europe. See id. A comparison of the percent-
ages for the period 1960-1970 is instructive. At that time, of the roughly 3.3 million arriv-
ing, 51.7% came from the Americas, 12.9% from Asia, and 33.8% from Europe. See id.
This comparison shows an increase in absolute numbers of Americans and Asians in the
latter period as well as a notable increase in the percentage of Asians in the latter period.
See id.
20 There are several prominent issues regarding language and Latino/a citizens and
residents that we do not consider in this Article. The language of primary and secondary
education is the most prominent. See, e.g., Alberto T. Fernandez & Sarah W.J. Pell, The
Right To Receive Bilingual SpecialEducation, 53 EDUc. L. REP. 1067, 1067 (1989) (arguing that
students with limited English skills have a right to bilingual education because all students
in the United States have a "right to a meaningful and appropriate education"). The con-
duct of criminal trials involving bilingual witnesses and jurors also has raised prominent
questions. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 370-72 (1991) (opinion of Ken-
nedy, J.) (upholding peremptory strikes of bilingual jurors at a trial at which several wit-
nesses were to testify in Spanish).
Questions also arise respecting the tort law duty to warn. Compare Stanley Indus. v.
W.M. Barr & Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570, 1575-76 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that English lan-
guage warnings might be insufficient when manufacturer uses non-English media to adver-
tise), with Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 177 (Cal. 1993) (holding that providing
warnings only in English is sufficient as a matter of law). Special protection provisions can
be found in consumer protection legislation in a number of states. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:16G-61.6(d) (West 1984) (requiring retailers who do business in a language other
than English to provide customers speaking that language with a copy of the receipt in that
language).
Nor do we take up immigration policy, whether regarding numbers admitted, stan-
dards for admission, or the treatment of undocumented entrants. We note only that the
prominence of Mexican border-crossers among undocumented entrants tends to be over-
stated. Sixty percent of illegal entrants come from countries other than Mexico, and one-
1999]
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Our case against English Only regulations centers on the value of
linguistic and cultural identifications to the individual person. It
shows that English Only regulations violate the basic right of personal-
ity of non-English-speaking and bilingual Americans without yielding
any cognizable benefits to American society as a whole. Our case has
two phases. The first approaches value from the point of view of the
person as modeled in economic theory. It thereby highlights infirmi-
ties in all three foundations-threat, cost, and volition-of the nativist
policy construct.2 1 The second phase approaches value from the
point of view of the person as modeled in Kantian moral and political
theory. It centers on the right of personality requiring that each of us
receive the legally protected freedom to represent and evaluate our
basic identifications. This general theory of right leads to a theory of
language rights that weighs against state-imposed norms of
assimilation.
This Article has three parts. Part I provides a more particular
description of the problem-the nativist response to Latino and La-
tina immigration during the last four decades and its manifestation in
Official English and Workplace English.
Part II sets forth our economic analysis. We demonstrate that
economic theory both undercuts the costjustification for state English
Only mandates and permits legal intervention against Workplace Eng-
lish. First, we draw on the economics of language, which teaches that
language difference is costly and that the cost of acquiring the domi-
nant language falls on minority-language speakers. Second, we draw
on the economics of discrimination, which teaches that cultural differ-
ences of any kind can increase the cost of production and that the
costs of difference fall on members of minority groups.
The economics of language and of discrimination imply a com-
plex description of Latino/a immigrants' incentives. On the one
hand, every reason remains to apply the traditional view that market
incentives sufficiently assure that immigrants learn English with a view
toward participating in the mainstream economy.22 This application
of economic theory rebuts the nativist characterization of a threat to
American civilization-spontaneous order appears adequate to do the
job here.2 3 That being the case, public choice theory invites us to
half of the total undocumented population originally entered under visas and then re-
mained after their expiration. See Kevin R Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The
Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. Rxv. 1509, 1517,
1546 (1995).
21 We expand on Andre Sole, Official English: A Socratic Dialogue/Law and Economics
Analysis, 45 FLA. L. Rv. 803 (1993).
22 See Perea, supra note 10, at 348 (noting the "overwhelming social and economic
incentives to learn English").
23 See infra Part II.A.3.
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account for Official English as Jim Crow legislation in fact if not in
name-a self-protective move by rent-seeking Anglos.24 On the other
hand, the economics of language and of discrimination provide no
basis for predicting that the economic opportunities the market offers
to Latinos/as provide incentives to disperse across the continent. Dis-
crimination by white Anglos limits Latino/a returns on human capital
investment and thereby lessens their incentive to assimilate. 25 More-
over, the economic theory of discrimination fails to support a predic-
tion that free markets necessarily will cause this problem to disappear
over time. Instead, it teaches that in a free market, suboptimal em-
ployment discrimination against minorities can persist indefinitely.
This flawed economic incentive structure effectively undercuts
any rational basis for applying the assimilation norm. If Latinos/as
face persistent employment discrimination due to ethnicity or race,
then for many of them, returns on investment in assimilation will fall
off long before the point implied in the assimilation story. At the
same time, the phenomena that support the nativist claims-enclave
settlement patterns and refractory Spanish speech-are explainable
in rational expectations terms. Given limited returns on investment
in English, it makes perfect cost sense to live in a Spanish-speaking
enclave. At the same time, volitional fault shifts to white Anglos: ab-
sent the Anglos' continued practice of ethnic and racial discrimina-
tion, Latinos/as would share previous immigrant generations' high-
powered incentive to disperse.
Finally, Workplace English in this analysis is indistinguishable
from other discriminatory conduct that Title VII bars.2 6 Title VII cov-
erage, however, may be costly. Discriminatory employer practices may
be cost reductive, and enforcement increases employer operating
costs. This cost evaluation does not end the discussion, however, be-
cause in legal contexts the ultimate cost-benefit result can depend on
who bears the costs. We project that Latinos/as themselves will bear
these modest costs. Thus, the question is: Would Latinos/as willingly
bear the costs of a Title VII bar to Workplace English? We presume to
answer in the affirmative because we see no reason to distinguish Lati-
nos/as from other Americans with respect to their willingness to bear
the costs of life in a free and equal society.
Part III sets forth a theory of right that compels the law to accord
suspect status to discrimination based on language. We connect the
Kantian ideal of the free person to the contemporary notion that
identifications play a constitutive role in each person's life. Our the-
ory of right follows from an interpretation of what it means to treat
24 See infra Part ll.B.
25 See infra Part II.C.
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
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each individual as a free person with equal dignity-an interpretation
grounded in a description and defense of the ideal of the imaginary
domain. This theory of right demands that each individual receive
the moral and psychic space to evaluate, to represent, and ultimately,
to integrate the complex realities of culture, linguistic origin, national
affiliation, ethnic identity, and religious heritage. Two points logically
follow from our theory of right. First, the legal system should treat
language as a fundamental identification encompassed by each per-
son's right of personhood. Second, a legal system that treats Latinos/
as as equals 27 recognizes and respects the value they bestow on the
Spanish language. In contrast, an English Only regime designed to
force Latinos/as to speak the majority tongue in public life or in the
workplace treats Latinos/as as something less than free persons,
thereby degrading them and violating their imaginary domains.
While articulating this position, Part III addresses recent, general
debates on cultural rights. This discourse teaches that identifications
are both constitutive of the person and, to some extent, embedded-
human beings cannot just step out of their identifications. This teach-
ing in turn destabilizes assumptions basic to the traditional metaphysi-
cal defense of the fully autonomous subject. We accept this result,28
but nevertheless define our project as Kantian because it focuses on
freedom. To understand the subject as symbolically or socially con-
structed is to imply that freedom is fragile. If who we are is pro-
foundly rooted in our identifications, then we cannot know for certain
whether any of our judgments, evaluations, or actions are truly self-
determined. A need to thematize anew what freedom can mean for
us arises from this uncertainty.
The ideal of the imaginary domain renders this thematization
consistent with the Kantian ideal that the individual person, as op-
posed to the state, must be legally designated as the responsible
source of judgments and evaluations. This approach makes no at-
tempt to claim in the strong Kantian sense that we can make our eval-
27 We write of "treatment as an equal" rather than "equal treatment," borrowing this
distinction from RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977). Treatment as an
equal is fundamental, consisting of the right to be treated with respect and concern equal
to anyone else. See id. Equal treatment, in contrast, is the equal right to an opportunity,
resource, or burden. See id.
28 We accept this result withoutjoining the discussants in debating the truth about the
constitution of the modem or postmodern subject. Our argument does not require us to
answer the question of who we really are as subjects. Its central point is that such basic
decisions about the meaning of identification must remain with individuals themselves.
Indeed, in our view, the focus of legal debates about minority rights and multiculturalism
should shift away from the question of the truth of the subject and instead ask how and
why state recognition of the person demands the right of personhood-the right we call
the imaginary domain. This need to change the question is not solely of philosophical
interest. It allows us to rethink the ethical stakes in political debates about identity without
attaching ourselves to a simplistic or, worse yet, naturalized conception of identity.
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uations and judgments freely and solely in accordance with the moral
law.29 It nevertheless insists that our actions andjudgments inevitably
engage us in the practice of self-responsibility. Even though our own
histories profoundly determine our decisions, we still make them and,
in so doing, make ourselves who we are. Self-responsibility re-emerges
on this interpretation as a practice by which we constitute ourselves as
unique beings who over time shape identities indissociable from the
evaluative designs we give to our identifications. On this view, our
value as free persons is independent of both our particular value and
of the uses we make of ourjudgments and evaluations. This approach
thus maintains the distinction, central in Kant, between the worth of
our freedom and personhood and the value we make of them in par-
ticular cases. It offers, in sum, Kant with an existential twist.30
Our conclusion applies the idea, which George Fletcher devel-
oped, that a culture or a nation can have a right to linguistic self-
defense, which justifies protective measures to ensure the survival of
its majority language, including in extreme circumstances regulation
like Official English.3' We conclude that the conditions for this right
do not exist in the United States at this time. Indeed, if here and now
any group could make a case for such a right, it would be Latinos/as
in the Southwest.
We note that our treatment couples two approaches that scholars
usually deem mutually exclusive 32 -consequentialist economic analy-
sis and the defense of a basic right of personality.33 We caution that
29 Some thinkers that psychoanalysis has influenced have redefined autonomy to
make it consistent with the recognition that we are constructed through and by a symbolic
Other with which we inevitably engage in defining a self. Cornelius Castoriadis, for exam-
ple, defines autonomy as follows:
Autonomy then appears as: my discourse must take the place of the dis-
course of the Other, of a foreign discourse that is in me, ruling over me:
speaking through myself. This clarification immediately indicates the social
dimension of the problem (little matter that the Other in question at the
start is the 'narrow' parental other; through a series of obvious connections,
the parental couple finally refers to society as a whole and to its history).
CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS, THE IMAGINARY INSTITUIrON OF SOCIETY 102 (Kathleen Blarney
trans., MIT Press ed. 1987) (1975).
30 See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF MrETAPHYSIcs (Richard
Taft trans., Ind. Univ. Press 5th ed. 1990) (1973) (examining Kantian idealism in light of
existentialism and hermeneutic phenomenology).
31 See George Fletcher, The Case for Linguistic Self-Defense, in THE MORAurrv OF NATION-
ALISM 324, 333-35 (Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan eds., 1997).
32 The convention that separates them follows from the deeply held view that rights,
by their nature, transcend cost concerns.
33 Any theory of deontological right begins with Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT,
On the Common Saying. 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice,'in KANT
PoLIcAL WRrNGs 61 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991). For a succinct
discussion of the difference between the use of deontological and consequentialist theory




our treatment does not thereby purport to offer a theoretical formula
that locates and resolves all tensions between these two approaches;
rather, we identify two intrinsic sources of tension between them.
First, we defend a right to personality, which limits the means open to
a society in pursuit of general economic welfare or other utilitarian
goals. Second, we defend the ideal of the person as the legally author-
itative source of her own identifications against any theory that vests
such evaluation in some prior analysis (welfarist or otherwise) and
that gives the State the power to impose that evaluation.
At the same time, however, this basic right of personality recog-
nizes the legitimacy of consequentialist considerations. This recogni-
tion makes it possible to synchronize the approaches and thereby to
mediate the tensions. At a minimum, a theory of right must take con-
sequences into account when evaluating the institutional and legal
means that protect the right to personality in practice. With language
rights, economic consequences must play a still larger role because
rights and costs operate as necessary complements in this context. To
see the element of complementarity, posit an ideal world in which
language acquisition is costless and each person strives to guarantee
maximum respect for each other person. In this ideal world, multiple
languages present no practical problem because each person's respect
for the other leads each to learn all languages.
The problem develops when we relax these heroic assumptions
and look at a more realistic world of interpersonal frictions, communi-
cative breakdowns, and finite resources. In this world, we cannot real-
ize the ideal of complete respect for the means of communication
closest to the other's identity; instead, we see a need to privilege one
language to facilitate communication by reducing its cost. A concomi-
tant need to protect minority-language speakers with rights to per-
sonhood arises . 4 The question that results is whether society feasibly
can bestow these rights in practice. We demonstrate in this Article
that it can. Although our imperfect world cannot realize the ideal of
complete respect for others' means of communication, this ideal still
can inform the rules of the game.
Our approach, while admitting consequentialist considerations,
strives to assure that they remain reasonably faithful to the person we
defend. This concern leads us to depart from the traditional methods
of law and economics. For others, economic theory, properly applied,
automatically yields a single, morally defensible result.3 5 For us, eco-
34 See infra Part III.
35 See, e.g., Ric:HAR A. POSNER, ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 284-89 (5th ed. 1998)
(describing the interaction of economic efficiency and morality). For a discussion on the
relationship between economics and morality, see Annalise E. Acorn, Valuing Virtue: Moral-
ity and Productivity in Posner's Theory of Wealth Maximization, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 167 (1993).
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nomic theory, properly applied, describes a range of possible conse-
quences, each of which is open to further moral evaluation.3 6 Our
coupling of economic analysis with the defense of a basic right of per-
sonality serves an additional objective: advancing the proposition that
economic analysis can coexist with the lessons of race critical theory.3 7
We anticipate skepticism on this point from the race critical commu-
nity. The skepticism is justified because economic analysis has the in-
trinsically offensive property38 of treating the fundamental rights of
minorities as contingencies open to legitimate negation in a rarefied
world of formal welfare analysis.3 9 Despite this possibility, we are con-
fident that economic analysis has practical potential for race critical
36 See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUAury REEXAMINED 16-19 (1992), for a broad discussion of
ways in which deontology and consequentialist economic theory could serve each other.
37 Others have advanced similar propositions. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43
UCLA L. REv. 1781, 1786-1800 (1996) (showing, assuming a compelling interest to remedy
past discrimination, that the narrow tailoring principle should not bar racial classifications
that tailor the size of the preference to the remedial need);JohnJ. Donohue Inl, Is Title VI
Efficient', 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1411-12 (1986) (commenting that the neoclassical eco-
nomic model, with its stress on the desirability of aggregating market preferences, has long
grounded an argument against antidiscrimination legislation).
38 Cf Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91
MIcH. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRoUNDs: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINArION LAws (1992)) (commenting that the method-
ological individualism of economics creates a disciplinary bias that causes a systematic mis-
perception of racism's essence).
39 In addition, prominent exemplars of law and economics purport to undermine the
policy assumptions supporting the body of rights that make up core accomplishments of
the civil rights movement. See generally EPSrEIN, supra note 38 (arguing that Title VII need-
lessly infringes upon the freedom of competitive employment markets).
Delgado makes a series of criticisms of economic methodology that provide a useful
basis for demonstrating this unexplored potential. See Delgado, supra note 38. All of the
criticisms, detailed below, are justifiable in the context of a discussion of Epstein's book.
We nonetheless think it is worth confronting them as a way of opening an avenue of com-
munication and demonstrating that economic theory holds out a flexible mode of inquiry.
Delgado's discussants make the following charges, in addition to that mentioned supra
note 38:
(1) Economics fails to "take into account the intentional, interest-serving dimension
of white-over-black prejudice." Delgado, supra note 38, at 1189. Actually, subsequent exer-
cises in law and economics confront this point. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Ac-
tion, 31 SAN DiEGo L. Rv. 133, 150 (1994) (describing discriminatory economic regimes as
cartels); cf. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 -ARv. L. Rxv. 1003, 1007-27, 1070 (1995) (describ-
ing discriminatory economic regimes as spontaneous orders that status competition
drives).
(2) Economics needs to explain why competitive pressures do not eliminate racism in
the market. See Delgado, supra note 38, passim. Not only is this the endeavor of statistical
discrimination theory, see infra notes 221-33 and accompanying text, but it also is a topic of
increasing prominence in the field. See Symposium, Discrimination in Product, Credit and
Labor Markets, 12J. ECON. PERsp. 23-126 (1998).
(3) Economics tends to assume perfect knowledge while the stigmatic picture that
whites have of blacks limits their level of knowledge. See Delgado, supra note 38, passim.
Information asymmetries and their contribution to racist economic behavior is what statis-
tical discrimination theory is all about. See infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
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scholars and believe that an analysis grounded in an unequivocal affir-
mation of the individual's right to treatment as an equal can usefully
demonstrate this potential.
I
LATINO AND LATINA IMMIGRANTS AND ENGLISH
LANGUAGE MANDATES
A. Latino and Latina Settlement and Speech
Nativists point to three aspects of the lives of Latino/a immi-
grants when they claim to identify a pattern of resistance to assimila-
tion. First, Latinos/as have gravitated to a small number of enclave
communities rather than dispersing across the continent. Nothing
about immigrant enclaves, of course, is new. Like turn-of-the-century
arrivals, many Latino/a immigrants have settled in enclaves because
they have arrived with a family or network connection that provides a
job or a place to stay.40 Nativists charge that the enclave-settlement
tendency is more pronounced among Latinos/as than with earlier im-
migrant groups. For example, a recent study found that today's top
five receiving states take in 78.2% of arrivals, and today's top five re-
ceiving metropolitan areas take in 47.9% of arrivals. 41 By contrast,
1910's top five receiving states took in 54.0% of arriving immigrants,
and 1910's top five receiving cities took in 35.6% of arrivals. 42
Second, inflows of Latinos/as and other new "visible" immigrants,
which began in the 1950s and 1960s, promise to continue indefinitely
and without abatement. Nativists contrast current immigration pat-
terns with the turn-of-the-century immigration wave, which Congress
ended abruptly when it imposed entry quotas in the 1920s.43 Entry
quotas resulted in a substantial reduction in both immigrant visibility
and concentration of immigrant populations in enclave communities
(4) Racial mythologies are firmly believed and interest promoting; images become
realities that reinforce the images. See Delgado, supra note 38, passim. For a model that
captures this dynamic, see Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, Culture, Information, and Screening
Discrimination, 104J. POL. ECON. 542, 558-59 (1996), discussed infra notes 250-68 and ac-
companying text.
40 The existence of enclave communities also implies that the new arrivals are not
takingjobs from American citizens. See DEFREiTAs, supra note 6, at 234; MicHAELJ. PioRE,
BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND INDUsTRIAL SocIETEs 120-23 (1979) (discussing
labor-market segmentation).
41 See Massey, supra note 4, at 647 tbl.2. For additional evidence of clumping, see
W.A.V. Clark, Scale Effects in International Migration to the United States, 30 REGIONAL STuD.
589, 591 tbl.1 (1996) (noting that 70.3% of new arrivals between 1985 and 1990 settled in
California, New York, Texas, Florida, or Illinois).
42 See Massey, supra note 4, at 647 tbl.2.
43 See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153; Massey, supra note 4, at 635.
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as immigrants assimilated over subsequent decades.44 Due to contin-
ued in-migration, Latinos/as will continue to be visible, and enclave
communities will indefinitely persist.45 Thus, even if assimilation pro-
ceeds at the same rate as it did at the turn of the century, enclaves will
not disappear.46
Third, many Latinos/as speak Spanish among themselves. In
fact, 48.0% of Latino/a households predominantly speak Spanish,
33.0% predominantly speak English, and the remainder alternately
speak both languages. 47 Nativists interpret these statistics to indicate
that new arrivals to the enclave communities take advantage of Span-
ish-language infrastructures to avoid incurring the cost of English-lan-
guage education.48 Moreover, unlike turn-of-the-century immigrants,
who crossed an ocean and practically had to cut ties with their home
country, today's Latinos/as enjoy easy access to their home countries
and cultures and consequently have a diminished incentive to assimi-
late.49 With the proportion of Latinos/as in the overall population
rising and projected to continue-from 9.0% in 1990 to a projected
22.5% in 2050 50-nativists argue that this refractory behavior imposes
44 See Massey, supra note 4, at 641-43 (noting the pattern of Europeans' assimilation as
their numbers declined).
45 One of the reasons for European immigrants' assimilation is "a long hiatus when
few additional Europeans arrived." Id. at 642. Therefore, Latin Americans will have diffi-
culty leaving their enclave communities because they "can expect to have their numbers
continuously augmented by a steady supply of fresh arrivals from abroad." Id. at 643.
46 See i& at 642-43; Portes & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 645-46.
47 See Andrew Pollack, The Fight for Hispanic Viewers: Univision's Success Story Attracts New
Competition, N.Y. TnmEs, Jan. 19, 1998, at D1.
48 See Massey, supra note 4, at 647. However, he offers no additional supporting evi-
dence. Moreover, if his argument is true, it is nothing new because widespread home-
language speech within the enclave lowers the immediate cost of assimilation for new arriv-
als. See Buckley, supra note 5, at 85 (asserting that new immigrants are likely to settle in
areas already settled by immigrants to find compatriots and a more tolerant community).
49 See Hispanics: More People than Power, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1988, at 32, 33 (citing no
data). Latinos/as have repeated this point themselves. See Pollack, supra note 47 (quoting
the head of the Telemundo television network); cf. THOMAS SowFLL, ETHNic AMERic& 243,
276 (1981) (suggesting that Puerto Ricans' and Mexicans' tendency periodically to return
home explains their income levels). For a definitive statistical refutation of this suggestion,
see DEFRErrAs, supra note 6, at 71-73.
50 "Between 1970 and 1990, the population of the United States increased 22.4%."
Hing, supra note 15, at 865. During that time the Latino/a population increased by 141%
to reach 9% of the total U.S. population. See id. at 865-66. According to the Census Bu-
reau, the relative percentage had increased to 10.2% by 1995. See HISPANIc AMERICANs: A
STATiSTICAL SOuRcEBOOx 11 (Louise L. Hornor ed., 1996) (drawing on the United States
Census Bureau's Current Population Reports). The Bureau predicts an increase to 11.3% by
2000 and to 22.5% by 2050. See id.
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a cost burden 51 and threatens national cohesion. 52 We are, say nativ-
ists, facing the chaos of the Biblical Tower of Babel.53
The facts just cited, however, at best suggest a possibility that Lati-
nos/as will assimilate at a slower pace than turn-of-the-century immi-
grants. They do not support a Tower of Babel projection. Indeed,
because Latino/a immigrants do learn English, the facts point to the
contrary conclusion. Just like immigrants at the turn of the century,
first-generation Latino/a immigrants incur the special cost of acquir-
ing English as a second language. They tend to read fluently within
ten years and speak fluently within fifteen years.54 Also, as with past
groups, the second generation speaks English fluently,5 5 and studies
show that settlement in enclaves does not inhibit the acquisition of
English skills.56 The third generation of Latino/a immigrants, re-
maining consistent with historical patterns, tends to be
monolingual.5 7
51 SeeJoseph Torres, The Language Crusade: What's Really Behind the Campaign for "Offi-
cial English"?, HisPAN c, June 1996, at 50, 52 (noting that nativists want English Only "for
the sake of cost-effectiveness and unity").
52 The findings of the proposed Language of Government Act of 1997, S. 323, 105th
Cong. § 2, summarize this perspective. The United States, they state, has a history of rich
diversity, but the common thread is a common language. "[T] o preserve unity in diversity
and to prevent division along linguistic lines, the United States should maintain a language
common to all people." Id. § 2(4). Furthermore, a single language for federal govern-
ment operations will promote "efficiency and fairness to all people," id. § 2(8), and "help
immigrants better assimilate," id. § 2 (6); see also Hing, supra note 15, at 874 (describing the
belief of many assimilationists that Latino/a and Asian immigration increases bilingualism,
creating problems for the educational system and leading to unwelcome changes in our
national identity).
53 See Portes & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 640 (quoting from the policy statement of
U.S. English, a political action organization prominent in the so-called "English Only
Movement," the warning that without linguistic unity, " [s] ociety as we know it can fade into
noisy babel and then chaos" (italics omitted)). Even prominent liberal Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr. reportedly fears that a Tower of Babel may result from multiculturalism. See Muller,
supra note 13, at 113.
54 See Hing, supra note 15, at 877. James Crawford reports that during the last half
century, there has been a four percent to five percent increase in the anglicization rate
among Latino/a immigrants. SeeJAMEs CRAwFoRD, HoLD YOUR TONGUE: BILINGUALISM AND
THE POLITICS OF "ENGLISH ONLY" 127 (1992). Immigrants from different countries angli-
cize at different rates-with age, ties to the homeland, educational level, and economic
prospects explaining, in large part, the differentials. See id. at 127-28.
High demand has caused a large language-education infrastructure to spring up
within Latino/a communities. English-as-a-second-language classes have long waiting lists
in both New York and Los Angeles. See Torres, supra note 51, at 54.
55 See Hing, supra note 15, at 877.
56 See id. at 863 app. b (describing Asian immigrants who both live in enclaves and
learn English).
57 See ild. Even within the enclaves, Latino/a parents who want their children to have
the cultural and economic advantages of bilingualism report having trouble getting the
children to speak Spanish. See Mireya Navarro, Pop Culture Blunts Immigrant Children's Taste
for Spanish, HoUs. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1996, at 16.
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The language question for Latinos/as, then, is not one of English
language acquisition; instead, it concerns the degree-to which English
and associated cultural traits completely replace Latino/a antecedents
in the second and third generations. Enclave settlement does have an
impact at this level because second-generation English monolingual-
ism increases as immigrants disperse geographically and as the length
of their residence in the United States increases.5 8 But fundamen-
tally, Latino/a families face the same cultural problems of earlier im-
migrants-ameliorating the generational loss of the parental
language to preserve the resource of bilingualism.59 The loss can
come violently. In her novel, The House on Mango Street, Sandra Cis-
neros described a Latina mother who tries to surround her family,
living in the heart of a Spanish enclave, with the beauty of Spanish in
their home. Television does not respect her boundary, and to her
horror she cannot keep her baby from speaking English:
And then to break her heart forever, the baby boy who has begun to
talk, starts to sing the Pepsi commercial he heard on T.V.
No speak English, she says to the child who is singing in the lan-
guage that sounds like tin. No speak English, no speak English, and
bubbles into tears. No, no, no as if she can't believe her ears.60
B. Official English
Under the assimilation norm, it is not Latino/a immigrants who
need legal protection, but the English language. 61 Assimilationists ar-
gue that Latinos/as, instead of complaining about their rights, should
take the path to equal status by extinguishing their Latino/a identities
58 See Portes & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 644-45. Portes and Schauffier studied
eighth- and ninth-grade students in Miami who were either born here of at least one for-
eign parent or born abroad and a resident in this country for at least five years. See id. at
646. Nearly 99% spoke English at least "well," and close to 73% spoke "very well"; more
than 80% preferred to speak English. See id. at 649.
59 See id. at 651.
60 SANnRA CISNEROS, THE HousE ON MANGO STREET 74-75 (1989). Compare the well-
publicized case of a county judge in Texas who, in the context of a child-custody dispute;
ordered a mother who spoke only Spanish to her child to speak both languages, declaring
her to be engaged in "child abuse" that would relegate the child to the status of a house-
maid. Clay Robison, Judge Defends His Order That Mom Speak English, Hous. CHRON., Aug.
30,1995, at 1A Luis Wihnot, ReportJudicial Abuse to State Commission, SuN ANANoNIo ExPREss-
NEws, Sept. 11, 1995, at 10A
61 If the agenda of the English Only Movement can be taken as a guide, the two
provisions with the highest profile are Spanish-language ballots and Spanish-language edu-
cation. It is not, say movement leaders, that Latino/a immigrants fail to share the aspira-
tions of their European predecessors, but that their political leaders have misguided them.
See Linda Chavez, Hispanics vs. Their Leaders, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1991, at 47, 48; see also
Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom To Speak One Language: Free Speech and the English Language
Amendmen, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L. Rxv. 35, 43 (1991) (noting that proponents of the Eng-
lish Language Amendment advocate termination of bilingual education).
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and becoming fully American. 62 Treatment as equals will follow in
due course.
This assimilationist analysis, carried to its logical conclusion, im-
plies that everyone in American society, including Latinos/as them-
selves, would be better off if Spanish speech were suppressed. The
First Amendment's free speech guarantee blocks the achievement of
this goal through direct legislative prohibition. 63 But indirect means
to the end of Spanish-language suppression prominently figure on na-
tivist agendas. Nativists have asked both the national and many state
governments to correct what they see as an oversight of the Founding
Fathers64 by privileging the English language with official status. Sen-
ator S.I. Hayakawa made the first request when he introduced an Eng-
lish Language Amendment ("ELA") to the Constitution in 1981.65
62 See Chavez, supra note 61, at 47 (noting that Hispanics, "like millions of immigrants
before them, see their best opportunity for success in assimilating to the common culture of
America" (emphasis added)).
63 See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
64 The Constitution does not declare English to be the national government's official
language, although an early Congress did reject requests from the German-speaking popu-
lation to publish laws in German. See Perea, supra note 10, at 303-09. Federal level Official
English legislation thereafter was sporadic. The New Mexico statehood legislation, itself
delayed until the territory had an Anglo majority, required the state to provide English-
language education and made English literacy a required skill for state officials. See id. at
321-23. In Puerto Rico, taken by force in 1898, the provision for English-language instruc-
tion in the schools was declared soon thereafter to be feasible and desirable by Major
General Guy Henry, the second military governor. See David Rodriguez Encamacion,
Evolucion del Derecho a la Educacion Consagrado en la Constitucion de 11952 y su Desarrollo juris-
prudencial 32 REvisTAJURIDICA DE LA UNrVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE PUERTO Rico 423,
426 (1998). Imposition of mandatory English-language education was attempted by the
colonial government in 1909, see Lisa Napoli, The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a
Colonized People: The Case of Puerto Rico, 18 B.C. THIRD WoRu L.J. 159, 183 (1998), and most
classes were conducted in English and until 1948, see Ennio M. Colon Garcia et al., The
Linguistic Factor, 32 REVISTAJURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE PUERTO Rico
310, 314 (1998). An Act to provide a civil government for Puerto Rico, and for other
purposes, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917), anglicized the spelling of the colony's name to
"Porto Rico." Congress later reinstated the Spanish spelling. See Act of May 17, 1932, ch.
190, 47 Stat. 158 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731a (1994)). For an economic history of Puerto
Rican colonization, see DEFRErrAs, supra note 6, at 26-36. Puerto Rico is now officially
bilingual. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 3, § 941 (1992) (added 1902) (requiring all government
reports published in English also to be published in Spanish). The issue remains a hot one
in Congress. When, in March 1998, a bill authorizing a referendum on statehood among
the Puerto Rican voters was presented to and approved by the House of Representatives,
an amendment conditioning statehood on English Only in federal offices and public edu-
cation was only narrowly defeated. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate Is Lukewarm, but Some Seek Vote
on Puerto Rico, N.Y. TiMsS, Mar. 6, 1998, at A18.
In the states there has been a sporadic history ofjuridical bilingualism. Pennsylvania,
California, and Louisiana each had periods of official bilingualism. See Perea, supra note
10, at 310-26. New Mexico remains officially bilingual, see id. at 323, as does Hawaii, see
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-13 (Michie 1998) (English and Hawaiian). For Texas's bilingual
history, see Juirez, supra note 16.
65 See S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong. (1981). Others have reintroduced it many times since.
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 37, 105th Cong. (1997) (adding that English shall be used for all gov-
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When Congress balked at adopting the ELA, the movement's political
focus shifted to the states.66 Twenty-one states responded with Official
English statutes, in some cases at the legislature's instance and in
other cases by popular initiative.67 Some of these statutes, which es-
sentially are mark-ups of the ELA, ambiguously68 declare "official sta-
tus" for English and accord an open-ended enforcement power to the
ernment documents and official proceedings); H.R.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong. (1987) (adding
that "[n]either United States nor any [s]tate shall require ... the use ... of any language
other than English"); S.J. Res. 167, 98th Cong. (1983) (declaring English to be the "official
language of the United States" and granting Congress power to enforce that declaration
through "appropriate legislation").
According to its proponents, the ELA would "establish English as the official language
of federal, state, and local governments; eliminate bilingual [election] ballots; and permit
bilingual" instruction in public schools only for the purpose of effecting assimilation. Wex-
ler, supra note 16, at 354-55. More generally, "[i]t would establish a national consensus
that a common language is necessary to preserve the basic internal unity that is required
for a stable and growing nation." The English Language Amendment: Hearing on SJ. Res. 167
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 23
(1984) (statement of Sen. Huddleston) [hereinafter The English Amendment]. For further
discussion, see Wexler, supra note 16, at 354-55.
66 Senator Hayakawa founded U.S. English in 1983. See Wexler, supra note 16, at 352
n.287; Torres, supra note 51, at 52.
67 A twenty-second state, Nebraska, has Official English legislation dating back to
1920. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27 (covering all official proceedings, publications, and
records, and all education-public, private, and parochial). A predecessor of this provi-
sion was struck down in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For a political analysis of
the state legislation, see Raymond Tatalovich, Official English as Nativist Backlash, in Imnsi-
GRANrS OuTr!, supra note 11, at 78, 80-91.
68 Courts can narrowly interpret a simple declaration of "official status" so as not to
carry negative implications for government activities in other languages. Some of the judi-
cial opinions interpreting these statutes take this narrow approach. See Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1226-27 (rejecting the State's interpretation
of a facially restrictive statute to permit use of other languages to facilitate the provision of
services), affd, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v.
Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1973) (noting that an Illinois statute making English
the official language does not "prevent publication of official materials in other lan-
guages"); Martin v. Metropolitan Dade County, 637 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a local ordinance repealing an antibilingual ordinance passed one year ear-
lier did not violate the state constitutional provision declaring English to be the official
language); see also The English Amendmen supra note 65, at 32 (statement of legislative
attorney Charles V. Dale) (arguing that ELA alone would have little practical effect without
an effective enforcement mechanism, which is not specifically defined by the ELA).
English Only activists take a more aggressive view of the statutes' meaning. After en-
actment in California, U.S. English set up a center to police implementation; in Dade
County, Florida an English Only ordinance was held to bar bilingual signs at the zoo. See
So16, supra note 21, at 810-11.
The Dade County experience reflects political tensions between Anglos and members
of the region's Cuban enclave. The County Commissioners voted the county bilingual in
1973. An initiative "stipulating that public funds could not be used to teach languages
other than English or to 'promote a culture other than the culture of the United States'"
revoked this designation in 1980. Portes & Schauffler, supra note 2,, at 645. The Dade
County Commission rescinded that initiative in 1993. See id. Martin was an attempt to
trump the Commissioners' action with the state constitution's English Only provision. See
Martin, 637 So. 2d at 313.
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legislature. 69 Other Official English enactments are more specific, ex-
plicitly restricting the language of government business.70
Federal English Only activity revived with the election of a Repub-
lican Congress in 1994.71 Since then, members of Congress have in-
troduced a number of Official English proposals in each house. The
least restrictive proposals mandate English for federal government op-
69 See ALA. CONST. amend. 509 (ratified 1990) (declaring English the official lan-
guage, authorizing the legislature to take all "steps necessary" to "preserve[ ] and en-
hance[ ]" English, and prohibiting any law to "diminish[ ] or ignore[ ] the role of English
as the common language"); CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6 (added by initiative 1986) (declaring
English the official language and authorizing the legislature to take all steps necessary to
preserve and enhance it); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a (added by initiative 1988) (declaring
English the official language and authorizing the assembly to implement); FLA. CONsr. art.
II, § 9 (added by initiative 1988) (establishing English as the official language and utilizing
substantially the same language as Colorado).
Other states have provisions that make the declaration without granting enforcement
power explicitly. See AR. CODE ANN. 1-4-117 (Michie 1996) (enacted 1987); 5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 460/20 (West 1993) (enacted 1991, with prior laws dating back to 1923); IND. CODE
ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (Michie 1998) (added 1984); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Banks-Baldwin
1995) (added 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (1991) (enacted 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 145-12 (1994) (enacted 1987); N.D. CENT.'CODE § 54-02-13 (1989) (added 1987); VA.
CODE ANN. § 7.1-42 (Michie Supp. 1998) (added 1996) (declaring English to be the official
language and stating that "no state agency or local government shall be required to pro-
vide... [or] prohibited from providing" other language documents "[e]xcept as provided
by law").
Many states also have incidental provisions concerning the language ofjudicial pro-
cess, record keeping, and other government functions. See Wexler, supra note 16, at 348.
For an example of a statute, see TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (West 1995) (enacted
1983) (specifying that no real property documents shall be filed in a language other than
English).
70 See ARuz. CONsT. art. XXVIII (added by referendum 1988) (declaring English as the
official language of ballot, public schools, and all government functions and actions and
authorizing the legislature to take all reasonable enforcement steps); NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 27 (adopted 1920) (covering official proceedings, publications, records, and all educa-
tion); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-100 (1998) (added 1996) (declaring English the official lan-
guage for acts of government and public meetings and permitting official filings of other
language documents only with an English translation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-510 (1997)
(declaring English the official language for acts of government officers and employees);
N.H. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 3-C:1 to :2 (Supp. 1998) (mandating English for all public docu-
ments, records, and proceedings in which excepting cases the "public good" requires use
of other languages); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (added 1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-27-20 (Michie Supp. 1998) (declaring English the offical language
and designating as language for public documents and meetings); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-
404 (1998) (added 1984) (mandating English for all "communications and publications"
of governmental entities); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (Michie 1997) (added 1996) (apply-
ing to documents and written materials and stating that no state agency or political subdivi-
sion "shall be required to provide" such documents and materials in any language other
than English, but excepting oral information provided to individuals in the course of deliv-
ery of a public service).
Courts struck down the Arizona statute on First Amendment grounds in Yniguez, 42
F.3d at 1241-42, and in Ruiz v. HulI 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 67
U.S.L.W. 3436 (1999).
71 Senator Dole endorsed federal-level Official English legislation in his 1996 cam-
pagn. See Torres, supra note 51, at 52.
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erations and services and declare a "right" to government services in
English.72 More restrictive versions repeal federal laws that require
Spanish-language election ballots and that encourage Spanish-lan-
guage primary and secondary education. 73 Congress has not, to date,
enacted any of the proposals.
72 See Language of Government Act of 1997, S. 323, 105th Cong. § 2; Bill Emerson
English Language Empowerment Act of 1997, H.R. 123, 105th Cong.; English Language
Empowerment Act of 1996, H.R_ 3850, 104th Cong. § 3 (adding § 163 to 4 U.S.C.); Lan-
guage of Government Act of 1995, H.R. 123, 104th Cong. § 3 (same); Language of Govern-
ment Act of 1995, H.R. 345, 104th Cong. § 3 (same); Language of Government Act of
1995, S. 356, 104th Cong. § 3 (same). The Language of Government Act of 1997 provides,
inter alia, (1) that "[t]he [g]overnment shall conduct its official business in English," S.
323, 105th Cong. § 3 (adding § 163(a) to 4 U.S.C.); (2) that the government has an "af-
firmative obligation to preserve and enhance the role of English as the official language of
the... government," id. (adding § 162 to 4 U.S.C.); (3) that "[n]o person shall be denied
services, assistance, or facilities, directly or indirectly provided by [g]overnment solely be-
cause the person communicates in English," id. (adding § 163(b) to 4 U.S.C.); and (4) that
"[e]very person.., is entitled to ... communicate with the [g]overnment in English;...
[to] receive information from or contribute information to the [g]overnment in English;
and... [to] be informed of or be subject to official orders in English," id. (adding § 163(c)
to 4 U.S.C.). Savings clauses go on to state that the statute is "not intended ... to discrimi-
nate against or restrict the rights of any individual," id. § 2(b) (1), and "not intended to
discourage or prevent the use of languages other than English in any nonofficial capacity,"
id. § 2(b) (2).
For a variant proposal, see the Declaration of Official Language Act of 1997, H.R. 622,
105th Cong., and the Declaration of Official Language Act of 1995, H.R. 739, 104th Cong.
These proposed bills (1) declare English to be the official language, see H.R. 622 § 2 (ad-
ding § 161 to 4 U.S.C.); (2) state that English is the "preferred language of communication
among citizens of the United States," id. (adding § 162 to 4 U.S.C.); (3) encourage citizens
to use English in a section labeled "Duties of citizenship," id. (adding § 164 to 4 U.S.C.);
and (4) command the INS to enforce the English-language proficiency standard, see id.
(adding § 165 to 4 U.S.C.).
73 See National Language Act of 1997, H.R. 1005, 105th Cong.; National Language Act
of 1995, H.R. 1005, 104th Cong. These proposals limit the Official English declaration by
exceptions only for religious purposes, foreign-language training, and persons over 62. See
H.R. 1005, 105th Cong. § 2 (adding § 163 to 4 U.S.C.); H.R. 1005, 104th Cong. § 2 (same).
In addition, they repeal Bilingual Education Programs and Bilingual Election Require-
ments and require English in new citizen admission ceremonies. See H.R. 1005, 105th
Cong. §§ 3-5; H.R. 1005, 104th Cong. §§ 3-5.
Guam delegate Robert Underwood has introduced an English Only School Prayer
Bill. According to Representative Underwood, "[w]e should not tolerate prayers in dead
languages like Latin, nor unfamiliar prayers in Hebrew, Greek, Arabic or Spanish." English-
Only Prayers, PLAIN DEAT R (Cleveland), Aug. 12, 1996, at 10D.
Finally, there is a counterproposal. See H.R. Con. Res. 4, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.
Con. Res. 83, 104th Cong. (1995). These resolutions recognize the importance of English,
but resolve to continue the provision of services in languages other than English to facili-
tate access to essential government functions. See H.R. Con. Res. 4; H.R. Con. Res. 83. The
declaration neatly summarizes several policy counters to the English Only Movement:
Whereas there is no threat to the status of English in the United States,
a language that is spoken by 94 percent of United States residents, accord-
ing to the 1990 United States Census, and there is no need to designate any
official United States language or to adopt similar restrictionist legislation;
Whereas "English-only" measures, or proposals to designate English as
the sole official language of the United States, would violate traditions of
cultural pluralism, divide communities along ethnic lines, jeopardize the
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Constitutional litigation has followed enactments of these laws in
the states. The Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona provision that
mandated English as the exclusive language of public services as
facially overbroad and violative of the First Amendment's free speech
guarantee. 74 The Supreme Court took the case only to vacate the
lower courtjudgment as moot.7 5 Subsequently, in Ruiz v. Hu476 the
Supreme Court of Arizona reached the same result as the Ninth Cir-
cuit, offering both a more expansive reading of the First Amend-
ment77 and a parallel equal protection ground for invalidation.78
Pending a definitive federal court ruling, however, the constitutional-
ity of restrictive Official English statutes remains an open question.79
provision of law enforcement, public health, education, and other vital serv-
ices to those whose English is limited, impair government efficiency, and
undercut the national interest by hindering the development of language
skills needed to enhance international competitiveness and conduct diplo-
macy; and
Whereas such "English-only" measures would represent an unwar-
ranted Federal regulation of self-expression, abrogate constitutional rights
to freedom of expression and equal protection of the laws, violate interna-
tional human rights treaties to which the United States is a signatory, and
contradict the spirit of the 1923 Supreme Court case Meyer v. Nebraska,
wherein the Court declared that "The protection of the Constitution ex-
tends to all; to those who speak other languages as well as to those born
with English on the tongue" . . . .
H.R. Con. Res. 4.
74 SeeYniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1241-42, affd, 69 F.3d
920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). The opinion holds, inter alia, (1) that the statute is facially
overbroad because it chills the speech of all Arizona public employees and officials and
burdens their interest in receiving information of non-English-speaking citizens; and (2)
that speech in a foreign language is not unprotected expressive conduct. See id. at 1229-30,
1232.
75 See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 43.
76 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3436 (1999).
77 Ruizjoins Yniquez in focusing on a violation of the right of elected officials and
public employees to communicate with constituents and the public. See 957 P.2d at 998.
But it also finds a violation of the First Amendment rights of "limited- and non-English-
speaking persons [to] access ... information about the government when multilingual
access may be available and may be necessary to ensure fair and effective delivery of gov-
ernmental services to non-English-speaking persons." Id. at 997.
78 The court applied strict scrutiny on the ground that the provision impinged on the
First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. See id. at 1000. Because the
State failed to establish a compelling state interest, the court held the provision violative of
the Equal Protection Clause "because it impinges upon both the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process and the right to petition the government for
redress." Id. at 1002.
79 We would expect the Supreme Court definitively to hold such restrictive Official
English statutes unconstitutional in line with Yniquez rather than Ruiz, advancing a narrow
First Amendment ground and avoiding the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
Under the time-honored preference for the narrow ground, avoidance of constitu-
tional challenges certainly would be sound litigation strategy. The First Amendment
framework allows only a tentative commitment to juridical equal status for Latinos/as. The
invalidating court need only accord Spanish equal status with English so far as it concerns
direct, governmental prohibition of the act of speech. Although this matter has important
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C. Workplace English
Private institutions may use direct mandate to suppress Spanish
when the First Amendment prevents the government from doing so.
Employers often impose these language regulations on an absolute
basis, requiring English speech at all times and in all circumstances
regardless of whether the conversation includes customers, monol-
ingual English supervisors, or fellow employees. Employer justifica-
tions cite workplace safety,80  simplicity,8 ' transparency of
administration, 82 and professional appearances.83 Yet Workplace Eng-
lish regulations often lead to workplace conflicts, and numerous peo-
ple have reported disputes in recent years.84
implications for the Latino/a community's political rights, it need not entail affirmative
recognition of equal status. An equal protection theory of invalidation, in contrast, shifts
the focus to the prevention of Spanish-language access to political participation and im-
plies an equal right to use political influence in the democratic process to secure Spanish-
language services. Government in Spanish would by implication join government in Eng-
lish in the universe of constitutionally sanctioned public goods. Even this limited recogni-
tion of Latino/a equality may be difficult to extract in the present American context. Even
less likely is substantive due process recognition of a right to a zone of protection for
individual choice respecting language acquisition and usage.
This Article's analysis of costs and rights applies regardless of the doctrinal framework,
however. In an ideal world, the courts would endorse a right to cultural and linguistic
freedom under the Thirteenth Amendment, making reference to David Richards's recent
exhaustive interpretation. See DAVID J. RiCHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTrrUTION
(1998). Under Richards's moral and legal interpretation, the Thirteenth Amendment in-
dudes and forbids all forms of moral slavery. See id. at 5. The concept of suspect classifica-
tion, as reconstructed by Richards, condemns the "basis for law that reflects the unjust
degradation of a cultural tradition (moral slavery) with which a person reasonably identi-
fies as central to their conscientious sense of personal and moral identity." Id. Further-
more, "[s]uch devaluation of identity is . . . what unites on grounds of principle the
interlinked grounds for the suspectness of religion, race, gender, and sexual preference."
Id. This principle provides a powerful basis for constitutional condemnation of Official
English and, more generally, legal instantiations of the assimilation norm. Richards's in-
terpretation is the closest in the literature to our defense of the moral right of the person
to be recognized as the self-authenticating source of the evaluation of her origin.
80 See Carol Kieiman, LearningEnglish OpensDoorsforEmployees, CHI. TRiB.,July 9,1995,
§ 8 (jobs), at 1; David Poppe, Batchelor Defends English-Only Rule, MiAMi HERALD, Mar. 28,
1997, at 1C.
81 See Kieiman, supra note 80; Diane E. Lewis, 5 Hotel Workers Quit, Cite English-Only
Demand, BosrON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1997, at B3.
82 Employers have contended that Spanish-speaking employees can disrupt the work-
place by belittling other employees in conversations among themselves. See Gutierrez v.
Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Long
v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E.D. Va. 1995), afj'd, 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir.
1996); Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 775 F. Supp. 338, 342 (1991), with-
drawn, No. 89 4289 ER (JRX), 1993 WL 326559 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1993). Employers also
often mention the facilitation of supervision by non-Spanish-speaking supervisors. See Gu-
tierre 838 F.2d at 1043; Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980); Dimaranan, 775
F. Supp. at 342-43.
83 See Garcia, 618 F.2d at 267 (explaining the employer's claim that Engiish-speaking
customers object to hearing conversations they cannot understand); Lewis, supra note 81.
84 At least one ACLU lawyer alleges that increased reports could reflect increased
employer usage of Workplace English. See Lewis, supra note 81. In the alternative, it could
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Meanwhile, the legal environment has turned markedly in the
employers' favor. Ten years ago, both the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") and the federal courts appeared to be
in accord on the Title VII status of Workplace English. The EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination 85 formally declared Workplace English
a burdensome term and a condition of employment that disparately
impacts a protected group and therefore presumptively violates Title
VII's prohibition of national origin discrimination.86 Under this anal-
ysis, Workplace English regulations are sustainable only if an em-
ployer can make a showing of business necessity.87 Although leading
federal cases initially adopted this position,88 the courts changed their
view, rejecting the EEOC Guidelines and holding that broad Work-
place English rules do not automatically raise a prima facie case of
reflect decreased tolerance on the part of Latinos/as and others whose contacts the regula-
tions constrain (or perhaps an increased interest on the part of the press). The Mexican-
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU have set up hot-lines to
receive complaints. See Torres, supra note 51, at 56. Protests now are common. See, e.g.,
Aly Colon, AOL Drops English-Only Policy, SEArmu TIMES, July 25, 1996, at A5 (reporting a
customer protest against English Only computer bulletin board); Ray Delgado & Julian
Guthrie, Day Care Language Barrier Spanish-Speaking Workers Claim They're Forced To Use Eng-
lish on the Job, or Else S.F. ExAMiNER, Sept. 20, 1996, at A4 (reporting a worker protest);
Lewis, supra note 81 (same). On a related front, there have been recent instances of pro-
tests by government employees in bilingual service situations who are fed up with doing
much more work than similarly situated monolingual Anglos for the same pay. See William
Booth, Growth in BilingualJobs Brings Demandsfor More Pay, WASH. PosrJan. 19, 1996, atA3;
Clemence Fiagome, Bilingual Job, Higher Pay, CrnusnAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Jan. 26, 1996, at 3;
Charles Strouse, Big Language Debate Pits English-Only vs. Bilingua FRESNO BEE, Jan. 21,
1996, at All.
85 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)-
(b) (1998).
86 See id § 1606.7(a).
87 SeeYee v. Runyan, No. 01942185, 1995 WL 44149 (E.E.O.C.) (Jan. 27, 1995) (apply-
ing Guidelines); Decision 83-7, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1861, 1862 (1983) (sus-
taining limited English Only rule on safety grounds); Decision 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1821-22 (1981) (applying Guidelines against absolute rule); Decision 73-
0479, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1788, 1804 (1973) (requiring business justification
for absolute rule); Decision 71446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1128 (1970)
(same).
88 See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that employee allegation of harm to identity sufficed to support preliminary injunction
and citing EEOC Guidelines with approval), vacated, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Saucedo v.
Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (ruling that an English
Only rule has disparate impact and therefore raises the issue of business necessity); see also
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1987) (sustaining radio sta-
don order of English-language broadcasting format because the order was business re-
lated). But see Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270 (holding that no discrimination is present when
employees can speak English but choose not to do so).
Gutierrez makes the important point that bilingualism does not terminate the link be-
tween language and cultural identity. See 838 F.2d at 1039. For further discussion, see
Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging. The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv.
303, 361-69, 376-77 (1986); Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Lan-
guage, 23 Hous. L. REV. 885, 898-900 (1986).
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disparate impact.8 9 Under this approach, to make a prima facie case,
the plaintiff must prove the existence of a discriminatory impact-that
the adverse effect is significant and that the general employee popula-
tion is not affected to the same degree.90
This judiciary change signals shifting concerns. Degradation car-
ries decisive weight under the EEOC approach, resulting in findings
that language prohibition is national origin discrimination. 91 Today,
courts reject this idea that expressions of ethnicity have Title VII sig-
nificance. 92 Costs matter more in this analysis. Accordingly, courts
cite Title VII's legislative history for the proposition that employer in-
ternal affairs should be interfered with as little as possible.93 Ascrip-
tions of fault also have shifted under the current approach. Courts
see complainants in these cases, who by definition are bilingual, as
possessing a choice about complying with Workplace English regula-
tions.94 Once the court concedes the legitimacy of the employer's
forcing this choice, employee volition emerges as the determinant fac-
tor in the case. 95 In effect, courts believe that employees who can
speak English, who know the rule, and who choose to speak Spanish 96
get what is coming to them.
The cost and volition components of the assimilation norm have
found their way into Title VII case law. The third member of the nati-
vist trio-the foreign language threat to American civilization-does
89 See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993); Long v. First
Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 943-44 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996);
cf Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 775 F. Supp. 338, 343-44 (1991) (finding
that an employer's administrative justification blocks inference of disparate treatment),
withdrawn, No. 89 4289 ER (JRX), 1993 WL 326559 (C.D. Cal.' Mar. 17, 1993).
90 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
91 SeeAdams, supra note 17, at 903-04; see alsoJorgensen, supra note 17, at 414 (discuss-
ing cases that connect English Only and discrimination); Kirtner, supra note 17, at 874-75
(arguing that English Only impacts non-English speakers).
92 Compare Gutierrez 838 F.2d at 1039-40 (adopting the EEOC's business necessity test
for evaluating Title VII claims), with Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (noting that Title VII does
not protect workplace expressions of cultural and ethnic identity).
93 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90; see also Long, 894 F. Supp. at 941 (characterizing
and rejecting the notion that the ability to converse in any language is a "privilege of em-
ployment" subject to employer control (emphasis added)).
94 See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 ("The bilingual employee can readily comply
with the English-only rule and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job." (emphasis
added)).
95 For challenges to the behavioral notion that bilingual speakers always have a
choice, see Adams, supra note 17, at 906-07; Mirand6, supra note 17, at 94-98. Others chal-
lenge the notion that mutability of the characteristic should determine a Title VII case in
the defendant's favor. SeeJorgensen, supra note 17, at 419-20; Kirtner, supra note 17, at
899, 903. On the importance of mutability in Title VII cases, see Peter Brandon Bayer,
Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under Title VI, 20 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 769 (1987); Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accom-
modation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEx. L. REv. 317, 331-32 (1997).
96 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487; Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410
(9th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1980).
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not yet explicitly figure into the jurisprudence. But it would be rash
to predict its permanent absence.
II
THE ECONOMICS OF ASSIMILATION: LANGUAGE ACQUISITION,
DISCRIMINATION, AND SPONTANEOUS ORDER
In this Part, we use economic theory to inspect the soundness of
the three concepts-threat, cost, and volition-that support English
Only.97
This inspection confirms that multiple languages do result in ad-
ded costs for a given economy. But it also shows that these costs fall
most heavily on minority-language speakers themselves. As a result,
individual economic incentives should keep overall costs at a manage-
able level, even given significant immigration. Moreover, enclave set-
tlement and bilingualism-each of which nativists call a threat-are
rational (and unthreatening) when viewed economically. The analysis
also shows that Official English does lend itself to a rational expecta-
tions description, but not as a first-best means to the end of Latino/a
assimilation. From a public choice perspective, Official English re-
sembles Jim Crow legislation designed to advance the collective inter-
ests of the Anglo majority either by discouraging Latino/a settlement
in the enacting state or by impeding the existing Latino/a commu-
nity's access to public services and employment.
The economic analysis, however, does not necessarily imply fric-
tionless repetition of the turn-of-the-century assimilation pattern. Ra-
tional members of an ethnic minority will migrate from enclaves only
to the extent that the wider economy offers superior economic oppor-
tunities.98 It is not at all clear that these opportunities exist for many
Latinos/as. Moreover, the economic theory of discrimination pro-
vides no credible assurance that market forces will provide a solution
to this problem in either the short or long run. In fact, the empirical
evidence supports a prediction that Latinos/as will face more virulent
and persistent discrimination than that which their turn-of-the-cen-
tury immigrant predecessors faced.99
97 In doing so, we do not wish to claim that microeconomic theory should provide the
exclusive methodological framework for analysis of problems of assimilation and discrimi-
nation. For criticisms with which we concur, see Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-
Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, 12J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 118-23 (1998). We draw
on microeconomics here because it occupies a privileged role in today's legal policy dis-
course and comes to bear on the subject matter with surprising results.
98 Cf Hing, supra note 15, at 891 ("In my experience, immigrants who reside or work
in ethnic enclaves do so less out of ideological reasons than out of comfort or affordability
99 For a review of the empirical literature on Latinos/as, see supra note 3 and accom-
panying text. We have come across no empirical studies comparing the experiences of the
different immigrant generations with discrimination.
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The character and intensity of Latino/a economic incentives to
assimilate' 00 depend on the character and intensity of discriminatory
behavior by Anglos. If public policy problems arise because Latinos/
as maintain stronger home country ties than members of previous im-
migrant generations, Anglos can blame themselves. This analysis
reveals a clear message for legal policy: a legal regime seeking to en-
courage assimilation should open opportunities for immigrants
through the subsidy of English-language education or through the
scrupulous enforcement of Title VII. English Only sticks are the tools
of segregationists.
A. Official English, Cost Economics, and Immigrant Incentives
1. Language Difference, Its Costs, and Their Allocation
Language differences make exchanges more expensive. Con-
sider, for example, a prospective trade between two monolingual par-
ties who speak different languages. Language acquisition or
translation costs necessarily will accrue if the parties consummate this
trade. Like costs of transportation, the parties typically will pass these
costs along to the parties' ultimate customers.' 0 ' Compare the afore-
mentioned trade with a situation in which producers in a small coun-
try with its own language wish to enter the market in a big country
with a different language. Here, the big country's market will deter-
mine the terms of trade, including the language. It follows that trad-
ers in the small country bear all the costs (and gain the benefits) of
learning the big country's language. 0 2
If we now take an additional step and consider international
trade in a world of multiple languages, we see that a transnational
lingua franca-presumably a big country's language-will reduce
costs. The small country's traders in particular will benefit from the
lingua franca's emergence because it gives them across-the-board ac-
cess to multiple markets at the cost of learning only one additional
language. 10 3 The lingua franca is thus a public good. The distribu-
tion of the costs associated with the lingua franca, however, is une-
qual. Those whose first language is not the lingua franca, such as the
small country's traders, bear the cost of learning it to reap the gains of
the transactions that a common language facilitates. Residents of the
big country (or countries, as is the case with English today) for whom
100 See supra Part I.A.
101 See Albert Breton & Peter Mieszkowski, The Economics of Bilingualism, in TI- PoIr-
ICAL ECONOMY OF FIscAL FEDERALISM 261, 264 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1977).
102 See id. at 264-65.
103 See id. at 262 (noting that investing in a second language can be profitable if the
country can realize gain to offiet the investment). They save the costs of investing in acqui-
sition of multiple foreign languages.
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the lingua franca is their native tongue receive a free ride. Some have
referred to this premium that native lingua franca speakers enjoy rela-
tive to other language speakers as the "seigniorage of language."' 0 4
The main points revealed by this pattern of costs and benefits and
of seigniorage and peonage also apply to foreign language speakers
within a national economy. The general currency of the native lan-
guage, like the lingua franca of global trade, is a cost-reducing public
good because it lowers transaction costs for the population as a
whole. 105 Members of linguistic minorities, like the small country's
traders, must bear the cost of learning the native language if they wish
to access the benefits of full participation in the national economy.
2. Public Policy Implications of Language Economics
A justification for Official English from a social engineering per-
spective follows from the above-described economics. If general flu-
ency in the native language is a public good, then the pattern of usage
of English in the United States is a legitimate issue of state concern. A
large, geographically concentrated, Spanish-speaking minority
amounts to an internal trade barrier that increases transaction costs in
the wider economy.10 6 In the long run, the mandatory provision of
public services in English reduces both trade frictions and the result-
ing costs by encouraging Latinos/as (and members of other language
minorities) to learn English and by hastening the disappearance of
minority languages.10 7
This social welfare calculation needs unpacking. The calculation
begins with the economic assertion that linguistic sameness lowers
(and difference increases) costs. Supporters make two further asser-
tions. First, mandated sameness enhances our economic welfare. Sec-
ond, the polity as a whole therefore prefers mandated sameness. We
question and negate the first of these assertions in the subsection that
follows.' 08 We address the second assertion in this subsection, asking
two questions. First, we question the positive correlation the calcula-
tion draws between cost-reductive homogeneity and real-world polit-
ical preferences. Second, we question the safety of assuming that
sameness always lowers costs, suggesting that at some point one must
104 Id. at 266-67, 270.
105 See id. at 268.
106 Cf Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism
and National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223, 262-63 (1992) (noting that the linguistic divisions
among Canadian provinces have become so intense that after NAFTA, "trade with the
United States [might] become[ ] a more viable option than the economic integration of
the provinces").
107 The argument in the text is a markup of Donohue's time-based defense of Title VII
against Becker's free market story of the inevitable disappearance of discrimination. See
infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
108 See infra Part II.A.3.
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concede the possibility that diversity can have positive consequences
for social welfare.
a. Homogeneity and Preference Aggregation
The proposition that sameness lowers costs is not unique to the
economics of language acquisition. This assumption also provides a
basis for the following disturbing proposition, 0 9 which is fundamen-
tal to the economic theory of discrimination:"10 If sameness lowers
costs, then all other things being equal, segregation enhances social
welfare. Just as a common language lowers the cost of a discrete
trade, other common traits such as race, gender, ethnicity, and social
class lower costs and facilitate more complex, long-term cooperative
economic relationships. Accordingly, one can expect people of simi-
lar types and tastes to sort themselves among different producing or-
ganizations-the narrower the variance of preferences within the
firm, the cheaper the process of firm decision making."' This sorting
may even appear within complex, hierarchical organizations in which
the costs of group decision making do not loom large. Since such
organizations segment themselves into teams performing different
functions, we can expect to see segregation along lines of race, lan-
guage, and gender." 2 It follows that mandated integration under Ti-
tle VII is costly.
The same cost analysis that justifies government suppression of
Spanish also justifies the repeal of Title VII." 3 This Title VII analogy
109 The economics of this proposition stands apart from its questionable ethical pos-
ture. This calculation seizes on a point of ethnic and cultural difference, finds it to be
mutable and costly, and concludes that a state-sponsored program of eradication advances
social welfare. The majority trait automatically becomes the uniform standard in the cost-
reductive homogeneous regime.
110 See infra Part II.C.2.
111 See EpsTEn , supra note 38, at 61-67; Cooter, supra note 39, at 142.
112 See, e.g., Finis Welch, Labor-Market Discrimination: An Interpretation of Income Dfferences
in the Rural South, 75J. POL. ECON. 225, 230-31, 238 (1967) (arguing that forced integration
of a multiracial workforce generates external inefficiencies, which decrease productivity).
113 This is the famous argument of Richard Epstein. See EPsmIN, supra note 38, at 61-
70, 76-77.
The arguments for the suppression of Spanish and for the repeal of Title VII are
distinguishable on the ground that education can change language whereas race, gender,
and ethnic origin are immutable characteristics. But the distinction loses much of its co-
gency on closer inspection. Mutability, by itself, does not disqualify a trait from state-spon-
sored protection. Religion is mutable too, yet a cost-based state policy encouraging non-
Christians to convert arguably would not advance social welfare. At the same time, lan-
guage is only mutable to some extent. The economic literature of discrimination makes
reference to sociolinguistics to expand the definition of linguistic difference. It is not just
the words one speaks, but one's verbal and nonverbal communicative apparatus-posture,
gesture, eye contact, and inflection-that counts. See Kevin Lang, A Language Theoy of
Discrimination, 101 QJ. ECON. 363, 366-68 (1986). In America there is a majority "code,"
the native speakers of which are white, Anglo, middle-class males. Others-women, Afri-
can Americans, Latinos/as, and other immigrants-all have to learn and use this code to
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highlights several factors that complicate and weaken the welfare cal-
culation behind Spanish suppression. Repealing Tide VII to reduce
transaction costs would have substantial distributive consequences-
white men would win, and everyone else would lose. This redistribu-
tion of wealth and privilege would not reflect the preferences of soci-
ety as a whole, even if it were possible to prove that its cost reductive
effect would cause the gross national product to rise. This divergence
between the economic optimum and the politically preferred result
probably would persist even if the proponent of repealing Tide VII
shows that the benefit of a higher gross national product evenhand-
edly would trickle down among the losers, so the worst off would be,
in the aggregate, at least as economically well off as before. Since los-
ing still hurts, it remains plausible that the class of losers might prefer
to be less well off in a more equal society.
The numbers work differently, of course, with Spanish suppres-
sion. The losers in this context are Latinos/as and other non-English
speakers, for whom public services become less valuable. English
speakers are the winners. Yet one still plausibly can posit a preference
for sharing within the wider class of Tide VII beneficiaries. The ra-
tionality for sharing is akin to the labor organizer's appeal to long-run
benefits of solidarity in the face of a short-run urge to give in to the
employer. Prisoners' dilemma literature presents a formal economic
showing of this possibility.' 14 New evolutionary models illustrate the
rationality of such cooperation by positing, first, a class of prisoners'
dilemma players who over time have managed as a group to overcome
the temptation to defect and achieve optimal, collective ends, and sec-
ond, another class of players who interact with the members of the
cooperative group, but who always favor defection.115 With infinite
repeat plays, these models show that cooperation within the group is
possible despite the presence of the class of opponents who are ever
ready to divide and conquer. 116 In accordance with those models, in-
tragroup cooperation may be benefit maximizing on an individual ba-
sis across the various classes of Tide VII beneficiaries. 117
succeed. Given the subtleties involved, it is not at all clear that a reconstructed majority
identity is within the reach of most of these outsiders.
114 See, e.g., BRIAN SKvRms, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCLAL CONTRACr 58-59 (1996). Skyrms
offers a prisoners' dilemma analysis contrasting one cooperator in a universe of defectors
to an identifiable group of cooperators in a universe of defectors. The solo cooperator is
eliminated by the defectors. The group of cooperators playing with one another will be
evolutionarily fit, however. Defectors will not be eliminated completely but will prey on
the edge of the group of cooperators.
115 See id. at 59.
116 See id. (noting that although defectors "will persist as predictors on the periphery,"
cooperators will survive).
117 Cf. id. (discussing the possible benefits of intragroup cooperation to increase "aver-
age fitness" over defectors).
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b. Homogeneity and Diversity as Tradeoffs
A second infirmity in the welfare calculation lies in its assumption
that homogeneity is absolutely cost-beneficial. This supposition ne-
glects the complex, real-world interrelation between sameness and dif-
ference. Within producing organizations, for example, diversity of
traits and tastes makes available different perspectives and talents that
increase the likelihood of solving complex problems. Any accompany-
ing increases in communication costs accordingly may find justifica-
tion in the improved quality of results." 8 More broadly, most people
have a taste for difference, albeit to widely varying degrees. Two pref-
erences operate-one for cost-reducing homogeneity and the other
for costly but stimulating difference" 9-with the inevitable tradeoffs
between cost and variety depending on subjective tastes and differing
from individual to individual.
A second-best world presents no basis for predicting that the
tradeoffs emerging in an environment of free individual interaction
will be optimal. Barriers including information asymmetries, free-
rider problems, and strategic concealment will prevent optimal out-
comes. 120 A number of possibilities result. One is that the assimila-
tion story, despite its currency, describes a suboptimally homogenous
social result. In a dynamic environment, the societal whole could
emerge better off if Latinos/as were left to make their own decisions
about learning English and acquiring Anglo cultural traits. If slow as-
similation resulted from their decisions, Anglos would gain the spil-
lover benefit of closer proximity to Latin American culture. Cultural
acquaintance in turn would generate valuable opportunities for An-
glos in the markets of increasingly robust Latin American economies.
In this scenario, Official English perversely channels Anglos toward
costly insularity whereas investment in cross-cultural learning opportu-
nities provides the more promising means to an optimal assimilation
equilibrium.
c. Nonconvergent Preferences
A more complex outcome emerges if we take this line of reason-
ing in a different direction and consider the possibility that an eco-
nomic optimum with a multicultural inclination may not be the
politically preferred result. Assume the present equilibrium is eco-
118 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 142.
119 Education about the incidents of other cultures and languages lowers costs of cross-
cultural communication and thus enhances an individual's ability to enjoy the different
traits of others. For a formal model suggesting this conclusion, see William Breit &John B.
Horowitz, Discrimination and Diversity: Market and Non-Market Settings, 84 PUB. CHOICE 63, 65-
70 (1995).
120 See it at 68.
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nomically suboptimal due to homogeneity. Under these circum-
stances, government intervention to move society toward a more
optimal level of interaction can find justification in theory. In prac-
tice, however, a policymaker considering this intervention would en-
counter the enormous problems of ascertaining the location and
cause of the suboptimal equilibrium and of articulating a strategy for
shifting it to a point of greater preference satisfaction.
Suppose the policymaker undertakes a state-of-the-art study, con-
cluding that Americans have a deficient level of multicultural knowl-
edge. In response, the policymaker proposes an extensive and
mandatory program of multicultural education for grades one
through twelve.1 21 This program, by hypothesis, would make most
members of the majority economically better off in the long run. Nev-
ertheless, it is likely that the program would be politically infeasible in
many American communities due to a perception (if not a reality) of
excessive governmental invasion of the individual's zone of choice
with respect to matters of acculturation. 122
Suppose we modify the program by employing a carrot-and-stick
approach. This approach could, for example, make eligible for fed-
eral college loans only those students who have received the approved
multicultural education. We suspect that critics would denounce as
coercive even this modified program. Without enforceable govern-
ment action to the contrary, cultural preferences could continue to
diverge from the economic optimum. 23
The carrot-and-stick approach to multicultural education is diffi-
cult to distinguish from Official English if one narrowly views it as a
121 A full exploration of multicultural programs in the schools is beyond the scope of
this Article. We note that particularly in NewYork City these programs have gained accept-
ance as crucial for what it means to treat students from different cultural backgrounds as
equal. One current aspect of the debate around these programs in NewYork concerns the
point in time at which schools should teach Spanish to all students. This debate recognizes
that Anglo children can be economically disadvantaged in cities with a substantial Latino/a
minority if they are not fluent in Spanish. See generally NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MUI-
TICuLTURAuSTS Now (1997) (discussing the changing face of America and how it will influ-
ence our future).
122 Cf. Lisa D. Delpit, The Silenced Dialogue: Power and Pedagogy in Educating Other People's
Children, in BEYOND SILENCED VOICES: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN UNITED STATES SCHOOLS
119, 122-23 (Lois Weiss & Michelle Fine eds., 1993) (asserting that issues of power are
enacted in classrooms and that school cultures accordingly are based on the cultures of the
middle and upper classes).
123 Breit and Horowitz suggest that this sort of mandatory education could have the
projected effect of shifting cultural preferences to their economic optimum in the small-
numbers situation of a university curriculum. See Breit & Horowitz, supra note 119, at 68-
70. They qualify the suggestion, however, by noting that "there is no certainty that a con-
sensus will arise over the optimal amount of 'familiarity' [with other cultures] to impose"
and no way to assure that a given policy assures the intended results. Id. at 69-70.
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legal manipulation of a zone of choice for cultural freedom.' 24 Like
the education program, Official English manipulates tradeoffs be-
tween cost incurrence and cultural attachment. By withholding pub-
lic services from Latinos/as, Official English induces a higher level of
English-language cost incurrence than otherwise would occur, making
it cheaper for Anglos to deal with Latinos/as. Of course, Official Eng-
lish also could yield economic benefits to affected Latinos/as. But be-
cause Latinos/as would not have pursued these benefits voluntarily,
they would be indistinguishable from those yielded through man-
dated multiculturalism.
d. Summary
Thus far, our analysis does not preclude the possibility that Offi-
cial English could be Kaldor-Hicks efficient.125 This possibility follows
from the numbers: the majority gets the benefit of lower costs at the
minority's expense. But the questioning process we have undertaken
does highlight some significant counterfactual possibilities. Rational
solidarity across society's many minority groups could lead an overall
majority to prefer forbearance of the economic benefit of state-im-
posed monolingualism. In the alternative, monolingualism entails op-
portunity costs that could alter the Kaldor-Hicks bottom line.
3. Economic Incentives To Learn English
Let us assume that Anglo resistance to Spanish language and cul-
ture is embedded and that the opportunity costs of monolingualism
124 This Article's analysis does signal a point of material distinction, however. One can
state the point both in the economic terms of this Part II and in terms of the ideal of the
free person we describe in Part III.
Economically, the difference lies in asymmetric incentives. When Latinos/as have a
powerful economic incentive to acculturate themselves as Americans, Anglos do not per-
ceive immediate gains from multicultural education, even if these gains accrue as a long-
run proposition. One can defend from a welfare perspective mandatory multicultural edu-
cation, but cannot defend Official English.
From the point of view of the ideal of the free person, the difference between a mul-
ticultural educational program, fairly designed and applied, and an English Only regime is
that the first is inviting while the second is degrading. Part III indicates that groups and
individuals only are reasonable to the degree they recognize that they cannot bind others
to norms to which they themselves would not agree to be bound. See infra notes 291-94 and
accompanying text. This recognition implies a basis for defending multicultural education
as a means to the end of equal dignity, even when mandated. Although society must allow
to all groups cultural expression, there is always a danger that the majority culture simply
can assert its superiority, thus violating the conditions of reasonable cooperation. Mul-
ticultural education protects against this danger.
125 That is, it results in most people being better off even as it leaves some people
worse off, with the aggregate gain outweighing the aggregate loss. See, e.g., Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, Smoking in the Washroom of the Chicago School: A Reply to Cresp4 22 LAW & Soc.
INQ. 171, 177-78 (1997) ("A policy is said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if those who are
made better off by the policy would pay more for adoption of the policy than those who are
hurt by the policy would pay to avoid adoption of the policy.").
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appear to be low so Official English seems to be welfare improving on
a Kaldor-Hicks analysis. The economic analysis is still not complete.
It remains to be seen whether the likely level of Latino/a acquisition
of English is appreciably lower in a world of free choice than it would
be in a world in which the government wields a stick. If Latinos/as
are not less likely to acquire English skills by free choice, then Official
English with its intrinsic capacity for perverse effects may not be worth
the trouble.
The analysis that ascribes desirable cost attributes to a lingua
franca implies that members of linguistic minorities have a high-pow-
ered incentive, which derives from the employment market, to learn
the majority language.1 26 Since entry of members of the linguistic mi-
nority into a given firm or workplace means additional communica-
tion costs, all other things being equal, a majority-group employer
either will avoid hiring members of the linguistic minority or, if it
chooses to integrate, will pay minority employees less to compensate
for the resulting increase in costs (and decrease in profits) not in-
curred by competing segregated firns. 127 The monolingual members
of the minority group will "bear the cost of intergroup communica-
tion."128 Employment discrimination will persist while the communi-
cation costs of integration persist.' 29 Members of the language
minority may solve the problem of employment discrimination by in-
curring the cost of learning the majority language. In effect, for any
given skill level the minority must make a greater human capital in-
vestment than the majority.1l 0
Despite their greater investment, members of the language mi-
nority may encounter obstacles on the road to wage parity. Assume,
for example, that newly bilingual members of the minority seek the
same wage as members of the majority but that monolingual members
of the language minority offer the same labor for a lower wage. The
bilingual and majority language speakers now could find themselves
competing with minority monolinguals. Although the costs of com-
munication dictate that a rational employer will prefer a monolingual
workplace, they do not necessarily determine the language chosen.
An employer could invest in learning the minority language or in pay-
ing a higher wage to a bilingual supervisor or supervisors, enabling
itself to employ a workforce monolingual in the minority language at
126 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
127 This model assumes the absence of regulation successfully mandating equal pay for
equal work.
128 Lang, supra note 113, at 373; see also Welch, supra note 112, at 231 (arguing that the
minority bears the cost of integration in the workplace).
129 See Breit & Horowitz, supra note 119, at 71-72 (noting that as the transaction costs
of interaction, such as communication problems, decrease, interaction will increase).
130 See Lang, supra note 113, at 376.
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the lower wage. The higher the number of workers per bilingual su-
pervisor, the more viable this option becomes for the employer.' 3 '
Despite this caveat, incentives to learn the majority language
should remain powerful.' 3 2 The prevailing cost bias in favor of segre-
gated, monolingual workplaces assures the strength of those incen-
tives. The minority can retain its language and its economic
independence only by restricting itself to segregated workplaces and
to teams that are monolingual in the minority language. Segmenta-
tion into certain occupations may result, along with overcrowding in
each.133 Stratification also will occur because highly verbal manage-
rial and professional opportunities will be unavailable to members of
the language minority. 34 Latinos/as understand this reality very
well. 135 In the words of the Dominican singerJuan Luis Guerra: "pues
no hablamos ingl6s/ni a la Mitsubishi/... ni a la Chevrolet."1 36
B. Official English, Sorting, and Rent Seeking
1. Latino and Latina Sorting
The economic factors that create a powerful incentive for Eng-
lish-language acquisition also explain immigrants' tendency to settle
in enclave communities. A simple jurisdictional sorting model illus-
trates this point.137 Assume an English-speaking federation with ten
states of equal size, each with an international port of entry. At t=0 a
Laino/a minority has immigrated into the federation, has settled
evenly across the ten states, and now constitutes ten percent of the
federation's population.138 Assume further that (1) movement within
the federation is costless, (2) it has unlimited job opportunities, (3) all
the Latinos/as have become citizens, and (4) most Latinos/as are bi-
131 The company will have to compensate the bilingual supervisor for her special skill,
of course. See generally Booth, supra note 84 (reporting that bilingual and monolingual
supervisors have demanded higher pay to speak Spanish). Because the cost advantage is
greatest with a low supervisor-to-worker ratio, one would expect this pattern, and any re-
sulting negative impact for English-acquisition incentives, to show up with respect to jobs at
lower skill levels. See Lang, supra note 113, at 373-74.
132 Studies show that there is little labor-market substitution between new arrivals and
earlier immigrant generations. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
133 See Breton & Mieszkowski, supra note 101, at 270; Lang, supra note 113, at 73-74.
134 See Breton & Mieszkowski, supra note 101, at 270.
135 As the above evidence on English-language education indicates. See supra notes 54-
57 and accompanying text.
136 JuAN Luis GuERRA, El Costo de la Vida [The Cost of Living], on ARErro (Polygram
Latino 1992) (translating as "Since we don't speak English, got no Mitsubishi, got no
Chevrolet").
137 For a review of the sorting literature, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. Mc-
Cahery, The New Economics ofJurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-
Best World, 86 GEo. L.J. 201, 239-43 (1997).
138 Assume further that no state has a special geographic connection to the home




lingual but prefer to speak Spanish because doing so facilitates
cheaper communication. Given these assumptions, the model
predicts that between t=O and t=1 the Latinos/as will resettle, concen-
trating their population in a smaller number of states.
Geographical concentration of the Latino/a population gener-
ates additional opportunities for transacting business in Spanish, cre-
ating both employment and trade opportunities for which a relative
disability with English presents no barrier. As the Latino/a popula-
tion concentrates, some Anglos may respond by moving out of the
target states. 139 Ethnic and cultural bias provides one reason for such
a reaction-Anglos apparently prefer to live in areas populated exclu-
sively by other Anglos. 140 Economics provides another reason for this
behavior. As an Anglo's immediate neighborhood populates with
Spanish speakers, the seigniorial value of English declines, even
though national economic integration and dominant Anglo numbers
assure that it never completely disappears in any political subdivision.
This simple sorting model predicts, all other things being equal,
that Latino/a concentration eventually will create a voting majority in
one state. 141 This model depends on heroic assumptions and accord-
ingly is only suggestive. It nonetheless suffices to explain why Lati-
nos/as have not settled evenly across the United States and, so long as
there continue to be substantial numbers of first-generation immi-
grants, why they cannot be expected to disperse from enclave commu-
nities. For first-generation Latinos/as, speaking limited English,
opportunities in enclaves will be superior to those in Anglo communi-
ties.142 The model therefore requires us to qualify our description of
a high-powered incentive to learn English. But the qualification is mi-
nor: an integrated national economy and an overwhelming Anglo ma-
jority ensure that English-language and bilingual employment
opportunities will outnumber Spanish-language opportunities, even
for those who live in enclaves.
Latino/a sorting results from both economic incentives and cul-
tural preferences. Since sorting coexists with an independent incen-
tive to learn English, it implies a long-term barrier to assimilation only
to the extent that the Anglo community takes actions that retard the
139 Cf David P. Kasakove, Note, New York State Association of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer:
When the Second Circuit Chooses Between Free Speech and Fair Housing, Who Wins?, 61 BROoKL L.
Rv. 397, 422 (1995) (discussing "tipping," which "is the sociological term used to refer to
the critical point at which whites... leave a community, because of black entry into the
neighborhood").
140 The population-sorting literature provides ample empirical support for this point.
See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 137, at 242 & n.169.
141 Concentration in two of the ten states and a slight increase in the population of
Latinos/as could mean a voting majority in two states.
142 Cf Lang, supra note 113, at 370 (noting that minority-language speakers likely will
experience "occupational segregation").
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ordinary course of population dispersion in pursuit of economic op-
portunity. The model suggests that English Only legislation conceiva-
bly could serve just such a purpose.
2. English Only as an Entry Barrier
Return to t=O in the original ten-state model. A state wishing to
discourage Latino/a in-migration due to sorting can make itself mar-
ginally less desirable by enacting a restrictive Official English statute.
If public services in Spanish remain available in the other states, 14 3
then the Official English state has erected an effective barrier against
Latino/a in-migration. Indeed, assuming costless movement, the state
can expect out-migration of its present Latino/a population. Of
course, because the other states are free to copy the legislation, the
long-term efficacy of this strategy remains questionable. A "race to
the bottom" could result, with all states adopting Official English stat-
utes.144 Ironically, in that event, the Latinos/as have a heightened
incentive to concentrate in enclave settlements. Once all states adopt
Official English, each potential target state offers the same set of costs
and benefits to Latino/a citizens. Only a sorting process can differen-
tiate the states again: a solid Latino/a majority in one state supplies
the means to remove even a constitutional Official English mandate.
3. English Only and Domestic Interest Groups
We can further modify this public choice analysis of Official Eng-
lish to explain domestic politics in a state with a Latino/a minority
and a restrictive Official English statute. Hypothesize a single state
and assume the following: (1) a ten percent Latino/a minority, many
but not all of whom are bilingual, (2) an even distribution across the
state of Latinos/as, (3) no bilingual Anglos, (4) residents who all are
citizens and taxpayers, (5) no possibility of in-migration of Latinos/as
from other states, (6) a monolingual provision of public goods and
services, and (7) a government operating in pursuit of the public in-
terest, meaning it distributes the return of the highest possible supply
of public goods as equally as possible to all taxpaying citizens.
Keeping the aforementioned assumptions in mind, consider the
following scenario. The government concludes that the provision of
monolingual services is inconsistent with its notion of the public inter-
est and decides to provide bilingual public goods and services to the
143 This conclusion rests on the assumption that complete information is available to
all sides.
144 This race to the bottom is analogous to the result that follows from applying juris-
dictional competition theory to welfare provisions for the poor. In the standard model,
wealth redistribution must proceed at the centralized, federal level because the states have
an incentive to encourage poor people to move out by lowering the level of the welfare
provision. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 137, at 217-31.
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extent feasible. An anti-Latino/a political entrepreneur responds by
putting a restrictive Official English provision on the ballot. The An-
glos have a cost incentive to vote in favor of the initiative. To the
extent that bilingual government imposes additional costs on all tax-
payers solely for the purpose of providing Latinos/as an effective pro
rata return for taxes paid, self-interested Anglos have no reason to
support bilingual government.
Even if the marginal increase in cost that bilingual government
causes is quite low, a discrete class of Anglos will have a high-powered
incentive to work to insure the measure's success. This class will con-
sist of present and prospective Anglo public employees. If the state
provides bilingual public services, then bilingual Latinos/as will have
a qualification advantage with respect to job openings. The degree of
that advantage will depend on the scope of the decision to provide
bilingual services, the distribution of the Latino/a population, and
the presence or absence of economies of scale in the providing of
services. If the population of Latinos/as is evenly distributed and the
government provides all public services through small offices spread
thickly across the state, bilingual Latinos/as could have a qualification
advantage for virtually every public position. I the distribution of La-
tinos/as is uneven and economies of scale have encouraged the devel-
opment of a small number of large government offices spread
unevenly across the state, then bilingual ability will not be a universal
qualification. Even so, the decision to provide bilingual services still
could disrupt extremely the expectations of entrenched Anglo civil
servants.
4. English Only and Local Politics
The two models presented thus far-the multijurisdictional-mi-
gration model 45 and the public-service provision model146-can com-
bine to thicken this rational expectations description of state politics.
For example, consider a state with multiple internal tiers of elected
government-counties, cities, and towns. Assume further that the
state has a substantial Latino/a minority that remains well short of a
state-level voting majority, but through the ordinary process of settle-
ment and sorting has gained voting majorities in several political sub-
divisions within the state. To the extent that officials in those political
subdivisions have discretion regarding the public-service provision,
Anglo public employees in those districts will have an incentive to
work for Official English at the state level. There, Anglos still consti-
tute a majority, even as the Latinos/as elect their own to the local city
hall, sheriff's office, and school board. A state-level statute, if restric-
145 See supra Part II.B.1.
146 See supra Part II.B.2-3.
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tively drafted, can hard-wire English language seigniorage at the local
level.147
5. Summary: The Multijurisdictional and Single-State Models
Official English emerges from this public choice analysis as the
functional equivalent of Jim Grow legislation.' 48 In the multijurisdic-
tional-migration model, Official English operates as a tariff that dis-
courages in-migration of a minority that the majority deems
undesirable. To the extent that Latino/a in-migration implies (or is
perceived to imply) increased labor-market competition for certain
Anglos, 149 we find a textbook example of a privileged group using law
to perpetuate its economic dominance and to retard the operation of
market forces that impair its position. In the single-state model, Offi-
cial English affects Latino/a subordination more directly, if only with
respect to access to public jobs and services. In this scenario, the ma-
jority again uses its legislative power in the Jim Crow tradition to con-
tain a minority's economic aspirations.
147 The back-and-forth experience of Dade County, Florida with Official English re-
flects this scenario. See supra note 68. But it is important to note that elected officials are
only beginning to feel Latino/a voting power, even within the enclave states. See, e.g., Todd
S. Purdum, California G.O.P. Faces a Crisis as Hispanic Voters Turn Away, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 9,
1997, at Al (noting that politicians are beginning to recognize the importance of appeal-
ing to growing numbers of Latino/a voters). The following chart catalogs the number of
Latino/a elected officials at the state and local levels in 1985 and 1994:
Public Official 1985 1994
State executives and legislators 119 199
County and municipal officials 1,316 2,197
Judicial and law enforcement 517 651
Education and school boards 1,185 2,412
Total 3,147 5,459
SOURCE: HisPANc AMERICANS: A STATISTICAL SOURCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 97.
Some have attributed past electoral filures for Latinos/as to low levels of voter regis-
tration and turnout. See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock, III & Susan A. MacManus, Structural Fea-
tures of Municipalities and the Incidence of Hispanic Councilmembers, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 665, 678
(1990) (showing that given adequate voter participation, Latino/a representation on city
councils grows as the percentage of Latinos/as in the population grows under a variety of
structural arrangements). In 1992, the national Latino/a registration level was 35.0%,
compared with 70.1% for whites; turnout was 28.9%, compared with 63.6% for whites. See
HIspANc AMERIcANs: A STATISTICAL SouRc-Boo, supra note 50, at 98. Gerrymandering
also has occurred, most famously in Los Angeles. Compare Chavez, supra note 61, at 47
(noting that a court order created a voting district to give Latinos/as a seat on the LA.
County Board of Supervisors), with Hispanics: More People than Power, supra note 49, at 32
(discussing ajustice Department suit alleging that voting districts were deliberately drawn
in LA. County to exclude Latinos/as and other minorities from power).
148 See SolM, supra note 21, at 828-29.
149 This proposition is controversial when advanced in the context of Latino/a immi-
grants. See generally D.FRErrAs, supra note 6, at 209-51 (concluding that some jobs are lost,
but not nearly as many as advocates of closed borders allege).
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Admittedly, these public choice scenarios cannot afford an exclu-
sive account of Official English. Nativist ideology has independent
and powerful causal force, particularly in a time when norms have
arisen to foreclose direct expression of racist impulses in public dis-
course.150 The scenarios show how neatly these impulses dovetail with
rent incentives.
C. Employment Discrimination and Latino and Latina Incentives
The assimilation story cannot plausibly be applied as a norm ab-
sent a concomitant and credible promise of equal economic opportu-
nity. It is, after all, economic opportunity that gives immigrants
incentives to disperse from enclaves and to complete the process of
Americanization. Without equal economic opportunity, it is not clear
why we should expect dispersion and full assimilation.
But why should discrimination block application of the assimila-
tion norm to today's Latinos/as when early twentieth-century eastern
and southern European arrivals also suffered and overcame signifi-
cant national origin and religious discrimination? We suggest two an-
swers. First, two wrongs do not make a right. It is one thing to intone
that immigrants should "pay their dues" when the dues are the costs
of learning English to achieve equal economic opportunity. It is quite
another to require them to undergo a vicious hazing process of indefi-
nite duration. Gloria Anzaldfia describes a youth's experience of An-
glo linguistic terrorism:
I remember being caught speaking Spanish at recess-that was
good for three licks on the knuckles with a sharp ruler. I remember
being sent to the corner of the classroom for "talking back" to the
Anglo teacher when all I was trying to do was tell her how to pro-
nounce my name. "If you want to be American, speak 'American.'
If you don't like it, go back to Mexico, where you belong."151
Anzaldfia's experience is not unique.1 52
Second, it is not at all clear that the concept of "national origin"
discrimination, closely tied to those early twentieth-century immi-
grants, adequately describes the discrimination barrier confronting
Latinos/as. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, and Cen-
tral and South Americans descend from Native Americans and Afri-
cans as well as from Europeans. In their responses to the 1980 census,
150 See Tatalovich, supra note 67, at 81-82 (making this point with admirable rigor).
151 GLORIA ANZALDOA, BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA 53 (1987).
152 Rosa Rosales, a spokesperson for the League of United Mexican Citizens, recalls
going to school under a regime that "threatened to have our mouths washed out with soap
and our knuckles hit with rulers when we spoke Spanish in the hallways." Stefanie Soott &
Nicole Foy, Judge's English Decision Rapped, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Aug. 30, 1995, avail-
able in 1995 WL 9500154.
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forty percent of Latinos/as classified themselves as neither black nor
white but as "other."'53 These responses suggest that for many Lati-
nos/as, their "visibility" stems less from their lack of acculturation
than from their skin color.154
Discrimination-whether ethnic, racial, or a combination-pre-
vents assimilation.15 5 To the extent that Latinos/as face discrimina-
tion, the appropriate analogy for the Latino/a enclave is not the turn-
of-the-century immigrant community, but the African American com-
munity of the contemporary inner city.' 56 Of course, an acknowledg-
ment that Latinos/as are targets of discrimination requires further
examination of our description of a high-powered Latino/a incentive
to acculturate as Americans. Discrimination reduces returns on
human-capital investments, and reduced projected returns lower the
present value of a proposed investment. A persistent residual income
differential due to discrimination means that a rational Latino/a
makes a smaller human-capital investment than a similarly situated
white Anglo. Accordingly, Latinos/as have a reduced incentive to ac-
culturate. In addition, the Latino/a perception that heightened dis-
crimination barriers exist outside of enclave communities lessens the
incentive to disperse in search of economic opportunity.157 If maxi-
mal assimilation is the objective, Official English is the wrong tool. A
vigorously enforced antidiscrimination law will be more successful.
1. Evidence of Economic Discrimination
Statistical evidence strongly suggests that markets convert per-
sonal skills into economic outcomes differently for Latinos/as than
for white Anglos. The studies we describe below detail adverse eco-
153 Forty-four percent answered white, and 3.9% said black. See Clara E. Rodriguez,
The Effect of Race on Puerto Rican Wages, in HisPANics IN THE LABOR FORCE '77, 77 (Edwin
Melendez et al. eds., 1991).
154 Nativist regulation, viewed from this perspective, stems less from a need to see ac-
tual assimilation and integration than from a racist need to ascribe fault.
155 For a discussion of racism as a motivating force in contemporary debates about
immigration policy, see Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New,
Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS Outr!, supra note 11, at 165, 173-81.
156 See Clark, supra note 41, at 598-99 (showing considerable evidence of economic
segmentation among immigrants in different California counties and suggesting that local-
ization of some Latino/a groups may be contributing to the creation of an immigrant
underclass similar to the existing localized African American pattern).
The Laino/a enclave, like the African American enclave, emerges as a place of safety
from the world outside: "All brown all around, we are safe. But watch us drive into a neigh-
borhood of another color and our knees go shakity-shake and our car windows get rolled
up tight and our eyes look straight. Yeah. That is how it goes and goes." CIsrNERos, supra
note 60, at 29.
157 See Hing, supra note 15, at 891.
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nomic treatment of Latinos/as through the use of varied data sets and
different methods of investigation.1
58
Latinos/as consistently earn less than whites, and little progress
in closing the historic income differential has occurred during the last
thirty years. 159 The average family income of Latinos/as was 69.2% of
whites' in 1973, and it fell to 62.9% in 1987. By 1993, however, it
climbed to 70.0%,160 which was roughly the same as the 1973 level.
Language barriers and other educational and skill differentials par-
tially explain these figures. The studies yield various quantifications
of the impact of these differences. Scholars have found that language
abilities account for income differentials ranging from as little as four
percent to as much as thirty-three percent.161 Differences in the par-
ticular samples that the studies compare and in the methodologies
that the studies apply explain the variations.
But language barriers, skill differentials, and other productivity
factors do not completely explain the differential. Studies that adjust
158 The text paraphrases Glenn Loury's description of the literature respecting African
Americans. See Loury, supra note 97, at 118; see also William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L.
Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON.
PERSp. 63, 63 (1998) (surveying the literature as a whole and concluding that "[the evi-
dence is ubiquitous" that discriminatory treatment in the labor market contributes greatly
to the racial and gender disparity in the American economy).
159 See DEFREITAs, supra note 6, at 56-57 & tbl.3.1.
160 See HIsPANIc AMERicANs: A STATISTICAL SOURCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 147. The








SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME,
POVERTY, AND VALUATION OF NONCASH BENEFITS-1993 at 5 tbl.2, reprinted in
HISPANIC AMERICANS: A STATISTICAL SOURCEBOOF, supra note 50, at 147.
161 See Gilles Grenier, The Effects of Language Characteristics on the Wages of Hispanic-Amer-
ican Males, 19J. HUM. RESOURCES 35, 50 (1984) (concluding that "language attributes," like
speaking Spanish during childhood, may account for up to one-third of income differen-
tials between Latino and non-Latino males); Cordelia W. Reimers, Labor Market Discrimina-
tion Against Hispanic and Black Men, 65 REv. ECON. & STAT. 570, 576-77 (1983) (finding that
poor English accounts for 18% lower earnings for Puerto Ricans and four percent to 14%
for other main Latino/a groups); Cordelia Reimers, The Wage Structure of Hispanic Men:
Implications for Policy, 65 Soc. Sci. Q. 401, 407-11 (1984) [hereinafter Reimers, Wage Struc-
ture] (estimating wage functions for Latinos); see also SCHOENI ST AL., supra note 3, at 28-29
(finding that differences in completed education could explain one-half of the 1990 wage
gap of Mexican immigrants in California and one-third of the wage gap of Central Ameri-
can immigrants in California).
One can infer that continued arrival of large numbers of non-English-speaking La-
tino/a immigrants retards the rate of closure of the Latino/a-white Anglo income differen-
tial, obscuring economic gains made by existing residents.
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for differentials in human capital find a residual gap. DeFreitas's
study, for example, compares the incomes of white, Puerto Rican, and
Mexican males. 162 All of the men he sampled had been born in the
United States, were fluent in English, and had lived in the same met-
ropolitan area for at least five years. 163 The study found that Puerto
Ricans' income was 62.6% of whites', and Mexicans' income was
74.7% of whites'. 6 4 It also found that for college graduates, Puerto
Ricans earned 70.0% of what whites earned, while for Mexicans, the
percentage was 74.5%.165 When the study controlled for age as well as
education, Mexicans fared better, earning 95.1% as much, while Pu-
erto Ricans earned 92.6% as much.166 Other studies have concluded
that the residual differential, an indirect measure of the impact of
discrimination on wages, for Puerto Ricans is 18.0%.167 The literature
offers a range from nine to fifteen percent for the residual differential
in income between Mexicans and whites.168
Comparative figures on "returns to schooling"-percent figures
representing the change in earnings associated with each additional
year of schooling-that Schoeni, McCarthy, and Vernez generated
point in a similar direction. 169 In 1970, the figure for United States
natives was 7.9%, and by 1990 it had increased to 10.3%.170 The com-
162 See DEFRErrAs, supra note 6, at 71-73.
163 See id. at 71.
164 See id. at 72 tbl.3.7.
165 See id
166 See id. (showing the results for persons with over 16 years of education who were
ages 30-34).
167 See Reimers, Wage Structure, supra note 161, at 407, 413 (noting also a 12% differen-
tial for other Latinos/as and a six percent differential for Mexicans).
168 Studies show human-capital, adjusted earnings differentials between white and
Mexican American males as follows: Jeremiah Cotton, More on the "Cost" of Being a Black or
Mexican American Male Worker, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 867, 883 (1985) (reporting a treatment dif-
ferential of 14.6%, using 1980 data); James D. Gwartney & James E. Long, The Relative
Earnings of Blacks and OtherMinorities, 31 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 336, 342-44 & tbl.4 (1978)
(reporting a residual differential of nine percent, using 1970 data); Dudley L. Poston,Jr. et
al., Earnings Differences Between Anglo and Mexican American Male Workers in 1960 and 1970:
Changes in the "Cost" of Being Mexican American, 57 Soc. Sci. Q. 618, 625 (1976) (reporting
13.46% to 16.57% depending on age, using 1970 data); Patricia A. Taylor & Susan Walker
Shields, Mexican Americans and Employment Inequality the Federal Civil Service 65 Soc. Sci. Q.
381, 384, 386 (1984) (finding a statistically significant difference in Mexican American and
Anglo salaries in the civil service, with only two-thirds of the variance being explained by
employment characteristics); Naomi Turner Verdugo & Richard R. Verdugo, Earnings Dif-
ferentials Among Mexican American, Black, and White Male Workers, 65 Soc. Sci. Q. 417, 424-25
(1984) (noting that discrimination accounts for 19% of the gap, using 1981 data). But see
StephenJ. Trejo, Why Do Mexican Americans Earn Low Wages, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1235, 1245
(1997) (showing that Mexican Americans earn low wages due to human-capital deficien-
cies and not due to smaller labor-market rewards).
169 See SCHOENI ET AL., supra note 3, at 55-56 & tbl.4.6.
170 See id. at 56 tbl.4.6.
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parable 1970 figure for Mexican Americans educated in the United
States was 6.4%, but by 1990 it had decreased to 5.3%.171
These figures, which are the product of regression analyses of
census or personnel data, 172 fall short of affirmative proof of employ-
ment discrimination because they do not foreclose the possibility that
other factors, such as secular changes in the relevant job base 173 or
information problems concerning immigration status, 174 also contrib-
ute to the residual income gap. 175 Therefore, at best they represent
an "upper bound" measure of discrimination's effects. 176 A different
and less well-developed line of empirical research, however, ap-
proaches the problem from a different angle to produce affirmative
showings of discriminatory behavior. Audit studies of matched white
and Latino/ajob seekers reveal statistically significant differentials in
job search results for whites and Latinos/as. 77
171 See id. Meanwhile, the 1990 figure for immigrants born in Canada and the United
Kingdom, as well as educated in the United States, was 8.3% and for immigrants born in
Japan, Korea, and China, as well as educated in the United States, was 13.1%. See id. at 56-
57 & tbl.4.6.
172 See id. app. at 69-74 (describing the data and regression analyses for the data we
reference).
173 See DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 89.
174 See SCHOENI ET AL.., supra note 3, at 58 ("[T]he wage penalty for being undocu-
mented may be as high as 7-10 percent."). Schoeni, McCarthy, and Vernez also mention a
special statistical discrimination factor-the difficulty of distinguishing legal from illegal
immigrants. See id. To the extent that illegals present legal risks to the employer, one can
expect difficulty in effecting informational separation to depress wages for all Mexicans.
See id. at 57-58. Alberto Divila, Alok K. Bohara, and Rogelio Saenz make the same point.
See Alberto Divila et al., Accent Penalties and the Earnings of Mexican Americans, 74 Soc. ScI.
Q. 902, 903-05 (1993). Their study finds that independent of English-speaking proficiency,
heavily-accented Mexican Americans earn significantly lower wages than nonaccented
Mexican Americans. See id. at 905. In addition, they find that accented Mexican Ameri-
cans pay more for their accents than do accented Germans and Italians. See id. at 914.
175 For further discussion, see James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 101, 103-07 (1998) (warning against reading discrimination into the disparity in
hiring of whites over blacks when interpreting the residual wage gap).
176 For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies employed,
see Darity & Mason, supra note 158, at 67-68.
177 See, e.g., Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Con-
trolled Experiments, in ARmcAN AMERiCANs AND Posr-INDUSnuAr LABOR MARxTs 77, 88-89 &
tbl.3 (James B. Stewart ed., 1997) (finding a rate of discrimination in excess of 20% in
Latino/a-Anglo pairings, with Latinos being nearly three times more likely to experience
discrimination than Latinas); Michael Fix et al., An Ovenew ofAuditingforDiscrimination, in
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEAsuREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 1, 22
tbl.1.3 (Michael Fix & RaymondJ. Struyk eds., 1993) (finding that Latinos are three times
as likely as non-Latino whites to experience employment discrimination); see also
Genevieve M. Kenney & Douglas A. Wissoker, An Analysis of the Correlates of Discrimination
Facing Young Hispanic Job-Seekers, 84 Am. EcoN. REV. 674, 676-77 (1994) (finding that the
differential in response narrows as the Latinos go from the inquiry and preinterview stage
to the postinterviewjob-offer stage). The Latinos who get through the screening process
do better at the latter stage, although there still is a statistically significant differential in
job offers. See id. An inference of crude statistical discrimination arises-employers are
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An additional body of studies also warrants mention. This body
of work investigates whether skin color contributes to the wider pat-
tern of discrimination. One study,178 whose findings some have con-
troverted, 79 looks for differences in earnings among groups of
Mexican Americans divided according to their skin color-light, me-
dium, and dark. The study adjusts for human-capital differentials
and concludes that the darkest, most Native American-looking group
members earn substantially less than their lighter-skinned counter-
parts. 8 0 Another study compared the earnings of New York City Pu-
erto Ricans who identify themselves as "other" in census reports with
those who identify themselves as "white."' 8 With everything else con-
stant, males who identified themselves as nonwhite earned eight per-
cent less than those who identified themselves as white.'8 2 Anzaldfia
echoed the studies and the controversies they engender: "I am visi-
ble-see this Indian face-yet I am invisible. I both blind them with
more accepting once they see that the Latino applicant does not have expected undesir-
able qualities.
Some have criticized audit study methodology. See Heckman, supra note 175, at 107-11
(emphasizing that unobserved variables can cause hiring differentials to be due to factors
other than discrimination). But see Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Ra-
cialDisriminationP, 12J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 93 (1998) (acknowledging the criticism but con-
cluding that " [w ]hile one can always invent hypotheses to explain away these results, there
is really no reason not to draw the obvious conclusions"); Darity & Mason, supra note 158,
at 79-81 (answering Heckman and describing an audit study designed to meet many of the
criticisms of the audit technique).
178 See Edward E. Telles & Edward Murgula, Phenopic Discrimination and Income Differ-
ences Among Mexican Americans, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 682 (1990).
179 See Alok K Bohara & Alberto Dfvila, A Reassessment of the Phenotypic Discrimination
and Income Differences Among Mexican Americans, 73 Soc. Sci. Q. 114 (1992) (subjecting the
same data to a different statistical methodology and finding no support for the finding of
discrimination). But cf. Edward E. Telles & Edward Murgula, The Continuing Significance of
Phenoype Among Mexican Americans, 73 Soc. Sci. Q. 120 (1992) (concluding that a linear
regression model is better suited to an analysis of Mexican American earnings and that
Boharo and Ddvila's results do not alter the finding that dark phenotype translates into
lower earnings for Mexican Americans).
180 See Telles & Murgufa, supra note 178, at 693. Telles and Marguia are surprised by
the lack of a significant differential between the light group and the medium group. See id.
They suggest that the medium group members were heavily concentrated in both the con-
struction industry and in unions, compensating for the greater labor-market endowment of
the light-skinned group members. See id. They also suggest that given the prevalence of
low skills across all three groups, the light and medium group members did not face fur-
ther discrimination within their already circumscribed labor markets. See id. at 694; see also
Carlos H. Arce et al., Phenotype and Life Chances Among Chicanos, 9 HisP-NicJ. BmEHv. Sci.
19, 25-30 (1987) (dividing their sample into two phenotypical dimensions, skin color and
physical features, and finding that Chicanos with lighter skin and European features had
higher socioeconomic status).
181 See Rodriguez, supra note 153, at 86.
182 For females, the differential was not statistically significant. See id. at 86-88. For
another study, see William Darity Jr. et al., Explaining Differences in Economic Performance
Among Racial and Ethnic Groups in the USA: The Data Examined, 55 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 411,
422 (1996) (reporting, on basis of 1980 and 1990 census data, that black Latinos/as suffer
proportionately more income loss due to differential treatment than do white Latinos/as).
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my beak nose and am their blind spot. But I exist, we exist. They'd
like to think I have melted in the pot. But I haven't, we haven't."8 3
2. The Economic Theory of Discrimination
The hypothesis that discrimination negatively impacts Latino/a
incentives to assimilate also must endure testing in the framework of
the economic theory of discrimination. This theory poses three com-
peting explanations for discriminatory behavior: taste, cost, and asym-
metric information. 184  The three explanations in tam provide
conflicting long-term projections of the degree to which the market
will correct discriminatory behavior and therefore draw conflicting
conclusions about both Latino/a assimilation incentives and the need
for (and justifiable scope of) antidiscrimination legislation. The fol-
lowing analysis shows that the asymmetric information approach,
which projects that discrimination will persist over the long term,
most accurately describes the situation of Latinos/as and other immi-
grant groups.
a. Taste
Gary Becker's famous theory of discrimination' 85 as a product of
a "taste for separation" is the foundation of the economics of discrimi-
nation. Under Becker's theory, discrimination results from a taste for
segregation that employers and employees hold. 8 6 If this taste is
widespread, the target minority receives a lower wage in the market-
place and finds employment only with the least prejudiced employ-
ers. 8s7 These employers benefit from a cost advantage because
society's widespread taste for segregation depresses wages for minority
labor. In Becker's neoclassical setup, the nondiscriminatory employ-
ers employ this cost advantage to drive discriminatory employers from
the market, and the wage differential falls over time. 88 The market's
eventual equilibrium always is nondiscriminatory; hence, antidis-
183 ANZALDOA, supra note 151, at 86.
184 As the discussion will show, the cost and asymmetric information explanations are
closely related because asymmetric information implicates costs.
185 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
186 See id. at 14.
187 See id. at 107.
188 See id. at 43-45; Kenneth J. Arrow, Models ofJob Discrimination, in RACiAL DISCRIMINA-
TION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83, 86-87 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972). In a perfect market, a
person having a special preference must pay for its satisfaction, and any employee demand-
ing special working conditions is paid less; thus, segregation is a higher cost mode of pro-
duction. See Cooter, supra note 39, at 13941. We should note that discrimination
disappears in the Becker model "[ojnly if the supply of entrepreneurship is perfectly elas-
tic in the long run at zero price, so" that employers have no discretionary income with
which to enjoy their taste for discrimination. Heckman, supra note 175, at 111-12.
[Vol. 84:595
COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM
crimination legislation is unnecessary189 and is merely a transfer
mechanism that causes efficiency losses.' 90
b. Cartels, Castes, and Dynamic Models
Subsequent variations on taste theory destabilize these emphatic
free market conclusions. Becker's model left the economic commu-
nity with two disquieting alternative possibilities. 191 On the one hand,
American history thus far has falsified the prediction that market
forces will eliminate discrimination. 92 Indeed, under the model, "it
is unclear how [a pattern of] discrimination could have arisen in the
first place."' 93 In the alternative, an admission of pervasive racism
among white Anglos could sustain the theory. 94 If the taste for dis-
crimination is very widespread, its cost implications become trivial,
and the market corrective never operates. Unsurprisingly, the aca-
demic literature has not much pursued the latter proposition. 95
189 See Donohue, supra note 37, at 1421-22. Ironically, taste theory indirectly confirms
the above analysis of Official English. See supra Part II.A.1, 2(a)-(b). Just as labor-market
incentives assure that Latino/a immigrants will learn English, price competition in product
markets causes discrimination barriers to disappear over time. In addition, a strong nega-
tive implication arises for applications of Title VII to Workplace English: just as the free
economy eventually solves any assimilation problems, it also provides solutions for any
problems respecting employer-employee relations. If Workplace English is cost effective, it
will survive and redouble the Latino/a educational incentive; if it is not, Workplace English
employers will be driven out.
190 See ShellyJ. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention
in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 340, 340 (1983) (noting the often-made
argument that antidiscrimination laws cause efficiency losses, but concluding that this leg-
islation is desirable under some conditions); see also Cooter, supra note 39, at 156 (arguing
that antidiscrimination laws can "benefit a social group by reducing competition from
others"). Note, however, that the assertion is not that "discrimination is efficient." As be-
tween an economy without discrimination and an economy with discrimination, utility and
income are comparable, but the ultimate question as to whether resources are being put to
their most productive uses is indeterminable. Answering that question requires a moral
determination about the appropriateness of facilitating the discriminatory taste. See Stew-
art Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 228, 228 (1986).
191 Arrow objects to taste theory from a different perspective. For him, it "under-
mine[s]" rational choice theory by introducing a variable in addition to profits for the
employers. Arrow, supra note 177, at 94-95.
192 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 150.
193 Lundberg & Startz, supra note 190, at 340; see also GEoRGE A. AKERLOF, The Econom-
ics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, in AN ECONOMIC TmomisT's BooK OF
TALES 23, 34 (1984) ("[T]here are a fair number of cases where opportunities have arisen
for deviants to break the caste code and make economic profits, with consequent rise in
their social position and erosion of the caste taboos."). A negative implication for the
robustness of neoclassical microeconomic methodology also resulted. See Lang, supra note
113, at 365.
194 See Lang, supra note 113, at 364-65.
195 The exception is Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirma-
tive Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1251, 1284-89 (1995), which draws on psychological
literature to suggest that unconscious discrimination will be a persistent phenomenon and
will resist market correction. Selmi's analysis leads to a conclusion similar to that of Cor-
nell & Welch, supra note 39, which we discuss infra text accompanying notes 250-68. Race
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Some have employed a cartel analogy to bring the model into
rough alignment with American history.196 This analogy explains that
racial majorities collaborated to exclude competition from other
groups and to shift the cost of discrimination to these groups, just as
producers often conspired to form cartels to escape the discipline of
price competition.197 Since cartels are unstable, the majority pro-
cured legislation-Jim Crow legislation-to reduce the risk of defec-
tion.198 These discriminatory statutes provided a narrow justification
for antidiscrimination legislation. This legislation legitimately can
serve the limited purpose of repealing or preempting Jim Crow con-
straints on free markets. 199 Once the legal support of the discrimina-
tory price conspiracy vanishes, however, price competition will assure
due employment for qualified people.200 According to this logic,
Congress should repeal Title VII.
Two additional lines of analysis depart from this narrow view of
Title VII while adhering to the neoclassical projection of long-run
market elimination of discrimination. The first accepts the Becker
model, but recasts it in a stochastic time frame. The analysis asserts
that the market corrective requires an intolerably long time period to
operate successfully. Title VII is justified as an interim measure be-
cause it drives discriminators from the market more quickly than non-
intervention by lowering their profits.201
The second line of analysis expands on the cartel analogy. It
posits normatively sustained group solidarity in the racial majority and
attempts to show how, assuming a spontaneous-order scenario, the
norm can sustain discrimination in the face of cost pressures. A ques-
tion arises about showing a spontaneous order: How can collusion
among millions of white employees who have no recourse to the legal
system enforce a segregationist norm that is contrary to the interest of
employers?20 2 To answer this question, the leading model posits a
critical theory also predicts this result while suggesting that the matter should be pursued.
See, e.g., Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculation on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34
ST. Louis U. L.J. 393, 402 (1990) (asserting that "the mass of whites ... will accept large
disparities in economic opportunity in comparison to other whites as long as they [retain]
a priority over blacks").
196 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 150-57.
197 See id. at 150.
198 See id. at 156 ("[Slouthern whites actively used the power of the state and local
government to reduce competition from blacks through the 'Jim Crow' legislation .... .").
199 See id. at 155-57. Antidiscrimination legislation also prohibits physical violence
against those who defect from discriminatory norms. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 246-47.
200 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 76-77.
201 See Donohue, supra note 37, at 1426.
202 Arrow enters the neoclassicist's objection to this move. See Arrow, supra note 177,
at 98-99. The description is, he says, contrary to the tradition of economics, which recog-
nizes group interests only in legally sustained form. Group solidarity holds out benefits for
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caste equilibrium.20 3 Under a caste equilibrium, the norm against
dealing with the minority leads to economic retaliation against defec-
tors, meaning those employers who hire cheaper minority employees
face product-market boycotts. Those employers who do not wish to
discriminate can escape the system only by creating an equilibrium-
breaking coalition and by setting up their own subsector.20 4 Since
they may incur substantial costs of searching out one another in the
process, it is possible for discrimination to persist even if most employ-
ers would prefer to integrate and most customers are unprejudiced.205
The caste equilibrium model leaves intact the neoclassical ac-
count of a free market corrective while altering the description of the
normative environment in which it operates. In other words, but for
the normative barrier, cost pressures would eliminate discrimination.
Two alternative economic approaches-cost and statistical theory-
controvert this assertion and predict persistent discrimination regard-
less of social norms.
c. Cost Theory
Cost theory follows from the observation that workforce homoge-
neity lowers production costs. Recall that the cost story has provided
the basis for our simultaneous descriptions of high-powered Latino/a
incentives both to learn English and to settle in enclaves.20 6 Retold in
the context of discrimination theory, the cost story provides a basis
both for predicting that discrimination will persist in the long run and
for attacking Title VII.
In the contexts in which taste-based discrimination increases costs
and is economically irrational, cost-based discrimination reduces costs
employees, but not for employers. Thus, the theory has to do the heroic job of making
collusion among hundreds of millions of white Americans plausible.
203 See AXERLOF, supra note 193, at 37-42. Akerlof's construct seems unsuited to ex-
plaining the persistence of discrimination in the post-Title VII economy. Given a shifting
normative pattern, nondiscriminatory subsectors seemingly would proliferate with ease.
The "noncompeting groups hypothesis," that Darity and Mason describe, reaches an end
point similar to that Akerlof reaches. Darity & Mason, supra note 158, at 85.
The caste concept has been revived in the legal literature in an expanded version that
draws on social theory. This analysis asserts that the pursuit of social status within discrete
communities provides an ongoing incentive for enforcement of the discriminatory norm.
See McAdams, supra note 39, at 1007, 1019, 1027, 1046-51, 1064. The advantage of this
approach is its depiction of society with antidiscrimination laws and a large population
containing both those who follow the nondiscrimination norm and those who continue to
discriminate despite price pressures. The weaknesses, in our view, are thinness in the de-
scription of the majority population's normative constitution and a reliance on the notion
of a robust spontaneous order that has no support in economics. For a presentation of the
latter point, see William W. Bratton et al., Repeated Games, Social Norms and Incomplete Corpo-
rate Contracts, in AsPEcrS OF FAmRNss IN CoNTRATar 161, 168-78 (Chris Willett ed., 1996).
204 See AxERLoF, supra note 193, at 37, 40-41.
205 See id. at 44.
206 See supra Part II.A3.
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and is economically rational.20 7 As a result, the same free market as-
sumptions that support a prediction that taste-based discrimination
disappears over time support a prediction that cost-based discrimina-
tion can persist. Moreover, according to this view, any legal prohibi-
tion of discrimination increases the costs of production (even
assuming costless enforcement);208 therefore, Congress should repeal
Tide VII209
This cost story significantly overlaps with the assimilation story.
This overlap becomes apparent when one applies the message of the
cost story to African Americans. Recall that according to the litera-
ture, the list of human differences having negative production cost
implications is long, extending to all aspects of identity and personal-
ity.210 It includes not only language, but also accent and a range of
nonverbal codes that manifest themselves in posture and gesture.211
Thus, cultural and ethnic identification, in addition to factors like the
number of years of school completed and other investments in techni-
cal skills, determines individual economic opportunity sets. To
achieve economic parity with whites, African Americans must mini-
mize their cost implications to employers by shaping their behavior to
mimic white patterns to the fullest extent possible. "Assimilation" is
an appropriate term for this process of reinventing oneself to sur-
mount the linguistic and cultural divides that separate a minority from
the majority group.
Cost theory therefore demands an added capital investment from
both African Americans and immigrants: assimilation. Ideally, we
would read Title VII to mean that African Americans should not have
to make this added investment to reconstitute themselves culturally as
whites. In a regime of equal economic opportunity, full qualification
207 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 61.
208 This is Epstein's argument. See id. at 61-67, 76. It overstates the role of decision-
making costs in the broader economy. Epstein depicts all producers as if they were law
firms with large numbers of partners, each with an individual vote. See id. at 61-67. On that
model, heterogeneity of personnel indeed might lead to decision-making costs approxi-
mating those in political life. In the real world, however, hierarchical organization ordina-
rily solves that problem. One wonders what Epstein is talking about. Something like the
treatment in Part II.A.2(b) would be more plausible. There may be a cost advantage to
homogeneity in large hierarchical organizations, but it is the lesser benefit stemming from
segregated teams. The cost is less impressive in the restated version-the U.S. Army, after
all, has become one of the nation's model integrated organizations.
209 The problem with this approach is the deterministic importance it accords to the
identification of costs of all sorts and the impoverished framework it allows for the articula-
tion of countervailing benefits. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in
Assessing Employmzent Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1583 (1992) (reviewing EPSTEIN,
supra note 38, and arguing that the early success of Tite VII supports the contention that it
generates substantial benefits).
210 See supra Part I.A.2(a).
211 See Lang, supra note 113, at 366-68.
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should follow upon successful investment in technical skills.212 Con-
trariwise, proposing the repeal of Title VII endorses placing on Afri-
can Americans rather than on employing firms (and society as a
whole) the burden of these assimilation costs.2 13
The repeal proposition also raises questions concerning skills-ac-
quisition incentives. On the surface, and particularly with widespread
and significant assimilation costs,21 4 repealing Tide VII diminishes
these incentives. Advocates of repeal controvert this prediction,
claiming that discrimination barriers create heightened rather than
reduced incentives to invest in human capital. 215 Just as minority-lan-
guage speakers must (and do) invest more to reach skills parity, vic-
tims of racial discrimination would have to invest heavily to develop
demonstrable skills, including indicia of white acculturation. 216 The
incentive to do so derives from the job market payoff. Of course, if
integration remains costly, minority job seekers who make this invest-
ment will not receive certain jobs until all qualified whites have found
employment.21 7 Nonetheless, because of a projected exhaustion of
the supply of qualified whites, one can predict that minority appli-
cants eventually will find work at the level for which they are
qualified.218
This Horatio Alger-like description of incentives for racial minori-
ties precisely parallels the assimilation story's description of self-reliant
immigrant success. Its application to African Americans, an histori-
cally disadvantaged group whose ancestors arrived in America as long
ago as those of the most advantaged white Anglos, is ironic. The de-
scription also makes problematic assumptions. First, we would argue
that it is inaccurate to assume that an inevitable exhaustion of the
supply of qualified whites guarantees equal opportunity for African
Americans. We would modify this projection by recognizing a cogni-
zable risk of a white surplus and would expect rational, risk-averse Af-
rican Americans investing in skills to do likewise. This modification
implies that the projected returns on African American skills invest-
ment will be less than the Horatio Alger story predicts. Second, the
story presupposes an absence of racial animus. We think rational Afri-
can Americans would discount the predicted value of any returns for
212 In Part III we state an ethical case supporting this proposition.
213 This argument assumes that Tide VII successfully has shifted costs to firms. It is, of
course, not at all clear that the level of Title VII enforcement is thorough-going enough to
shift these costs to firms in the first place.
214 See supra Part IAL.
215 See EPsTEIN, supra note 38, at 40-41.
216 See supra Part HIl.
217 See EpSTEIN, supra note 38, at 35.
218 See id. at 34-40 (assuming that some employers invest in adequate information
about the skills of minority applicants).
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the contrary possibility. We can restate this argument in cost terms by
stating that the costs of integration may include significant residual
frictions, stemming from negative white responses to dark skin
color-costs that investment in acculturation cannot reduce.219 This
residual animus means a rational African American would not predict
that an investment in skills would result in an equal opportunity to
achieve a return. Ex ante investment incentives accordingly de-
crease. 220 Thus, an examination of the assumptions underlying the
Horatio Alger story casts doubt on its motivational power.
Latinos/as, particularly those of color, receive the same message:
Persistent discrimination based on the costs of difference means that
returns on investment in acculturation start to diminish at an earlier
point than the assimilation story predicts. A disturbing proposition
thus arises for economic theory: discrimination can persist indefinitely
despite constant competitive pressure to produce at the lowest possi-
ble cost. A line of formal theory-the statistical theory of discrimina-
tion, which draws on the economics of asymmetric information-also
suggests this proposition.
d. Asymmetric Information: Statistical and Screening Theories
Statistical theory removes the economics of discrimination from
the neoclassical world, in which information is complete and costless,
to a second-best world, in which information is costly and incomplete.
In the second-best world, employers subject to cost constraints have a
choice when they make hiring decisions. They can hire based on a
limited number of easily observed but imperfect signals, accepting the
attendant chance and cost of mistakes.22' Alternatively, they can re-
duce the number of mistakes by investing in the development of par-
ticularized information about candidates. If the cost of obtaining
accurate information exceeds the cost of mistakes that the imperfect
signals generate, the rational employer will use the cruder measure.
Furthermore, if the employer's experience makes minority group
membership a negative signal, the employer will not give full effect in
the hiring process to a minority applicant's equal or greater skills. 2 2
2
219 Both cost and taste figure into white discriminatory preferences, and in a world
without Tite VII, the persistence of the costs in a free market economy would create a
space for the exercise of the taste. Because the two varieties of cost are not distinguishable
in the real world, shifting the cost of acculturation to African Americans through a Title
VII repeal would only serve to make the world safe for exercise of the taste.
220 Loury takes the position that the economic explanation of continuing racial ine-
quality in the labor market should accord a central place to the "skills gap." Loury, supra
note 97, at 118. He points to a cluster of responsible social and cultural factors, each
having a racial quality--"geographic separation, deleterious social norms and peer influ-
ences, and poor educational quality." Id.
221 See AKmRLOF, supra note 193, at 23-24.
222 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 158.
[Vol. 84:595
COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM
The formal model of statistical discrimination 223 assumes a non-
discriminatory but Bayesian employer who responds to greater mea-
surement error respecting the performance of minorities. 224 The
employer evaluates workers by calculating a weighted average of the
particular worker's directly observed productivity and the mean pro-
ductivity of the group.2 25 Greater measurement error stemming from
cultural difference indicates that the employer weights the mean fig-
ure more heavily when evaluating minorities.2 26 The result is not dis-
criminatory with respect to groups as a whole because both the
majority and the minority receive the same average compensation.
But heavier mean weighting yields underpayment for highly produc-
tive minority group members and overpayment for unproductive mi-
nority group members.227
Discrimination results when this pattern continues across genera-
tions. If employers cannot accurately identify good performance, in-
centives to make productivity-enhancing investments lessen
accordingly.228 Rational minority group members will reduce their
human-capital investments in skills that the employer cannot observe
directly. Over time, minority workers' mean productivity will decline,
while whites will become relatively better skilled and receive higher
average compensation. This result is discriminatory, given equal ini-
tial endowments between the two groups. 229 Therefore, legal prohibi-
tion of discrimination improves labor-market allocations. 230
Statistical theory justifies Title VII despite the fact that it assumes
unprejudiced white employers. The theory's justification, however, is
qualified. Statistical theory, like cost theory, argues that discrimina-
tion persists in a free market because it stems from- cost calculations,
and one may term it cost efficient 23' Title VII implies costs too: the
opportunity cost of barring employers from using the cheapest means
223 See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
659 (1972).
224 For a discussion of Bayesian theory, see, for example, Michael 0. Finkelstein &
William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REv. 489, 496-
505 (1970); Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Verdical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabalistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 247,
255-56 (1990).
225 See Phelps, supra note 223, at 659.
226 See id. at 660.
227 See id. at 660-61.
228 See Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility
H)pothesis, 102 QJ. ECON. 453, 456-57 (1987). This disincentive occurs because the mem-
bers of the group enjoy the diffusion of the benefits of the investment See Cooter, supra
note 39, at 158.
229 'See Lundberg & Startz, supra note 190, at 341-42, 344-45.
230 See id. at 340 (showing formally that a policy forbidding separate wage schedules
between two types of workers forces an increase in allocative efficiency).
231 See Schwab, supra note 190, at 228.
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of employee evaluation. 232 On the other hand, extensions of the sta-
tistical model have introduced the possibility that statistical evaluation
can lead to structural inefficiencies. 233 These extensions marginally
strengthen the case for Title VII.
The statistical model is not without its critics. One criticism is
that the model is too crude. For example, it presumes that employers
cannot distinguish entry-level candidates based on the candidate's
number of years of education. 23 4 In the real world, critics argue, em-
ployers cheaply develop basic information workups, decreasing their
232 See id. This cost structure in turn suggests that the more cost efficient way of curing
the problem is to increase the flow of information to the market so that it no longer has to
rely on crude signals. See Cooter, supra note 39, at 159-60. The problem with this solution
is that an increased information set can magnify a discriminatory tendency. See infra notes
247-67 and accompanying text.
233 Schwab offers a model that draws on the idea of a market for lemons first advanced
in George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). See Schwab, supra note 190, 229. Schwab shows "that statistical
discrimination [may] increase [the] efficiency of labor supply for the favored group but
decreases efficiency for the disfavored group." Id. The upshot is "that the net efficiency
effect cannot be determined a priori." Id.
More particularly, Schwab's model posits both a standardized employment market in
which employers judge employees on statistics and an individualized economy in which
each employee is self-employed and there are no information asymmetries. See id. Assum-
ing that all workers look alike in the standardized market and that employers treat them
based on the averages, and further assuming that employees are drawn from the individu-
alized market to the standardized market by higher wages, Schwab's model shows that an
unregulated economy may allocate too few workers to the standardized market. See id. at
229-30. Schwab then changes the assumptions so that firms in the standardized market get
information about employees in the form of one true stereotype, by which employers
costlessly can divide workers into two groups: Group 1 workers are, on average, more pro-
ductive than Group 2 workers, but all workers of ability a (highly skilled marginal workers)
have the same behavior whatever their group. See id. at 231. Given the foregoing assump-
tions, the efficiency of statistical discrimination depends on (1) the relative numbers of
type a workers; (2) the extent of the cross-market shift in wages; and (3) the net change in
output as workers go to standardized market and workers in the standardized market go to
the individual market. See id. A legal ban on statistical discrimination means that wages of
Group 2 workers move "closer to a socially optimal incentive to work, but causes the wage
of [G]roup 1 workers to diverge further from an efficient level." Id. at 232. "The net
efficiency effect depends on shape of ability functions of the two groups." Id. Further-
more, "[s]tatistical discrimination is most likely to be inefficient when the disfavored group
has relatively large numbers of unskilled workers," "pulling down its average skill level,"
"while the skilled workers are more evenly distributed between [the two) groups." Id. Sta-
tistical discrimination becomes unambiguously inefficient if the labor supply of Group 1 is
inelastic, so that all work in the standardized market, while the Group 2 supply is elastic, so
that more able members tend to stay in the individual market. See id. In this case the result
is that employers in the standardized market only see substandard Group 2 workers. See i&L
at 232-33; see also Milgrom & Oster, supra note 228, at 456-57 (arguing that information
asymmetries create employer incentives to underpromote and underpay highly effective
minority employees to avoid creating a credible marketplace signal of capability and
thereby capture minority's services for a low price).
234 See Lang, supra note 113, at 365.
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reliance on statistical generalities.23 5 The model also assumes that
employers continue to use statistical abstracts in their-internal evalua-
tions, but real world firms have an incentive to develop particularized
information to improve the quality of internal job assignments.236 Fi-
nally, critics cite statistics on returns for formal education that date
from the early 1980s to show that young African Americans reap a
greater income increase than young whites for an additional year of
schooling.2 37 Critics argue that these results refute the suggestion that
statistical practices have a negative incentive effect on minorities' skills
acquisition.23 8 These critical arguments produce the tendency, partic-
ularly in the legal literature, to dismiss as minimal the potential for
statistical discrimination.23 9
This dismissal merits strict scrutiny.2 40 Whatever the statistical
model's methodological shortcomings, it is implausible to proclaim
235 See EPSTMIN, supra note 38, at 34; Darity & Mason, supra note 158, at 83; see alsojohn
J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEo. LJ.
1713, 1725 (1991) (noting that if employers can distinguish among African American em-
ployees based on the number of years of schooling, then a statistical effect would result
only if all high-school graduates were treated equally, and that even in that event it might
be possible to develop information respecting performance in school).
236 See Milgrom & Oster, supra note 228, at 455; see alsoJOSEPH G. ALTOIJ & CHARLES
R. Pi.RRET, EMPLOYER LEARNING AND STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6279, 1997) (using an information theory to argue that
employers discriminate based on easily observable variables, such as years of schooling and
race, in the first period of an employment relationship, but that learning stemming from
noisy indicators of worker performance causes wages to become more closely tied to pro-
ductivity in subsequent periods).
237 SeeJAMEs P. SMrrH & FINIS R. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP: FoRTrYYEARs OF ECONOMIC
PROGRESS FOR BLAClS 40, 113-16 (1986).
238 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 40-41; Donohue & Heckman, supra note 235, at 1725.
239 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 40-41; Donohue & Heckman, supra note 235, at 1725.
This dismissal is an essential link in Epstein's story that qualified minority candidates even-
tually get picked up in the free market hiring process. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 34-37
(arguing that due to search costs the law only should encourage employers to develop
fuller information). But cf Donohue, supra note 209, at 1609 (arguing that an effort to
reduce job search costs for minorities through freedom of contract imposes a dignitary
harm on minorities and that the result of Epstein's approach is higher search costs for
minority job-seekers and more employer rejections of minority job-seekers). Darity and
Mason comment that this point of view ultimately seeks to absolve market processes from a
causal role in the discriminatory results that are manifest in American society. See Darity &
Mason, supra note 158, at 83. It follows that any deficiency must be with the victims them-
selves-whether due to poor schooling or cultural factors, or perhaps as the result of some
inherent quality.
240 The dismissal may to some extent reflect dissatisfaction with statistical enforcement
techniques. But misuse of statistical evidence in employment discrimination litigation is a
separate problem. In the litigation context, the use of averages to show a discriminatory
pattern can have the perverse effect of discouraging the development of particularized
information. See, e.g., Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, Antidiscrimination Enforcement and the
Problem of Patronization, 83 Am. ECON. REv. 92, 92-93 (1993) (using a formal model to ex-
amine the perverse incentive effects of statistical enforcement); Robert S. Follett et al.,
Problems in Assessing Employment Discrimination, 83 Am. ECON. REv. 73, 73 (1993) (analyzing
problems when using statistics in the unquantifable area of employment discrimination);
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that whites and African Americans have equal skills-acquisition incen-
tives. Scholars generally concede that although incidences of racial
discrimination markedly declined during the period 1965-1975, the
movement toward economic racial equality has stagnated since the
mid-1970s. 24' Along the same lines, the education gap between young
African Americans and young whites, which in former decades had
narrowed steadily, became a constant during the 1980s. 242 This trend
occurred while the aggregate wage gap between African Americans
and whites widened from the low point it had reached in the 1970s.243
Moreover, whatever returns African Americans receive on investments
in schooling, the corresponding returns for Mexican Americans do
not even, approach those of whites and actually have deteriorated dur-
ing the past two decades. 244
More importantly, statistical theory makes a broader point that
becomes obscured when we focus exclusively on formal problematics.
The model's basic insight originated with Arrow's touchstone discus-
sion of information asymmetry and discrimination. 245 Arrow argued
that once experience has led employers to believe that minority group
members perform worse than majority group members, that belief
does not necessarily yield to hard information about a candidate's ed-
ucation and experience. 246 As employers scrutinize candidates more
carefully, cultural difference begins to influence them.24 7 Qualitative
evaluations may turn on unverifiable or unobservable factors, such as
habits of thought, "steadiness, punctuality, responsiveness, and initia-
tive"-factors employers more easily can access in own-group candi-
dates. 248 What begins as statistical observation becomes a taste
prejudice that cognitive dissonance perpetuates. With an ethical code
condemning discrimination, cognitive beliefs become necessary so-
cially to justify the discriminatory conduct.249
Mark R. Killingsworth, Analyzing Employment Discrimination: From the Seminar Room to the
Courtroom, 83 Am. ECON. REv. 67, 71 (1993) (discussing the problems resulting when statis-
tical studies are used in the courtroom).
241 SeeJohn J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The
Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LrERATURE 1603, 1604
(1991).
242 The aggregate fall in the education deficit during the 1980s was one half as great as
that during the 1970s. SeeJames P. Smith, Affirmative Action and the Racial Wage Gap, 83 AM.
EcoN. REv. 79, 81 (1993). "[T]he schooling gap of black workers with 1-10 years of experi-
ence has remained constant at about 0.5 years throughout the 1980's." Id.
243 See id. at 80-81. Wage parity for new college graduates was achieved in 1971-1972,
but wage gains at this level steadily eroded thereafter. See id. at 81.
244 See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
245 See Arrow, supra note 188, at 95-97. For a recent reaffirmation, see Arrow, supra
note 177, at 96-97.
246 See Arrow, supra note 177, at 97.
247 See id. at 96.
248 Arrow, supra note 188, at 97.
249 See Arrow, supra note 177, at 97.
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Arrow's insights are formalized in a recent model of screening
discrimination from Cornell and Welch.2 50 The model posits that a
prospective employer will be interested in unverifiable, intangible
qualities that constitute the candidate's character.251 It draws on the
economics of language to assert that the employer can better judge a
candidate's character type (high or low) when the employer shares
with the candidate a common cultural background, which enables the
employer to understand the full range of the candidate's verbal and
nonverbal communications. 252
More specifically, Cornell and Welch assume that employers hire
from a pool of candidates evenly distributed both between two cul-
tural (or racial) types and between good and bad types within each
cultural pool.2 53 The Cornell-Welch employers are neutral, but do
have a cultural type and more readily can identify good and bad types
of their own cultural type because of better information.2 54 Cornell
and Welch's results parallel those of the statistical model-the more
information an employer develops about a group of candidates in a
given pool, the greater the pool's variance.2 55 If the employer selects
only one candidate, the best candidate is likely to come from the
group with the widest distribution.2 56 Since employers receive more
information about candidates in the pool that share their cultural
background, the probability that the chosen candidate will come from
that group increases as the number of candidates increases.2 57 The
chances of same-group hiring are fifty percent with two candidates
(one from each group), are seventy-five percent with four candidates
(two from each group), and continue to rise as the number of candi-
dates increases.258 Recast in a generational framework, the model
predicts that in a universe of as few as forty candidates and five jobs, it
would take more than one million generations before the chances of
other-group hiring exceeds fifty percent.25 9
250 See Cornell & Welch, supra note 39, at 543 n.l.
251 See id. at 543.
252 See i& at 543-44.
253 See id at 549.
254 See id.
255 See id. at 548.
256 See i& at 549.
257 See id. at 552.
258 See i& at 544-45. Assuming both two possible types (good and bad) evenly distrib-
uted in the population and an ability to distinguish between them only with own group
candidates, neutrality results only when there are two candidates. In this case there is only
a 50% chance that the candidate from the same background is bad. As the number of
candidates increases, the probability of hiring a same group applicant approaches one.
This analysis derives from the "rank-order tournament[ ]" literature. Id- at 545 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
259 See id. at 546.
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Cornell and Welch recognize the possibility that with a concen-
tration of employers from one group in the high-wage sector, the
model's hiring dynamic implies the evolution of a caste system.260 If a
pool of favored-group candidates remains available, nothing exists to
trigger the market corrective of hiring from the growing pool of capa-
ble candidates in the excluded group.261 Employers have less incen-
tive to hire from the disadvantaged pool because by doing so they lose
the benefit of the screening device. 262 Segregated workplaces prolif-
erate accordingly, and the excluded group makes up the low-wage sec-
tor of the labor market. Rational employers, relying on market
information concerning hiring patterns, cease incurring the cost of
considering candidates from the excluded group.263 Eventually, cog-
nitive dissonance causes the advantaged group to develop theories to
explain and tojustify the segregation in terms of the excluded group's
inferiority.264 The resulting discriminatory equilibrium, however, is
not immobile. Either entry by excluded-group employers into the
high-wage sector or exhaustion of the supply of good types in the ad-
vantaged group will break the equilibrium.265
The Cornell-Welch screening model, like both the cost and the
statistical models, assumes that discrimination is cost efficient. But the
Cornell-Welch model works from that starting point to destabilize ad-
ditional cost assumptions that have crept into the legal literature. It
demonstrates that information asymmetries can lead to discriminatory
results even when the employer invests in researching background in-
formation and in interviewing candidates. 266 The model also projects
that discriminatory results, once repeated, become discriminatory
schema, which can be perpetuated in a market economy.2 67 It thus
260 See id. at 558-59.
261 See id.
262 If the supply of good types in the favored pool is exhausted, however, discrimina-
tion breaks down. See id. at 555. Thus, there is no direct conflict with Epstein's market
corrective. He presupposes that the pool of favored group candidates is exhausted and
that equal information either is available or can be developed. See EPsTrEi, supra note 38,
at 34-37. This analysis implies a descriptive question: How quickly, if ever, does the pool of
good white types at the high end of the United States employment market become
exhausted?
263 This result is a "cascade effect." See Cornell & Welch, supra note 39, at 547.
264 See id. at 558-59. Note that to the extent that the discrimination has had the effect
of depressing the minority's skills-acquisition incentives, minority group members might
not be in a position to take advantage of this opportunity. One can state the incentive
point in psychological as well as economic terms. See Bruce Elmslie & Stanley Sedo, Dis-
crimination, Social Psychology, and Hysteresis in Labor Markets, 17 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 465
(1996). According to Elmslie and Sedo: "One initial bout of unemployment that is not
productivity based can lay the foundation for continued future unemployment and persist-
endy lower job status even if no future discrimination occurs." Id. at 474.
265 See Cornell & Welch, supra note 39, at 554-55.
266 See id. at 547-52.
267 See id. at 554-55.
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reaches the same end point as statistical theory, but takes a different
route, which completely avoids (and even reverses) the objection that
commentators lodge in the legal literature. The model also suggests
that one cannot safely assume that market forces will correct an inher-
ited pattern of discrimination, even though it acknowledges the possi-
bility of correction under the right conditions.268 Finally, the model
controverts the notion that the economics of discrimination posits an
absolute assumptional choice between prejudiced whites (taste the-
ory) and unprejudiced whites (cost theory). "Neutral" cost-based be-
havior can trigger the development of discriminatory tastes that add
to the costs of integration.
The screening model is particularly pertinent to Latinos/as be-
cause its conceptual roots lie in language discrimination theory.2 69 It
supports two predictions. First, discrimination against Latinos/as may
persist for an extended period, even if one excludes phenotypic fac-
tors.2 70 The screening model asserts that English fluency alone does
not ensure equal opportunity-assimilation must be absolute. Lati-
nos/as and other immigrants gain wealth at a correspondingly high
cultural cost. Second, since employers within the enclave economy
will best appreciate the skills of Latinos/as who are not completely
assimilated, these Latinos/as intensively should pursue opportunities
within the enclave. As applied to Latinos/as, then, the information
asymmetries posited in the screening model imply an economic op-
portunity barrier that separates the enclave and mainstream
economies. 271
3. Summary
Can we describe the incentives of a rational second-generation
Latino/a in light of the above economics? As illustrated above, the
literature offers contrasting incentive stories. In the majority view, dis-
268 See id. These ideal conditions, an exhaustion of the supply of qualified whites or an
adequate supply of minority employers, arguably will not arise in the real world.
269 See supra Part IA-B.
270 The likelihood of phenotypic discrimination complicates long-term projections. It
gives rise to the possibility of a separating assimilation equilibrium based on skin color. On
this model white Latinos/as face lower barriers and eventually, upon acquisition of com-
pletely American cultural identities and appearances, uncover economic opportunities suf-
ficient to prompt dispersion. Meanwhile, by analogy to the experience of African
Americans, Latinos/as of color face more substantial barriers and tend to remain in en-
clave communities. Cf Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143
U. PA. L. Rav. 1659, 1670-71 (1995) (describing the phenomenon of racial tipping by
which neighborhoods become segregated due to white distaste for people of color).
271 Previous immigrant generations faced similar barriers, of course. But because par-
ticular barriers' heights will depend on the totality of the economic and cultural circum-




crimination has a depressive impact on skills investment, 272 thereby
contributing to its own perpetuation. A minority, grounded on the
legal side, describes a heightened incentive to take advantage of edu-
cational opportunity to overcome the barrier of discrimination.273
Which incentive story should we incorporate in the description of sec-
ond-generation Latino/a incentives?
It is not clear to us that we can or should make an absolute choice
between the high- and low-incentive alternatives. Certainly, the low-
incentive story is technically correct because it inexorably follows from
the economics of investment; accordingly, aggregated Latino/a
choices should show a depressed level of skills investment. The aggre-
gate result, however, does not capture an all-purpose description of
rational choice. Just as different subjective preferences with respect to
risk determine the choices of investors, so too will Latino/a choices
turn on subjective factors-talents, ambitions, familial and cultural
ties, and risk aversion. Thus, in our economic picture, Latinos/as
have a wide zone of rational choices for investments in human capital.
We would expect some Latinos/as to invest more heavily than others,
in the same manner as did yesterday's immigrants and as do today's
Anglos.
Although this economic description is capacious, it has a power-
ful normative implication. It emphatically negates the normative as-
similation story. Latinos/as neither have broken past immigrant
patterns nor have failed to live up to some vague obligation to accul-
turate. Instead, they rationally have responded to the problem of as-
similation in the unique circumstances they confront. Moreover,
while the assimilation story focuses exclusively on immigrant choices,
the economics shows that Anglo choices also matter. Since Latino/a
cultural choices depend upon economic prospects, these choices de-
pend in part on Anglo choices about Latino/a opportunities. Only
one moment of culpability occurs in this story-the moment when
Anglos convince themselves that their own Americanness implies su-
perior capability.
D. Workplace English and the Costs of Title VII
Finally, we turn to the economic implications of requiring Work-
place English to find justification in a showing of business necessity
under Titie VII.
One easily may articulate an economic case against application of
Tide VII to Workplace English. The absolute suppression of Spanish
in the workplace is cost-justifiable because communication is costly,
272 See Coate & Loury, supra note 240, at 92-93; Cooter, supra note 39, at 158; Cornell &
Welch, supra note 39, at 555-56; Milgrom & Oster, supra note 228, at 454-55.
273 See supra Part II.A.3.
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especially when the environment is not monolingual. 274 The resulting
transparency renders supervision cheaper and reduces frictions in in-
tra-employee relations.2 75 The employer, who bears the cost of inef-
fective workplace rules, has a strong incentive to promulgate the
lowest cost set. Over time, employers and employees will sort them-
selves between monolingual and multilingual environments. 276 Addi-
tionally, Title VII enforcement is itself costly. If the employer has a
goal of cost reduction, it should have Workplace English.
However forceful this cost case may be, it is not conclusive. The
identification of a set of costs alone does not conclude the determina-
tion of social welfare. We must appraise costs in broader contexts
before concluding an inquiry about any particular course of action.
The costs of applying Tite VII to Workplace English fail to impress
when we examine them in this broader context.
First, this cost case does not differ in substance from the cost case
for a complete repeal of Tite VII. Recall that according to the cost
theory of discrimination, all other things being equal, rational em-
ployers have a high-powered incentive to operate segregated work-
places.277 Thus, the same social welfare judgment that activates Title
VII as a whole justifies the constraint on employer business judgment
which is actualized as a qualified prohibition of Workplace English. It
would be anomalous to allow free rein to business judgment in the
limited context of Workplace English but not in other contexts gov-
erned by Tite VII.
Second, the economics provides no credible assurance that Work-
place English reflects only cost concerns and bears no taint of ethnic
or racial animus. The economics we reviewed above does not describe
any financial incentives that assuredly constrain such impulses, at least
as long as a robust market correction story is lacking.278
274 Cf supra Part RI. (discussing the general economic costs associated with bilin-
gual interactions).
275 See supra notes 82-84.
276 See Breton & Mieszkowski, supra note 101, at 262-63.
277 See supra Part II.G.2(c).
278 Indeed, Workplace English appears to be doubly attractive to many employers for
this reason. It could be disruptive of employee relations yet still be cost reductive because
it offers a means to terminate employees that is unrelated to the more conventional and
work-related matters included in the notion of "good cause."
Anecdotal evidence does indicate that large firms have been waking up to the fact that
Latinos/as constitute 10% of the population and have been adjusting their business prac-
tices to increase Latino/a market share. For such a firm, the goal of good will in the
Latino/a community could lead to a decision against Workplace English despite a projec-
tion that bilingualism increases management costs. But this story in the end only rein-
forces our conclusion. In our view, large American firms have been remarkably slow in
their "discovery" of the Latino/a market. We suspect that Anglo myopia and prejudice
have long retarded pursuit of these ready profits.
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Third, although Title VII enforcement intrinsically is costly,279
the prohibition of Workplace English presents no significant addi-
tional cost burden. The Workplace English cases have simple facts-
most concern work rules with no arguable relationship to business ne-
cessity.2 80 The message to employers resembles a per se rule: do not
fire employees for speaking Spanish to each other in informal situa-
tions. In a dynamic environment, such a message even could have a
transformative affect. To the extent that Workplace English stems
from animus and fear, its prohibition prompts the rational employer
to suppress the taste for segregation without incurring further signifi-
cant costs.
Thus, the economic case against Title VII for Workplace English
fails as an absolute assertion. But, because Title VII coverage and en-
forcement still will be costly, we must answer one remaining question:
Who bears the cost?
To answer this question we consult, by analogy, economics that
predicts the effects of taxes on employment. Given static labor de-
mand, a payroll tax can cause a reduction in employment or in
wages. 28 1 Since empirical studies of these taxes do not clearly evi-
It is helpful to consider some examples. First, we note the recent performance of the
stock of Univision, the larger of the two Spanish-language television networks. A block of
stock purchased for $50 million in 1992 recently was reported to be worth $700 million.
See Pollack, supra note 47. Part of the increase in value came at the expense of the net-
work's competitor in the market. See id. But much of the value comes from perceptions of
an arbitrage profit opportunity created by Anglo myopia-a large gap between the net-
work's audience share and ad share. See id. Apparently, the gap will be closed, and net-
work revenues will increase as marketers discover the existence of the Latino/a market.
For a second example, consider Sears. For about three years, Sears has been manag-
ing 148 of its stores, all located in or near Latino/a communities, in a manner that would
appeal to Latino/a tastes. In so doing the company has reversed a cost-benefit decision
not to micromanage to reach geographical ethnic markets. Sears is happy; sales in the
effected stores are way up. SeeJennifer Steinhauer, A Minority Market with Major Sales: Stores
Redo the Merchandise Mix and the Hispanic Dollars Flow, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1997, at D1. What
surprises us is not the result of this management decision, but the length of time it took
Sears to ascertain the existence of the opportunity-decades in the case of stores in places
like East Los Angeles, California and Hudson County, New Jersey, for example. We also
note that by definition the new policy entails the extension of managerial responsibility to
Latinos/as. See id.
A final example, in which an external shock led to sudden visibility in the business
community, involves People magazine. People started a quarterly Spanish-language issue af-
ter a special issue on the singer Selena proved extremely successful. The people at People
had never heard of Selena before her murder was front page news. See Octavio Emilio
Nuiry, Magazine Mania, HIsPANIC, Dec. 1996, at 53, 53-58. People En Espafiol now publishes
monthly.
279 See Donohue, supra note 209, at 1602-03. He estimates the total cost of Title VII
enforcement at $15 billion per year, or $200 per worker. See id. at 1602. Given standard
estimates of elasticity of demand for labor, it follows that total employment is reduced by
one-fourth of one percent or 188,000 jobs. See id. at 1603.
280 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
281 See DANIEL S. HAmERMESH, LABOR DEMAND 169-73 (1993).
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dence a proportionate effect on levels of employment, an inference
that the burden falls on wages arises.2 82 We can draw a more tailored
analogy to models that predict the effect of a tax on a particular group
of workers, again given static demand for labor. The impact of this
tax depends on the relative supply behavior of the affected workers
and on the ability of employers to substitute the taxed workers for
others.283 Without relative supply elasticity between the affected
group of workers and other workers, a relative decline in the affected
group's wages again offsets the tax.2 8 4 In that case, any impact on
employment levels additionally depends on relative supply within the
affected group. To the extent that employers can substitute workers
from other groups, a smaller aggregate impact on wages and employ-
ment will result. Indeed, given high substitutability, members of the
affected group will have an incentive to take steps to realign them-
selves with an untaxed group.285
When reading these parameters together with the results of the
empirical literature on labor elasticities,286 one can draw an inference
that bilingual Latinos/as themselves consequently would pay for spe-
cial Tite VII protection in the form of lower wages. The labor elastic-
ity studies reveal only very small "elasticities of complementarity
between immigrants and natives, or between new immigrants and
older cohorts."287
It is important to note that the predicted trade off between pro-
tection and wages assumes imperfect enforcement of Title VII. Such a
wage adjustment could be hard to realize in a world of perfect en-
forcement. Given diverse workplaces, employers would have to pay
Latinos/as at the same level as members of other groups.288 Even if
bilingual workplaces without Workplace English cost more than bilin-
gual workplaces with Workplace English, employers could not pass on
the cost in the form of a reduced number of jobs for Latinos/as, at
least to the extent that perfect enforcement of Title VII requires em-
282 See id.
283 See id. at 181.
284 See id.
285 See id. at 178-81.
286 See, e.g., id. at 61-136.
287 Id. at 126; see DEFRarrAs, supra note 6, at 232-34. The implication is that immigrant
flows have relatively little effect on the wages of domestic workers. The wage studies con-
tradict the neoclassical view, which suggests that the arrival of low-skilled immigrants de-
presses wages and increases unemployment. See id. at 231. They also support Piore's
description of immigrant employment in a secondary segment of low-wage jobs on the
industrial periphery. See id. DeFreitas concludes that Latino/a immigration has not af-
fected significantly the wages or employment of American-born Latinos/as, but that un-
documented immigrants adversely have affected the employment of African American
males and wages of African American females. See id. at 250.
288 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 36 (noting that perfect enforcement prevents workers
from discounting their services).
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ployers to hire a proportionate number of qualified bilingual Latinos/
as. This scenario yields an inference of cost shifting to the
employer.28 9
But Latinos/as still would bear significant costs even in this scena-
rio. An employer who wishes to avoid the cost of bilingualism would
avoid locating in a region with a significant non-Anglo population.
These employers, if located in regions with mixed Latino/a and Anglo
populations, would tend to take up residence elsewhere. As a result,
Latinos/as would have reduced job opportunities. The resulting con-
centration of monolingual firms would harm bilingual firms that did
not relocate to a monolingual region and abandon their bilingual sta-
tus. Those bilingual firms would suffer a long-term cost disadvantage,
and monolingual firms would drive them out of business, reducing
the stock of job opportunities available to Latinos/as.
The imperfect enforcement scenario is the more plausible of the
two, and it holds out no significant hopes of cost sharing. But the case
for Title VII constraints on Workplace English remains compelling
even if cost sharing is very unlikely. As the next Part demonstrates,
choices respecting language implicate an individual's right to treat-
ment as an equal. It is fundamental to American ideology that we
must make sacrifices to secure these freedoms. We have no doubt
that Latinos/as stand as ready as other Americans to incur this cost.
III
THE INTRINSIC WRONG OF LEGAL SUPPRESSION OF SPANISH:
LANGUAGE, FREEDOM, AND THE
IMAGINARY DoMAIN
Our economic analysis shows that English Only reinforces the sei-
gniorage of the English language by increasing the cost of withdrawal
into a Spanish-language enclave and by prodding Latinos/as to in-
crease their investment in English-language acquisition. Our analysis
does not deny that linguistic sameness lowers costs under one promi-
nent model of social welfare calculation.29 0 But it does identify three
points that undermine that calculation's soundness as a basis for pub-
lic policy. First, the analysis questions whether we safely can assume in
every case that the imposition of the English language (or any other
majority trait) effectively enhances welfare.291 In our complex mul-
ticultural world-characterized by growing trade, transnational con-
tacts, and emerging communities of nations in Europe, Asia, and
South America-we must at least question the assumption that homo-
289 Cf id. (noting that because an antidiscrimination law would prevent free market
bargaining, employers would pay more for services).
290 See supra notes 100-04, 108-11, 207-12 and accompanying text.
291 See supra text accompanying note 271.
[Vol. 84:595
COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM
geneity is cost beneficial. Second, assuming that language homogene-
ity enhances social welfare, economic theory suggests that free market
incentives suffice to assure language homogeneity's prompt evolution
in any society with a large linguistic majority. Third, white Anglos'
economic discrimination against Latinos/as presents the only signifi-
cant barrier on that assimilationist evolutionary path. Our ultimate
conclusion is simple. Because legal suppression of language and legal
sanction of segregation follow from the same cost economics, both
Official and Workplace English impose a form of peonage on Lati-
nos/as that is discriminatory.
In this Part, we step outside the consequentialist framework of
economic theory to discuss the characteristics of right and wrong that
make it both intrinsically and extrinsically wrong to suppress Span-
ish.292 Proof of an intrinsic or extrinsic wrong cannot rest on eco-
nomic analysis alone. We have shown, for example, that legal
suppression of Spanish is the functional equivalent ofJim Grow. Yet if
we are to complete our analysis, we must still go on to demonstrate
that something is deeply wrong with these laws. Without a reasonable
moral, political, or legal conception of the person coupled with an
interpretation of freedom and equality, the fact that legal suppression
of Spanish is the functional equivalent ofJim Grow is just a fact. What
makes it wrong is that legal imposition of peonage controverts the
292 Let me explain why we are arguing that the suppression of Spanish is both ani
intrinsic and an extrinsic wrong. At least under a strict reading of Kant, the suppression of
Spanish simply can be understood as an extrinsic wrong, in the sense that it is a violation of
the doctrine of Right. To quote Kant:
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's free in accordance with a
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist
with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law.
If then my action or my condition generally can coexist with the free-
dom of everyone in accordance with a universal law, whoever hinders me in
it does me wrong; for this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with free-
dom in accordance with a universal law.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE MErrA'Hysics OF MoRALs 56 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
Outer freedom is outer in the sense that it issues from an external source such as law.
But we are also making another point, as we will see shortly. Given our understanding of
personality, the development of one's potential to shape an identity can and should be
understood as inner virtue. Kant never would have spoken of potential. This reliance on
potential clearly has Hegelian overtones. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF
(1989). But despite this difference, an internal virtue in Kant includes respecting your
own person as an end in itself. For us, the development of the potential or capability to
shape an identity then can be grasped as internal virtue. Hence, our argument that the
suppression of Spanish can be both an intrinsic and an extrinsic wrong. If a Latina makes
Spanish-speaking into an end and this confers ethical value on her mother tongue, then it
clearly can be part of her respect for her own person that she speak her language. If she
fails to be true to the pursuit of her end, even if because of outward pressure that degrades
her language, then she can be understood to have degraded herself. Of course, this argu-
ment turns on the Latina making Spanish-speaking an end in Kant's sense. Our point is
that she cannot be forced to do so. To coerce her to do so, in the sense of legal coercion,
violates her external freedom.
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equal dignity of persons by legally imposing a form of moral servitude
on Latinos/as.29 3
This Part begins by discussing the moral, ethical, and legal mean-
ing of the free person pursuant to an existentialist interpretation of
the Kantian idea of equal worth. We then use the concept of the free
person of equal worth to locate the intrinsic wrong inherent in the
suppression of Spanish.294 In doing so we step outside the conven-
tional liberal framework, which has difficulty accommodating a com-
plex understanding of individual identity, to discuss the formation of
identity out of basic identifications, one of which clearly is language.
To lay the groundwork for this discussion, we revisit the communitar-
ian-liberal debate as well as the critique of the liberal person that femi-
nist and race critical theory articulate. We ultimately hope to show
both that one can reconcile a more complex understanding of iden-
tity with a concept of rights and that the ideal of the person need not
rely on an individualistic anthropology. The mainstay of this case for
a revived ideal of the person is the aesthetic idea of the imaginary
domain.
After establishing a right to personality at a general level, this Part
argues that the suppression of Spanish controverts the freedom of La-
tinos/as reasonably to design, by developing their own sense of cul-
ture and heritage, unique lives. This argument does not rely on
metaphysical or foundational notions of the subject.295 Our assertions
depend instead on a simple, direct interpretation of the normative
organizational ideal of political or ethical liberalism-the State and
our basic social institutions should treat everyone as free and equal
persons.2 96 At the same time we contend that this interpretation sur-
vives the contemporary critique of the autonomous subject. We begin
our analysis by reconsidering the ideal of the person.
293 See Ricu ARDs, supra note 79, at 5.
294 John Rawls has clarified the relationship between the operation of wrong- and
right-making characteristics-the facts "cited in giving reasons why an... institution is...
just or unjust"-in Kantian constructivism. JOHN RAWLS, PoLmcAL IUBERALISM 121-25
(1993). Although it is beyond the scope of this Article fully to explore this issue, we agree
with Rawls that some form of Kantian constructivism is the most philosophicallyjustified
path to take in the justification of political and, we would add, moral ideals of right. See id
295 For a discussion of the difference between a metaphysical conception of the subject
and our political and moral interpretation of the free person, see DRuCILLA CORNELL, AT
THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX, AND EQUALrY 3-65 (1998) [hereinafter CORNELL,
AT THE HEART]; DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN 3-27 (1995) [hereinafter CoR-
NELL, DOMAIN].
296 According to Hegel, the hallmark of modernity is the historical and normative con-
struction of the legal and moral person through a concept of right, which in turn legiti-
mates the State on the basis of whether or not the State allows for the actualization of this
construct. See HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RirHT 15-24, (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) (1821).
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A. The Ideal of the Free Person
All forms of liberalism start with a simple premise: the State
should treat us all as if we are free persons of equal worth.2 97 Critics
of liberalism attack this moral, legal, and political ideal of the person,
charging that it is out of touch with reality. In real life, they contend,
we are not the abstract persons that the liberal model deploys; we are
not beings who in any meaningful sense actually can be self-determin-
ing.298 Some of these criticisms, however, fail to recognize the reason
why Kantian liberalism stresses the significance of justice of the free
person. Our interpretation of the Kantian ideal of the person is not
meant to be a full picture of the lives of actual human beings; rather,
it is tailored to enshrine our freedom as a practice of self-responsibility
for the lives we lead.2 99
1. The Kantian Idea of Equal Worth of Free Persons
If social benefits are not for persons, one may ask, who is the
beneficiary of any theory or practice of an ethics of social organization
or of any theory of justice?300 We (and many others301 ) reject the
answer that the beneficiary should be society as a whole-or a major-
ity of those within it-as an invitation to tyranny. Much political and
297 Almost all of the important debates in Western liberal jurisprudence and political
philosophy have been over what it means to treat people as free and equal persons. For an
excellent discussion of how widely this ideal is held, see Ronald Dworkin, Why We Are All
Liberals (Oct. 19 & 27, 1995) (paper presented at the Program for the Study of Law, Phi-
losophy, and Social Theory) (on file with authors).
298 The most searing critique of the liberal ideal of the person remains that of Karl
Marx. See KARL MARx, CRmQUE OF HEGEL'S 'PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT' (Annette JoHln & Jo-
seph O'Malley trans., Joseph O'Malley ed., 1970) (1964) . The last hundred years have
generated fierce dispute about what Marx's critique of the legal, moral, and political cri-
tique of the person actually means: Was Marx arguing against this category altogether?
Was he instead arguing that it was "undialectical," hence one-sided? We cannot explore
the voluminous literature, let alone examine the history of the sweat and blood that has
been spilt because of the state enforcement of the position that there is no moral nor
political validity to the ideal of the person. We stand behind the interpretation that a
Marxist should believe in right and thus, the persons who have them.
299 Since the Kantian person is an idea that, by definition, must be in the abstract, it
often has been thought to be inconsistent with any recognition of our phenomenological
existence. I have tried to show, however, that we can use a philosophical anthropology that
can recognize certain aspects of our phenomenological existence, such as our sexuate be-
ing, but recognize it in such a way that it does not controvert the freedom that is main-
tained in the abstract definition of the idea of the person. Of course, in this Article, we are
trying to make a similar argument about how we should grapple with another crucial as-
pect of our phenomenological existence, i.e., language. See CORNELL, AT THE HEART, supra
note 295, at 37-39; CORNELL, DOMAIN, supra note 295, at 3-27.
300 For a discussion of how the person has to exist at least implicitly in utilitarianism in
order for the theory to be coherent, see GARY L. FRANcioNE, RAIN WTHotrr THUNDER: THE
IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 147-89 (1996).
301 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin's distinction between constitutionalism and ma-
joritarianism in RONALD DWORKIN, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise, in FREE-
DOM'S LAW 1-38 (1996).
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legal theory conceptualizes the person from this point of view to ex-
amine what constitutes a legitimate relationship between the individ-
ual and the State.30 2 In our analysis, one can justify for reasons apart
from its value as a shield against tyranny the political and legal ideal of
the person. We pursue a second, alternative approach to understand-
ing the person: interpreting the ideal of the free person that Kant
initially invoked in the context of cultural and linguistic choices.
Kant defended the simple idea that the State should treat all
human beings as "ends in themselves" because as rational beings they
are the ultimate source of the value they give to their ends.30 3 This
idea is Kant's Formula of Humanity.30 4 For Kant, an end is an object
of free choice. Ends are by definition at least partially "set" by practi-
cal reason. We want to stress partially because Kant does not mean
that an "end" may not also be an object of desire or inclination. But it
is reason that is responsible for the unique human characteristics that
translate an object of desire into an end. It is a misreading of Kant,
however, to argue that the Formula of Humanity demands respect
only for our capacity for choosing morally obligatory ends. When we
take a rational interest in something, we do so by deeming it valuable
or important and, in that sense, good. In this sense, we do not value
our ends as objects of desire, but because they are good. It is this
capacity that the Formula of Humanity demands that we treat as an
end in each person. This is why it is completely illegitimate to force
someone to take up an end because to do so denies her dignity as
someone with this capacity. As beings who assume responsibility, in-
cluding self-responsibility in the practice of moral and ethical judg-
ment, each is of equal worth because each bestows value on those
decisions.305
302 For an excellent discussion, however, of why an instrumental or utilitarian account
of the person never can be an adequate account of the worth of persons, see JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OFJUSTICE 22-27 (1971).
303 See THE MORAL LAW: KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYsic OF MORALS 61-64
(H.J. Paton ed. & trans., 1961) [hereinafter KANT'S GRouNDWORK]. For an excellent dis-
cussion of Kant's Formula of Humanity, see CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KING-
DOM OF ENDS 106-32 (1996).
304 The Formula of Humanity is Kant's second formulation of the universal law. The
first is the Categorical Imperative. For readers unfamiliar with Kant, he states the Categori-
cal Imperative as follows: "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law." KANT'S GRouNDwoRK, supra note 303, at 88 (footnote
omitted and typeface altered). The Formula of Humanity is stated as follows: "Act in such
a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means but at the same time as an end." Id. at 86.
305 One could term Kant's elaboration of our equal worth as persons as "metaphysical"
and thus philosophically outdated because it relies on ontological dualism. See KANT'S
GROUNDWORK, supra note 303, at 104-08. To defend free will, which is our capacity to set
our end by reason, Kant understood dualism as the division of the "human being" into the
"noumenal" world of moral freedom and the "phenomenal" world of causal determination
by the laws of nature. See id.; see also KORSGAARD, supra note 303, at 159-60 (providing a
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Kant's argument for our equal worth is based on his argument
that the good will-or our rational nature (which, to. Kant, is synony-
mous to the good will)-is the only thing that can have unconditional
value, meaning it can be recognized as the source of all value.30 6 For
Kant, something has unconditional value if it has intrinsic value under
all conditions, and the only "thing" that can meet this condition is the
good will.3 0 7 Even something like happiness and the search for it, at
least according to Kant, is conditional and not valuable in all conceiva-
ble circumstances. 308 As beings who ultimately confer ethical value
around us through setting our ends at least partially by reason, we are
the source of what makes things important or deemed good. Objects
have value because they have value for individuals who bestow value
on objects rationally by making them their ends. It is this value-con-
ferring capacity as rational beings that human beings recognize in one
another. This recognition creates the mandate that Kant claims is ba-
sic to both morality and, in an impure form, politics.30 9 An individual
summary of the relationship between Kant's noumenal world and the phenomenal world).
For Kant, we are free if we make ourselves a law unto ourselves; if we, in other words, are
self-legislating. We can only become self-legislating if we act solely in accordance with the
idea of law and not with any particular aspect of its substantiation. The preeminent good,
which Kant calls moral, is the idea of law itself and only that. Since the must of the moral
law is the idea of law that only a rational being can apprehend, when we act in accordance
with this law, we also are acting solely in accordance with our free will or with our rational
nature. We know that our maxims are rational and therefore freely chosen by subjecting
them to the test of universalizability-the test of the moral law. My maxim is rationally
chosen and thus freely chosen if it can be understood as a maxim of all other rational
beings who subject themselves to the moral law. Because the must of the moral law is the
idea of law that only a rational being can approach, as free beings we become self-legislat-
ing and act solely in accordance with free will by following the Categorical Imperative. See
KANT's GRouNmWoRK, supra note 303, at 95-104. One may note the ethical irony of a the-
ory of moral freedom that appears to incorporate an act of subjection to the moral law.
Kant's need to understand moral freedom in this way stems from his acceptance of the
proposition that all human action must be understood through laws of causality. See id. at
110-13. By making ourselves subject to the Categorical Imperative, it is our free will, our
capacity to set our ends by reason, that makes us the cause of the value we give to those
ends. Thus, by subjecting ourselves to the idea of law, we can be self-legislating, rather
than legislated-to. See, for example, THEODOR AnolRNo & MAX HoRKHEIMER, DxT ECnc OF
ENUGHTENMENT (John Cummings trans., 1944), for an excellent discussion of the ethical
difficulty of a theory of moral freedom that seeks to render itself fully consistent with a
Newtonian conception of causality. For an excellent critique of the Kantian notion of
causality, with which Kant starts in his definition of the free will as causality, see CHARLE
SANDERS PEIRCE, Causation and Force, in REASONING AND THE LOGIC OF THINGS 197 (Kenneth
Laine Ketner ed., 1992).
306 See KANT's GRouNDwoRK, supra note 303, at 61-66.
307 See id.
308 See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Morality in Genera in
KANT. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 33, at 64, 67 ("The maxim of absolute obedience to
a categorically binding law of the free will... is good in itself, but [happiness] is not. [It]
may, if it conflicts with duty, be thoroughly evil.").
309 See IMMANUEL KANT, Introduction to the Theory of Right, in KANT: PoLIcA.L WRITINGS,
supra note 33, at 132; KANT's GROUNDWORK, supra note 303, at 96-98.
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respects the equal worth and dignity of all others because she shares
in the humanity that makes them the source of value they give to their
own ends. Hence, it is as free persons that we all have equal worth,
and it is this equal worth that law must recognize.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to rehearse all the criticisms
of Kantian moral theory or, alternatively, to review the efforts to
render his moral theory coherent without ontological dualism.310 We
note only that we agree with those who argue that a strong Kantianism
offering a comprehensive view of the self is indefensible because it
relies on an outdated concept of causality.311 Yet we still want to de-
fend the Kantian conception of our equal worth as free persons who
possess a value-conferring capacity, partially setting our ends by rea-
son. We do so by adding an existentialist twist to Kant's insight into
the assertiveness of our value-conferring capacity whenever we judge
an object of desire to be an end.
In his book on Kant, Heidegger argues that the factual dimension
of lived experience makes judgment and evaluation inevitable. 312
Moral freedom is a praxis of self-responsibility that we must assume as
part of our moral awakening to the inevitable reality that we do make
judgments and evaluations, bringing forth a moral self when making
those judgments and evaluations. Self-responsibility is a practice in
and through which we constantly are becoming who we are as we indi-
viduate ourselves by evaluating and re-evaluating our actions, evalua-
tions, and judgments as we make them our own ends.313 In this
understanding, we exercise our freedom as a narration that makes the
value-conferring moment in our actions and judgments one that we
310 'For an excellent discussion of why Kant's two standpoints need not rely on onto-
logical dualism, see KORSGAARD, supra note 303, at 159-87.
311 See PEIRCE, supra note 305, at 197-217.
312 See HEIDEGGER, supra note 30, at 89-142.
313 See id. We are well aware that one can read Heidegger to have dropped all linger-
ing aspects of his "humanism" in his later writings. See REINER ScHORMANN, HEIDEGGER ON
BEING AND ACTING (Christine-Marie Gros trans., 1987). Our intent is not to enter into the
debate about the meaning of Heidegger's "turn" for his understanding of action and more
specifically of self-assertion. We only argue that it is possible to maintain something close
to Kant's understanding of our equal worth because we are value-bestowing creatures who
turn our actions into ends that wejustify through reasons by giving moral or ethical narra-
tions of our lives. The process of narrating a moral or ethical story is how we bring forth
the moral self, which then takes responsibility for her actions, valuations, andjudgments as
if they had been her ends all along. This process we call the practice of self-responsibility.
Both Herbert Marcuse and Hannah Arendt took up the Heidegger-Kant dialogue and
made it central to their own thinking. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REvOLUTrON 47-50 (1963)
(elaborating on the Kantian ideal of freedom and the role it has played in inspiring revolu-
tions). For an important discussion of Marcuse's appropriation of the ideal of moral free-
dom as a practice of responsibility, see MARTINJ. BECK MATUgT! K, SPECTERS OF LIBERATION
25-47 (1998). For an excellent discussion of the Kant-Heidegger dialogue as Heidegger
conceived it, see LAN WARD, KANTIANISM, POSTMODERNISM AND CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 36-
56 (1997).
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ourselves understand as called upon rationally or reasonably to justify
to others. This understanding of our moral freedom as a practice of
self-responsibility for our ends as moral beings suffices to defend the
idea of our equal worth, even though it temporalizes the way in which
the moral self is brought into being.
2. The Kantian Standpoint of Practical Reason
As persons with a life, which is ours alone to lead, we all ask the
question, "What should I do?" By posing this question, each one of us
takes up the stance of practical reason. From this standpoint, an indi-
vidual cannot be the object of another because each individual is exis-
tentially positioned to ask and answer that question through moral
reflection only for herself; her actions still will be hers as she reflec-
tively takes them on as such. Each of us has her own moral and ethi-
cal options and reacts to her own set of external demands, although
some of us are much more constrained by law and circumstance than
others.
Liberal political philosophy, particularly when informed by the
tradition of critical idealism, 3 14 demands that any just societal order
begin with the treatment of each individual as an equal in the sense
that we must view each as equally worthy to pursue her own answer to
that fundamental question, "Wh'at should I do?" The State should
treat each of us as if we are rational in a specific sense-as if we are
capable of assuming responsibility for our own ends. We are reasonable
in that we realize that we are capable of recognizing and harmonizing
our pursuit of the good with creatures who are like us in that they
have equal dignity.3 1 5 Both notions, rationality and reasonableness,
must operate in the law. The law should recognize persons as the
source of ethical value that they give to their own life's decisions when
they take these up as ends through moral reflection. But it also
should accord individuals the capacity to decide that other human
creatures are, like themselves, worthy of that same recognition and
respect. We therefore are reasonable only when we recognize in
others their worthiness to pursue their own lives and recognize that
we must try to organize both our own lives and a system of social life
314 See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRms: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A Dis-
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
315 John Rawls's work, which profoundly has shaped the last two generations of liberal
political, ethical, and legal thought, develops his entire theory from the initial recognition
of equal dignity in the sense that human beings must be politically recognizable as having
both of these capacities or capabilities; that is, they are both reasonable and rational. See




and of political organization that is consistent with the equal dignity
of all persons.316
The person as a legal and moral ideal must remain abstract if that
ideal is to denote the freedom on which it is based. Because each
individual undertakes her own practice of self-responsibility, the State
must not impose definitions of how one can or should realize that
potential for self-definition. Of course, we are more, much more,
than this abstract free being. The political and moral point of ab-
stracting the ideal of the person from the substance of any one indi-
vidual's concrete life is to protect the freedom-the potential-of
forming ourselves into a unique being-a being immersed in a life to
be lived in all the relational complexity we associate with any actual
living human being.
3. The Ideal of the Imaginary Domain
On this understanding, a person is notjust a given, but implicates
a practice in and through which the person is constantly engaged, a
process of assuming self-responsibility through moral reflection on
316 We endorse John Rawls's definition of the reasonable:
If we ask how the reasonable is understood, we say: for our purposes here,
the content of the reasonable is specified by the content of a reasonable
political conception. The idea of the reasonable itself is given in part, again
for our purposes, by the two aspects of persons' being reasonable: their
willingness to propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation among
equals and their recognition of and willingness to accept the consequences
of the burdens ofjudgment.
Id. at 94 (internal cross-reference omitted). We can highlight the moral and political sig-
nificance of the reasonable by contrasting it to the unreasonable:
By contrast, people are unreasonable in the same basic aspect when they
plan to engage in cooperative schemes but are unwilling to honor, or even
to propose, except as a necessary public pretense, any general principles or
standards for specifying fair terms of cooperation. They are ready to violate
such terms as suits their interests when circumstances allow.
Id. at 50.
We contrast the notion of rationality operative in our economic discussion. In eco-
nomics a considerably narrower ideal of rationality operates, focused almost exclusively on
wealth maximization as the expression of self-interest. The Kantian-inspired notion of the
reasonable altogether disappears. See generally I KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SO-
ciAL CoNrRAcr 7-92 (1994) (proceeding under the title "DeKanting Rawls" to struggle with
the proposition that an expanded concept of economic rationality can encompass the rea-
sonable). The assertion instead is that people's free pursuit of rational self-interest leads to
a society that realizes the greatest possible wealth. This realization has obvious ethical
implications in a world of scarcity and physical suffering. Significantly, the Kantian ideal of
rationality permits the existence of the individual as economic actor. Recognizing rational-
ity as a basic human capability in politics and law necessarily concedes legitimacy to eco-
nomic self interest; political philosophy must not foreclose it in the name of an
overarching good, but it must be allowed to play out as a part of human freedom. At the
same time, however, it cannot be accorded essentialist status. In Kant, rationality is always
a limit to self-interest because an end or a maxim is only freely chosen if it is chosen in
accordance with the universal law. Game theory does not understand rationality as a limit
to self-interest but rather as the means to its realization in the world.
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the question, "What should I do?" As persons, then, we inevitably are
implicated in the working through of personas. Since these are not
just given or imposed on us but have to be assumed, it also turns us
toward culture. In this sense, culture tends to be a condition of per-
sonhood. The personas in and through which we come to ourselves
are both culturally expressed and a fundamental expression of
culture.
This understanding of the relationship between person and per-
sona is crucial to our defense of the ethical, political, and legal ideal
of the person against the legitimate and powerful criticisms of this
ideal that both feminists and race critical theorists have made. In
crude summation, these critiques argue that the liberal ideal of the
person is too "thin" to provide political or legal insight into the em-
bodied concrete concerns of everyday life.3 17 Significantly, the criti-
cisms do not reject the idea that all persons have equal worth. They
instead turn on an ethical mandate to provide a "thicker" and thus
truer conception of the self as the basis for legal reform. 3 18 We ad-
dress these criticisms and simultaneously maintain as central to our
defense of language rights the ideal of the free person.3' 9 To do so,
we defend the ideal of the imaginary domain.3 20
The imaginary domain is an aesthetic idea that illuminates what
freedom demands of creatures that inevitably are shaped by their own
identifications. We understand freedom as a practice of assuming re-
sponsibility for our evaluations of our basic identifications as we make
them our own in the course of shaping our individual lives.321 Kant
317 See, e.g., SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING (1989) (arguing that mothering gives
rise to a distinct mode of thinking and exploring the implications of this thought).
318 For an example of a "thicker" conception of self, see ROBIN WESr, NARRATIVE, Au-
THoar= Am LAW 251-63 (1993) (comparing her "literary woman" with Richard Posner's
.economic man").
319 See CoRNELL, DOMAiN, supra note 295, at 3-27 and CORNELL, AT THE HEART, supra
note 295, at 3-2, for a more elaborate defense of why scholars should maintain the ideal of
the person in political philosophy. For an example of a feminist who criticizes the abstract
ideal of the person, see RUDDICK, supra note 317.
320 Later we will defend the degradation prohibition as it is a limit on the equal protec-
tion of each person's imaginary domain implied by the way we define the ideal.
321 Ronald Dworkin uses a similar concept of the relationship between freedom and
responsibility to base the legal authorization of ourselves as the only legitimate source of
value for the evaluative design of our lives. To quote Dworkin's understanding of his own
second principle of ethical individualism:
The second principle is not just a general principle assigning each person
major responsibility for what happens to him. It is more specific. It assigns
people for the evaluative design of their life; it assigns each person the re-
sponsibility to shape his life to a conception of ethical value that is chosen
or endorsed by him rather than by any other person or group. We must
take considerable care not to misunderstand that assignment. It assumes
and demands a kind of freedom but it is not metaphysical freedom-it is
not, that is, people's power by an act of free will to alter the chain of events
predetermined by physical or mental causation. The second principle is
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defines aesthetic ideas as interpretative in that they help us grasp the
personal significance of otherwise hopelessly abstract ideals.322 The
expression of aesthetic ideas facilitates political and moral reflection
and gives body to our interpretation of the meaning of the free and
equal person.323 Aesthetic ideas configure the moral dimension of
experience. 324 The moral dimension is crucial to articulating the con-
struction of the wrong- and right-making characteristics of any partic-
ular social fact-in the present case, the legal suppression of Spanish.
More particularly, the aesthetic idea of the imaginary domain helps us
to imagine and to articulate the cross-references by which our case for
language rights follows from the liberal ideal of the free and equal
person.
The imaginary domain expresses an essential right of personality
by recognizing both our equal dignity and our potential to assume our
special responsibility for ourselves. 325 We cannot assume this respon-
sibility, however, unless the moral and psychic space is protected, al-
lowing us to engage in the practice of self-responsibility through
which we come to terms with the ethics of our own identifications.
We may either embrace these identifications, keep them fluid, or
struggle to discard them altogether. These possibilities are what
makes way for our ethical responsibility for our identifications. When
we make an identification, such as being a Latina, a conscious end,
then we clearly can see why respect for how that identification is ar-
ticulated is crucial to the respect for the person. But even if we are
not so explicit in making an identification an end in Kant's sense, we
cannot entirely escape our responsibility for how we live with these
not offended or undermined in any way by a commitment to determinism,
because it neither demands nor presupposes what we may call relational
freedom: it insists that so far as your life is guided by convictions, assump-
tions, or instincts about ethical value, that they must be your convictions,
assumptions, or instincts. You rather than anyone else have the right and
responsibility to choose the ethical values that you will try to embody in
your life.
Ronald Dworkin, The Roots ofJustice 29 (Aug. 28, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors).
322 See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 183 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 1987)
(1793).
323 In Kant's words, aesthetic ideas draw out a "concept's implications and its kinship
with other concepts." Id.
324 In particular, aesthetic ideas can draw out the moral dimension of experience.
Although Kant never directly would have connected aesthetic ideas with his conceptualiza-
tion of the morally free person, I have argued that we can use such ideas to try to give body
to what would otherwise remain abstract. So, for example, when Rawis argues that the veil
of ignorance is a representative devise, I would argue that it is more precisely thought of as
an aesthetic idea. For Rawls's most recent discussion of his understanding of the original
position or the veil of ignorance as a representational devise, see RAwLs, supra note 294, at
27-28. For a more elaborate discussion of my own use of the aesthetic idea of the imagi-
nary domain, see CORNELL, AT THE HEART, supra note 295.
325 See CORNELL, AT THE HEART, supra note 295.
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identifications because they always are being reshaped by us as we take
them on, even if we think we only are doing so by following tradition.
As persons who can never entirely escape self-responsibility, we need
the moral space in which to exercise it. The imaginary domain man-
dates that the moral community of persons include each of us and
provide us this space.
The imaginary domain operates on two levels within the moral
community of persons. At one level, the imaginary domain allows
each of us to demarcate a space for self-evaluation through moral re-
flection. This space must have protection prior to the beginning of a
conception of proceduralist justice, such as the one John Rawls de-
fends. In a famous analogy, Rawls uses the representational device of
"the original position" and "the veil of ignorance" to engage in a hy-
pothetical experiment in the imagination that guides our moral re-
flection.3 26 The veil of ignorance forecloses knowledge of our gender,
our ethnic identity, our linguistic origin, our race, or our class posi-
tion. Without this knowledge, the perpetuation of social hierarchies is
not rational because no one knows where in the world of social hierar-
chies she would fall.
The veil of ignorance helps us envision a procedure for moral
reflection that, by virtue of its very articulation, forces us to question
social hierarchies, and at the same time, challenges their hold on our
imaginations. But how does one take into account gender, race, na-
tionality, and ethnic and linguistic background in the hypothetical ex-
periment of the imagination? Certainly we should take into account
these fundamental aspects of each person's life. But the solution is
not to assert that "facts" concerning the meaning of these realities
about ourselves should reside behind the veil of ignorance. 327 Be-
cause these so-called facts are intertwined with basic social hierarchies
in the real world, placing them behind the veil of ignorance frustrates
the purpose of the exercise of imagining ourselves as free, equal, and
unbound by our hierarchical place in society. This difficulty, however,
does not mean that we should forget these realities; instead, we should
imagine ourselves as persons free to morally evaluate these hierar-
chies. Behind the veil of ignorance, in other words, the idealized situ-
326 RAWLS, supra note 302, at 304-09.
327 Critics of Rawls wrongly have attacked the idealized representations behind the veil
of ignorance as if they were supposed to be real human beings. Thus, these critics argue
that Rawls gives us a hopelessly abstract ideal of the person that cannot guide our moral
reflection in real life. Real life, of course, is infused with the hierarchies that corrupt our
thinking about equality. These critics neglect the purpose of a hypothetical experiment in
the imagination, which demands that we try to represent the conditions for moral reflec-
tion of free and equal persons. Such an experience does not start with reality, particularly
a social reality that hierarchies bind together, because the point of the representative de-
vice is to imagine a basis for moral reflection on the moral legitimacy of the hierarchies.
How would we think about justice if we did not know how those hierarchies would treat us?
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ation of the representative includes the postulation of the self as free
in the terms described earlier. The imaginary domain, in which we
conceptualize all persons in the moral community as possessed of the
right to represent and evaluate what these realities mean to them, pro-
vides a space for that prior evaluation of our equal worth.3 28
At a second level, the imaginary domain extends to each person a
right to self-representation-a right to establish herself as her own
representative of whom she is because she must take responsibility for
her own life. 329 To be included in the moral community is to be rec-
ognized as having the potential to shape and to reshape one's identifi-
cations out of the symbolic material they present. This right to self-
representation subsumes the right to privacy, at least when inter-
preted as the demand to be left alone. This subsumption is because
the right to self-representation insists that each person must have the
psychic and moral space to experiment with the personas through
which culture is expressed so that she may have the chance to
resignify what culture means to her. By demanding this psychic and
moral space for each of us, the right to the imaginary domain takes us
beyond hierarchical definitions of the self, whether caste, class, race,
gender, national origin, or linguistic descent imposes it. Some have
thought that these socially and symbolically constructed identifica-
tions determine the person.330 But as persons with the right to self-
representation, women, African Americans, and Latinos/as cannot be
reduced to naturalized classes whose entitlements and duties flow
from their status positions. This right demands that the State and our
basic social institutions recognize the person as worthy of being who
she is as a member of the moral community of persons and, as such,
treat her as the legally authoritative source of any moral or ethical
meaning she gives to her basic identifications.
B. The Dynamic Nature of Identification and Our Disagreement
with the Communitarians
We now turn to a detailed response to the several critiques of the
liberal person that communitarians, feminists, and race critical theo-
rists make. Our conceptualization of identifications as central to the
shaping of identity answers these divergent critiques of the liberal per-
son. For us, a person's identity is inseparable from her identifications;
328 For a more extensive discussion of the imaginary domain and Rawls's hypothetical
experiment in the imagination, see CORNELL, AT THE HEART, supra note 295, at 14-19.
329 See id. at 17-18.
330 For an excellent summation of the communitarian critique of the liberal person,
particularly as it has been elaborated in the work of John Rawls, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrs OFJUSTCE (2d ed. 1998). For a rich analysis of the relationship
between race critical theory and the liberal ideal of the person, see PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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as a result, the moral self is inseparable from an ethics of identifica-
tion through which the person engages the practice of self-responsi-
bility. We have no quarrel with communitarians, feminists, and race
critical theorists when they criticize the phenomenology of the indi-
vidual, often implicit in liberal thought.33' But we argue that they are
wrong to the extent that they denigrate the significance of freedom
due to its purported use in a misguided phenomenology or anthro-
pology in liberal theory.
Our basic identifications are fundamental aspects of our lives.
We internalize these basic identifications initially as essential to our-
selves, often even without recognizing, let alone rationally assessing,
the fact that we do so. We cohere into a self only by making sense of
these basic identifications, whether we consciously question them as
contestable or not. When an individual assumes an identity, this as-
sumption implies that these basic identifications have received a sedi-
mented meaning or meanings. We inevitably engage these
inheritances when we acknowledge ourselves, whether as a Jew, a
woman, an African American, a Latino, or a Latina.332
"No one chooses her parents," goes the old saying, and indeed,
our parents' identity is only one of an array of life circumstances we
do not choose. As soon as we are born, we are stamped with a sex.
Our racialized culture racially designates our parents (or parent) and
us with them. We are placed in their arms and delivered into their
realities-their country, their culture, their class position, their reli-
gion (or lack of it), their lived sexualities, and whatever other basic
identifications that have shaped them. We are immersed into a world
thick with meaning, meaning that is passed on to us in language. We
rely on this language to give ourselves form slowly to distinguish our-
selves from our surroundings. We inherit a world that at least to some
extent comes to us framed by the language of those who engage us in
intimacy; they are the ones who first teach us, consciously and uncon-
sciously, what it means for them and in turn for us to be human.
Communitarians continually remind us that our inheritance of
language, our country, our culture, and our tradition constitute us.3 33
331 See, e.g., SANMEL, supra note 330, at 1 ("This is an essay about liberalism.... Against
the primacy of justice, I shall argue for the limits of justice and, by implication, for the
limits of liberalism as well.").
332 See TAYLOR, supra note 292, at 111-14.
333 It is important to remember that long before the "new" communitarians, Hegel
made the same point about the constitution of human identity. See HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT, supra note 296, at 38-40. But Hegel also understood that people could draw differ-
ent moral and ethical lessons from the recognition of how human identity is rooted in
history, language, and culture. Indeed, Hegel argues that the modem person is distin-
guishable from other legal and moral forms given to our humanity. See id. at 39-40. The
person of modernity is no longer reducible to her social role in established hierarchy. Nor
is she identical with any of the final ends of her community or even with the State. Given
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We do not, they say, make ourselves up from scratch. This argument
is true enough. But it is just as true that we revise ourselves, even if
some of us experience ourselves as already imbued with an identity,
"man" or "woman"; "white" or "of color"; 'Jewish" or "Christian"; "gay"
or "straight"; "Anglo," "Latin American," or "Asian." As we stressed
before, when we take up these identifications, we become responsible
for them and for the ethical meanings they receive.33 4 Some of us
may experience our identifications as if ancestral tradition, religious
conviction, national origin, or the nature of our sexuality carved them
out in certain forms. For people who experience themselves in this
way, it makes little or no sense to separate themselves from these basic
identifications. Who they are is for them identical to their constitu-
tion as Jewish, African American, or Asian. But consciously or not,
they still exercise moral and ethical responsibility when they take up a
life associated with a particular identification.
For example, there are many meanings of what it means to be
Jewish. Anyone who simply claims that her Judaism mandates accept-
ance of a particular institutionalized form of Judaism still must con-
front responsibility for this associational decision. Clearly, members
of the Jewish community constantly exercise this responsibility or free-
dom, as many different meanings of being Jewish have been both ex-
pressed and institutionalized. Still, other people do not experience
themselves as identical with their origins, whether national, ethnic, or
religious. Indeed, the entire immigrant story, particularly as it empha-
sizes battles between the generations, stems from what it means for
the members of the next generation to revise their sense of them-
selves by re-evaluating for their own lives the basic identifications of
their parents.
Many believe the debate between the liberals and the com-
munitarians to be over whether or not individuals can revise these
basic ends and identifications or for that matter rationally assess these
at all.33 5 As generation after generation of immigrants have shown,
the complexity of the modem state, the individual herself no longer can have a simple
identity. She must subjectively identify with the ends of her community-the nation state
in which she is a citizen. See id. at 155-59. This insistence on the split and complex nature
of modem individuality separates Hegel from modem communitarians such as Michael
Sandel who argues that because our communities' ends are constitutive of who we are, it is
legitimate for the State to impose restrictions on people's ability to revise those ends. See
SANDEL, supra note 330, at 183 (examining deontological liberalism and concluding that it
neglects the power of politics to achieve a level of common good that individuals alone
cannot achieve).
334 For a more extended articulation of what I mean by an "ethics of identification,"
see Anti-Racism, Multi-Culturalism, and the Ethics of Identification, co-authored with Sara
Murphy (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
335 For an excellent response to the communitarian argument that we can revise our
own ideals, Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in 11 THE TANNER LEcruREs ON
HuMAN VAaUES 1, 66-71 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990).
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even the deepest identifications are open to both re-evaluation and
rerepresentation.3 36 Thus, the communitarians clearly are wrong
about what people can do. The real debate is over what people
should do and should take responsibility for and, more specifically,
what the State should be allowed to do to enforce people's allegiances
to specific ends and identifications. If, as some communitarians have
argued, people's ends and identifications constitute and thus are
identical with them,3 37 the State can enforce fidelity to these ends and
identifications without trampling on individual freedom and on the
practice of self-responsibility. The individual is the ends and identifi-
cations; she only can be as free as those specific ends that already con-
stitute her. As we already have suggested, this conception of the self
may indeed be a true description of how some people experience
their identities, but even then it does not relieve them of responsibil-
ity. It also suffers from overinclusion: the State still can trample on
other people's freedom by reinforcing all people's allegiances or by
limiting the space in which people's basic identifications can be re-
evaluated and rerepresented.
What body should we recognize as the source of moral value for
these moral allegiances and identifications when they are defined as
ends? Can the State bestow value on them in its own name or even in
the name of the "true" interests of the individual? For a communitar-
ian, if the individual truly knows who she is, she would understand
that the state-imposed allegiances are truly her own ends.338 She
would exercise her practice of self-responsibility in the only way she
truly ethically can: by living a life in allegiance with her community.33 9
We argue, on the contrary, that the person must be recognized as the
source of the ethical or moral value she gives to her basic identifica-
tions. To make this argument in no way implies that human beings,
like persons shedding clothes, simply can detach themselves from the
ends and identifications that have shaped who they are as persons.
Our argument presupposes only that people can revise and readjust
ends and identifications and that even if we accept them as passed
down to us, we remain responsible for the form in which we accept
them. It emphasizes that the communitarian insight that human be-
ings grow into individuals only in and through webs of relationships
also should remind us that freedom is fragile. Indeed, the degree to
which persons actually can revise identifications and ends depends in
part on whether the State and basic social institutions provide them
336 See, e.g., supra notes 54-57 (noting that immigrants use English as their primary
language within three generations).





with the moral and psychic space to do so. This responsibility is why
the equal protection of the imaginary domain is so important. Pro-
tecting the imaginary domain ensures that the person and not the
State is the source of the evaluations and representations of her fun-
damental ends and identifications. It is precisely becausewe initially do
not choose the primordial relationships and identifications through
which we pattern a self and become a person that we need morally
and legally provided psychic space to incorporate them, to re-evaluate
them, or to contest them through the evaluations and meanings we
give them. How one does so is inevitably a part of the exercise of self-
responsibility.
Once we see that identifications are not just stamped on us, we
begin to comprehend the ideal or idealized element of identification.
This element often is made explicit as an ethical or political ideal.
This is the case with Latinos/as. The identification of Latino/a car-
ries an ethical and political message due in part to the historical basis
of its usage in the United States. The identification implies that the
person can trace roots to a Latin American country and is ensconced
in the Spanish language, but is not trying to pass as Spanish-as a
white European. Identification as Latino/a also is relational-an his-
torical interpretation of the Southwest, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and
Cuba, as well as the significance of the economic and political domi-
nation of South America for Latin culture and for the Spanish lan-
guage, defines in part the meanings of Latino/a.3 40 The definition of
what it means to be a Latino/a thus is partially an act of the political
imagination. To enhance this identification can be to take it as an
end through moral reflection. In like manner, Gloria Anzaldfia de-
scribes the political and ethical process by which Chicanos/as came to
imagine themselves as bound together as a people:
Chicanos did not know we were a people until 1965 when Ceasar
[sic] Chavez and the farmworkers united and IrAmjoaquin was pub-
lished and la Raza Unida party was formed in Texas. With that rec-
ognition, we became a distinct people. Something momentous
happened to the Chicano soul-we became aware of our reality and
acquired a name and a language (Chicano Spanish) that reflected
that reality. Now that we had a name, some of the fragmented
pieces began to fall together-who we were, what we were, how we
had evolved. We began to get glimpses of what we might eventually
become.34'
340 For an excellent discussion of the political demarcations that either create or rein-
force identities, see Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming The Logic of Group
Political Conflict, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CuLTuREs 155 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
341 ANZALDOA, supra note 151, at 63.
[Vol. 84:595
COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM
C. The Difference Between Parameters and Limits
The fact that the boundaries of an identification have political
and ethical dimensions does not mean that anyone can take on any
identification. Neither of us is Latino/a, and if either of us were to
insist that we are, you would be right either gently to prod us to see a
psychiatrist or, once you had heard either of us speak Spanish, to
make reference to this Article and accuse us of moral hubris. The
communitarians are correct that the inheritance of language, culture,
and country sets parameters for our lives.34 2 But they are just that-
parameters. They are not necessarily imposed limits that so rigidly
define us that we cannot develop a personal response to the full par-
ticularity of our situation.3 43 As Ronald Dworkin has argued, ulti-
mately, each of us personally should make the distinction between
parameters and limits, even if the historical situation in which we find
ourselves in turn indexes it.344
At this point, another important difference with the com-
munitarians becomes manifest. It is a limit on our lives that under the
above definition of Latino/a, we cannot embrace that identification
or gain acceptance as those who identify themselves as Latinos/as,
even if we desperately seek to do so.3 45 But what if one of us were to
marry a Mexican, move to Mexico, become a Mexican citizen, achieve
fluency in Spanish, and raise children of the marriage as Mexicans?
Assume that the one who took on that overwhelming project of trans-
342 See Dworkin, supra note 335, at 67.
343 We borrow the distinction between parameters and limits from Ronald Dworkin.
See id. at 68.
344 As Dworkin explains:
The ideal life is always the same: it is a life creating as much independent
value-as powerful a pleasing of God or as much human happiness-as it is
conceivable for a human being to create. Circumstances act as limits on
the degree to which the ideal can be achieved. Mortality, for example, is a
very important limit: most people could create more pleasure if they lived
longer. Talent, wealth, personality, language, technology, and culture pro-
vide other limits, and their force as limits will be much greater for some
people, and in some times and places, than others. If we take an indexed
challenge view of ethics, however, and treat living well as responding in the
right way to one's situation, then we must treat some of the circumstances
in which a particular person lives differently, as parameters that help define
what a good performance of living would be for him.
Id. at 66-67.
345 When a commentator argues that bilingualism in Spanish and English is a disability
in the United States, he is setting out Spanish as a limit on people's lives that must be
addressed in the name of equality. See Mirand6, supra note 17, at 103. For this commenta-
tor, it is only by addressing bilingualism as a disability that we can hope legally to interpret
statutes that forbid the speaking of Spanish in workplaces as discrimination. See id. at 102-
03. How an ability to speak two languages at home sensibly could be rendered as a disabil-
ity demands more discussion. See infra note 396.
Clearly, this conception of bilingualism in Spanish and English as a disability is insep-
arable from the treatment of Latinos/as in the United States.
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formation were later to tell the other, "At this point in my life I iden-
tify myself more as a Mexican than as an American." That individual's
life parameters substantially would have changed. Identification as La-
tino/a would no longer seem like simple craziness or hubris, despite
the fact that many if not all Mexicans would continue to identify that
person as an Anglo.
Even though we cannot completely escape our Anglo context, we
certainly can change its meaning for ourselves-despite the fact that
other members of society may not recognize the change.3 46 Freedom
demands that the individual should be the only entity empowered to
set, ethically and politically, the divide between limits and parameters.
The imaginary domain gives the person the moral and psychic space
to determine which historical circumstances are limits and which are
parameters. Concomitantly, the imaginary domain gives the person
space within which to embrace the parameters of her life, thereby en-
abling her practice of self-responsibility.
D. Language, Culture, and Identification Within the Parameters
of the Imaginary Domain
1. Language as a Parameter
In response to the question of whether or not he was "influ-
enced" by the Spanish language, the great novelistJorge Luis Borges
exclaimed:
I am inseparable from the Spanish language. My dreams, my aspira-
tions as a writer are formed in Spanish. It's no exaggeration to say
that the man I am would not "be" who he is without Spanish. The
writer I have become is unthinkable without the shape it has been
given by the great traditions of Latin culture. 347
For Borges, the Spanish language is a personal, ethical, and aes-
thetic parameter of his life both as a man and as an artist. In Dwor-
kin's sense, Borges makes judgments about whether or not he has met
his own standards for an effective life as an artist and as a person
within the parameters of Spanish language and of Latin American cul-
346 As Dworkin articulates this point:
Anyone who reflects seriously on the question which of the various lives he
might lead is right for him will consciously or unconsciously discriminate
among these, treating some as limits and others as parameters. I might
treat the fact that I am an American, for example, as just a fact that in some
cases might help and in others hinder my leading the life I think best. Or I
must treat my nationality as a parameter and assume, whether or not self-
consciously, that being an American is part of what makes a particular life
the right one for me.
Dworkin, supra note 335, at 67.
347 Interview by Sonia Moria with Jorge Luis Borges, Buenos Aires, Argentina (May
1985).
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ture.348 Spanish language and culture are, at least for this one writer,
what Dworkin calls "hard" parameters. 349 Borges can imagine himself
only within these parameters. The person outside those parameters
would no longer be the man or writer, Borges.
Toni Morrison makes a similar point when she writes:
The question of what constitutes the art of a black writer, for whom
that modifier is more search than fact, has some urgency. In other
words, other than melanin and subject matter, what, in fact, may
make me a black writer? Other than my own ethnicity-what is go-
ing on in my work that makes me believe it is demonstrably insepa-
rable from a cultural specificity that is Afro-American? 350
Morrison answers her question through a careful analysis of the first
sentences of several of her novels, noting that one can find the answer
in "the ways in which I activate language and ways in which that lan-
guage activates me."351 The parameter of her writing that gives it the
specificity of the work of a black writer is a practice of language, "a
search for and deliberate posture of vulnerability to those aspects of
Afro-American culture that can inform and position my work."352
Morrison's writing, in other words, is inseparable from her assump-
tion of the identification of African American in the form of a
search-a search conducted in part by her self-responsibility for the
articulation of the cultural difference of her people.
For Morrison, it is through language thdt we try to fathom cul-
tural difference and try to give shape to "Unspeakable Things Unspo-
348 By using the term "Latin American culture," we isolate the culture of South
America from that of Spain.
349 See Dworkin, supra note 335, at 70. Dworkin elaborates:
We must distinguish between what I shall call hard and soft parameters.
Parameters, as I said, enter into the description of any challenge or assign-
ment: they describe the conditions of successful performance. Hard param-
eters state essential conditions: if they are violated the performance is a
total failure, no matter how successful in other respects. The formal struc-
ture of a sonnet imposes hard parameters: we cannot make a sonnet better
by adding an extra line, no matter how beautiful it is. Soft parameters are
those aspects of assignment that, when violated, reduce the value of the
performance but do not annihilate it: they act as standards of good per-
formance that permit defects to be compensated by high success against
other standards. Compulsory figures in competitive ice skating are treated
as soft parameters. It is part of the assignment that the performance exe-
cute a particular figure, and any deviations, no matter how beautifully exe-
cuted, count as faults. But deviations are not absolutely fatal to winning any
points at all, and a performance that includes a brilliant deviation may win
more overall than a lackluster but perfectly faithfil one.
Id.
350 Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American
Literature, in 11 THE TANNER LEcrupxs ON HuMAN V a .us, supra note 335, at 121, 146.
351 Id
352 Id. at 162.
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ken."353 How does a writer tell the story of a young African American
girl's unbeing? How does one tell this and other horror stories that
block the "rememoration"-which is in turn a representation of the
previously unrepresented past? Writing, for Morrison, is explicitly an
act of self-responsibility before the stories that haunt the historical
present of her life-a life that she deliberately has assumed as that of
an African American writer. The opening phrase of The Bluest Eye is,
"Quiet as it's kept."354 This phrase was a familiar one from Morrison's
childhood, one she heard again and again, listening to adult black
women talking amongst themselves. The hope in this phrase, from
the perspective of the adult women looking back on the young girl-
friends who lived through the character Pecola's undoing, is that the
"us" that is keeping the secret can admit to it and therefore confirm
that this "us" has the power to confront even the most horrible reality.
Telling a story gives a possible new meaning to the "us" that is formed
even if the secret that made us can never be fully revealed, not only
because it is too horrible, but also because the story comes too late to
save Pecola. As Morrison writes,
The words are conspiratorial. "Shh, don't tell anyone else," and "No
one is allowed to know this." It is a secret between us and a secret
that is being kept from us. The conspiracy is both held and with-
held, exposed and sustained. In some sense it was precisely what the
act of writing the book was: the public exposure of a private confi-
dence. In order fully to comprehend the duality of that position,
one needs to think of the immediate political climate in which the
writing took place, 1965-69, during great social upheaval in the life
of black people. The publication (as opposed to the writing) in-
volved the exposure; the writing was the disclosure of secrets, secrets
"we" shared and those withheld from us by ourselves and by the
world outside the community.3 55
The "we" is in quotation marks because this group is not just there,
but is formed in part by the secret and the effort to fathom the mean-
ing of the rape of a young black girl who only can be there when she
hallucinates a white self with the bluest eyes. How can "we" make
sense of that? Of a young black girl who cannot see herself until she
becomes mad enough to see herself as the idealized white girl with the
bluest eyes? She strives to take on her own version of the idealized
identification "white girl." Then she becomes what everything in the
racist world in which she grew up told her she could not be. The
young girl's hallucination of herself is madness because she must ex-
tinguish herself to see herself as "worthy" of her existence. Psychosis
353 Id. at 121.
354 ToNI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 5 (Alfred A. Kappf 1994) (1970) (italics omitted).
355 Morrison, supra note 350, at 147.
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is the only way for her to dream up a self because she lives her "black-
ness" as an absolute limit on any attempt to fill herself in and become
a person. The adult women who tell the story stumble before they
make the identification with her that they must to reveal the secret, an
identification they did not make when they let her go to the abyss of
her madness. Pecola is not alone in the brutal limitations imposed
upon what she could make of herself as a black girl in a racist society.
The story proceeds through rememoration-re-identification of what
it means to be an African American.
How does the writer find the language to tell this story? What is it
about this story and the language in which it is told that makes it an
expression of identification and re-identification of the difference of
Afro-American culture? Morrison explains:
The points I have tried to illustrate are that my choices of language
(speakerly, aural, colloquial), my reliance for full comprehension
on codes embedded in black culture, my effort to effect immediate
coconspiracy and intimacy (without any distancing, explanatory
fabric), as well as my (failed) attempt to shape a silence while break-
ing it are attempts (many unsatisfactory) to transfigure the com-
plexity and wealth of Afro-American culture into a language worthy
of the culture.3 56
It might seem strange to use Morrison and Borges as if they are
making the same point. Borges is speaking of the unsunderable con-
nection between himself and the Spanish language and culture. He
implicitly draws the connection between Spanish language and Latin
culture. But the Spanish language also embodies the culture of Spain,
which is not Latin American. Morrison writes in English, but hers is
an English that amongst other things expresses the colloquial prac-
tices of black folklore and the day-to-day expressions encoded in Afro-
American culture. Both writers articulate the insight that who they
are is inseparable from the way they are "activated" in language and
that their language is inseparable from both the culture that brings it
to life and their own identification with that culture. Morrison and
Borges describe language as an essential parameter of their lives, but
one that the complex relationship language has with culture, ethnic-
ity, nationality, and race shapes. As is the case with all parameters, the
very attempt to articulate its significance reworks its meaning.
2. Language and Culture
The exact relationship between the person, language, and
thought remains a matter of dispute, as does the precise connection
between language and culture. Steven Pinker, for example, has ar-
356 Id. at 150.
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gued that we all think in a prelinguistic medium called
"Mentalese."357 As a result, the mode of linguistic expression has no
real bearing on our thoughts and on our access to reality. Pinker
could imagine a world in which we all speak in the same universal
language. 358 Perhaps James Joyce in Finnegans Wake came closest to
realizing such a world, undoing the boundaries of historical human
languages. But to do so Joyce also had to imagine the dissolution of
the rigid ethnic, national, and sexual identifications.3 59
For human beings living today, however, language differentiation
is inseparable from the lived experience of ethnicity, national conflict,
and racism. This is not to say that Pinker is right or wrong, although
other thinkers and linguists strongly disagree with him. For example,
Benjamin Lee Whorf, who has devoted his life to studying the unique
syntax of the Hopi language, argues that different structures of lan-
guage can shape our conceptualization of basic parameters such as
space and time.360 And yet, if we listen to Morrison,36' to imagine the
English language is not to imagine the form of life of African Ameri-
can culture, even though African Americans speak English.362
Culture is more than language. To parallel (and deepen) an ob-
servation central to the screening model of discrimination we de-
scribed earlier,363 culture is the full range of encoded day-to-day
behaviors, which at least in part find expression in the personas
through which a culture is assumed. Not all culturally embedded
communication is verbal. Many ways of signaling to one another mark
our connection or our identification with a group. Signs-a way of
pointing a finger, raising the eyebrows, sighing in church, nodding to
357 STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 55-82 (1994).
358 See id. at 82.
359 See JAMES JoYcE, FINNEGANS WArE (Paladin 1992) (1939). Toni Morrison evokes
this "paradise" as she ends her new novel by the same name:
There is nothing to beat this solace which is what Piedade's song is about,
although the words evoke memories neither one has ever had: of reaching
age in the company of the other; of speech shared and divided bread smok-
ing from the fire; the unambivalent bliss of going home to be at home-the
ease of coming back to love begun.
TONI MORRISON, PARADISE 318 (1998).
360 See generally BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REA= (1964) (illus-
trating the principle of linguistic relativity, which states that the structure of a human be-
ing's language influences her understanding of reality and her behavior).
361 See supra text accompanying note 350.
362 As the anthropologist Gananath Obeyeskere has observed:
There are people who are thoroughly fluent in an alien language but are
quite incapable of understanding the alien culture. This is simply because
culture is not coterminous with language. The variety of normative behav-
ior governed by implicit meanings, nonverbal communication, and
nonlinguistic symbolic forms shows that language provides at best access to
the culture.
GANANTH OBEYESEKERE, THE WORK OF CULTURE 230 (1990).
363 See supra text accompanying note 250.
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each other on the street, and shaking hands-allow others to identify
the signaler as a member of a particular group.
These nonverbal personas are crucial to how actual human be-
ings express culture. But personas are lived only as the people who
are the members of the culture and who bring it to life assume and re-
imagine them. Because human beings are the entities that express
themselves and their cultural identifications through these personas,
the meanings of those personas always are changing. At the same
time, one can both misinterpret and stereotype the cultural personas
of others. This misinterpretation and stereotyping is one of the many
ways in which people convey racism and ethnic disparagement within
a culture. Sometimes it takes the subtle form of mistakenly thinking
that only other cultures have personas, while we white Anglos simply
represent the moral and decent mode of behavior.
The proposition that language and culture are not coterminous
does not imply that language is not a basic parameter of culture. A
person who has no access to the language of a culture is severely, if
not entirely, limited in her access to that culture. We may dance the
salsa; we may love Mexican food; we may be obsessed with the tradi-
tion of hyper-realism found in many of the great South American
novels; we may be completely convinced that Puerto Rico is economi-
cally and politically disadvantaged because of its commonwealth sta-
tus.3 64 More profoundly, we may have thrown in our lot with people
who are Latino/a and find in these loves the most important relation-
ships of our lives. But neither our love for Latin music, our apprecia-
tion of South American literature, our deep sympathies for the
political concerns of the Latin American community, nor even the
profound love and respect we feel for Latino/a members of our fami-
lies will make us part of that culture. Similarly, learning to speak
Spanish, while undoubtedly enhancing our access to the culture,
alone cannot make us a part of it. Language for most of us is more of
a limit than a parameter precisely because attaining fluency in an-
other language is a truly formidable goal.
One cannot easily draw with exactitude the relationship between
language and culture. If we are monolingual, to what extent are we
enclosed in our culture? George Fletcher, who fully recognizes the
complexity of this question, convincingly draws a clear connection be-
tween language and culture when he examines the relationship be-
tween the English language and the subculture of law.3 65 Fletcher, in
one of his several examples, argues that the different meanings of rea-
son in English, German, and French make it virtually impossible to
364 See DEFRErrAs, supra note 6, at 26-36 (describing Puerto Rico's historic and current
status).
365 See Fletcher, supra note 31, at 329.
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translate accurately the term "reasonable person" and to convey to
participants in other legal systems the place it holds in our legal sys-
tem.3 6 6 Fletcher writes:
In contrast to a single rule based on reasonableness, European law-
yers start their arguments with broad, sweeping rights. They would
say, for example, that you have the right to use all the force neces-
sary to protect your interests regardless of the costs that fall on
others. But this is only the first step of a structured argument. If it
appears that the defensive force imposed a disproportionate cost on
others, European lawyers would apply the doctrine of abus de droit-
the principle that defeats the exercise of absolute rights in particu-
lar situations. Not surprisingly, in view of the doctrine of reasona-
bleness, English-speaking lawyers have no need for the doctrine of
"abuse of rights." 367
In Fletcher's view, this variance in the definitions of reason reflects an
important difference between the subcultures of Anglo-American and
European legal systems.368 The use of the word "reasonable" suggests
an Anglo-American preference for pluralism in legal thought as op-
posed to the stronger notion of rights that some European legal sys-
tems defend.3 69 The word and the meaning it has acquired over time,
including the preference for pluralism that comes to be a part of what
reasonableness encodes as a word of art in the subculture of law, pass
down through the generations and blend into the traditions of legal
scholarship. For Fletcher, thought, language, and culture have a re-
ciprocal relationship.370
We think Fletcher is exactly right. The relationship between
thought, language, and culture is both reciprocal and dynamic. But
we would make one important addition, addressing the question of
whether or not there is a determinative or constitutive relationship
between thought and language and between language and culture:
this is not the right way to think about these relationships because lan-
guages and cultures live only through persons and personas. It is not
the right language because human beings also fabricate the cultural
personas in which they express themselves. Fabrication disrupts the
causal chain that we need to show a determinative relationship be-
tween language and culture and leaves us with the potential to shape
and reshape ourselves.
366 See id. at 329-31.
367 Id. at 330.
368 See id. at 330-32.
369 See id. at 331.
370 See id. at 331.
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3. Turning Limits into Parameters: Language, Culture, and
Individual Choice
We have seen that it is hard to learn a new language well enough
to make another culture accessible, and it is harder still to revise one-
self to identify with that culture, whether psychically or in one's out-
ward relations with others. Yet we also have seen that this learning
and revision is just what generation after generation of immigrants,
including those from the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central and South
America, have achieved. Although the high degree of difficulty di-
minishes the potential occurrence of cross-cultural movement, it by
no.means erases that potential. It follows that freedom is deeply im-
plicated in the potential's realization. We repeat our central argu-
ment: Each of us-those experiencing that difficult process of
linguistic and cultural access, as well as natives-should receive the
legal freedom to re-evaluate and rerepresent our basic identifications,
including the significance we give to our mother tongue. Different
people will value this freedom differently.
For us, this distinction between the freedom and the value of the
freedom is crucial in the case of language rights. Consequently, we
disagree with the terms that define one current of the multicultural
debate: the current that poses a choice between a liberal nationalist-
rooted in and contained by linguistic and cultural context-and a cos-
mopolitan conception of the subject-surmounting context to con-
struct an independent, personalized identity. In our view, the choice
between those two conceptions is false when posed either to defend or
to undermine the importance of cultural or language rights.
Jeremy Waldron views cosmopolitanism as an ethical and political
ideal that best expresses the value of the freedom to make sense of
our basic identifications.371 Waldron describes the cosmopolitan as
follows:
[One] may live all his life in one city and maintain the same citizen-
ship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his
location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though
he may live in San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not
take his identity to be compromised when he learns Spanish, eats
Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung
by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment, follows Ukrainian poli-
tics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques. He is a creature
of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed-up world and having a
mixed-up self.3 72
371 SeeJeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in THE RIGHTS




Waldron bolsters his appeal to the ideal of cosmopolitanism by argu-
ing that liberal nationalists are wrong to emphasize the importance of
defining oneself through a specific culture and language.373 Will
Kymlicka counters, correctly in our view, that the sort of cultural me-
lange that Waldron describes does not actually involve moving be-
tween cultures.374 For those who do attempt such a move, language
fluency will be a first, necessary step. Waldron exaggerates how easy it
is for us, particularly as adults, truly to escape our "mother" tongue. 375
Yet Waldron certainly has a right to his imaginary domain and
deserves the psychic and moral space to define himself as a cosmopoli-
tan.37 6 Indeed, one can understand Waldron as describing an immi-
grant identity-one that has fluid parameters because many different
social and historical forces constitute it.3 77 Gloria Anzaldfia makes a
similar point when she describes what she calls the consciousness of
the new mestiza:
The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions,
a tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be an Indian in Mexican
culture, to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view. She learns to
juggle cultures. She has a plural personality, she operates in a plu-
ralistic mode-nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly,
nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain
contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else.3 78
Both Waldron and Anzaldfia are describing processes by which
an individual comes to terms with a complex historical web of rela-
tionships. The new mestiza consciousness is in part a political act that
373 See id. at 105-08.
374 See Will Kymlicka, From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism
10-11 (Sept. 11, 1997) (paper presented at the Program for the Study of Law, Philosophy,
and Social Theory) (on file with authors).
375 See id. at 101.
376 Cosmopolitanism as a special, overarching, constructed identification has faced
criticism as a mask for the more particular white, male, middle-class identification of a
handful of academics. See Bruce Robbins, Comparative Cosmopolitaniws, in CosMoPoLrrTcs
246 (1998) (discussing some of the pitfalls of cosmopolitanism either as a reality achieved
by globalization of an elite or as an ethical or political identification that recognizes the
value of freedom and the equality of all human beings); see also Pheng Cheah, Given Cul-
ture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism, in CosMopoLrrlcs, supra, at 290
(criticizing northern academics who critique nationalism as a weapon for southern nations
resisting re-colonization and control by multinational corporations).
377 We must note here, as we saw in supra Part II.G.1, that economic discrimination
remains central to the lives of large numbers of Latinos/as in this country. This discrimi-
nation against immigrants, particularly immigrants who are racialized, is not limited to
Latinos/as. But because of the discrimination, there is a sense in which cosmopolitanism
may not be a rational alternative for many Latinos/as. We must distinguish the decision to
stay within a barrio to reduce the risk of exposure to a brutally discriminatory "outside"
culture from the affirmance of loyalty to a group identification made by a person whose
means give rise to alternative choices.
378 ANZALDOA, supra note 151, at 79.
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turns limits into parameters and thereby challenges the meaning of
being Indian in Mexico. Yet in Anzaldfia's description, cultures con-
tinue to operate as both limits and parameters in part through the
personas they make available to the individual seeking to make sense
of her complex identifications. No Anglo could access the Mexican
persona from the Indian point of view in the same way that Anzaldfia
does. Both Anzaldfia and Waldron not only are describing piecing
together identities (and in the case of Anzaldfia, playing with cultural
personas to expand their meaning), but also are telling us how they
morally and ethically value their identifications. This process of evalu-
ation is that which freedom demands be left to the individual.
For these reasons, we need not choose between liberal national-
ism and cosmopolitanism in the context of defending language rights.
Each principle accurately describes how some individuals come to
value their freedom to make sense of their identifications. Consider
as an example individuals who identify themselves as both Quebecois
and liberal nationalists. For these individuals a commitment to the
French language is essential to their self-definition, and they should
be free to identify with their inherited language in this strong man-
ner. Waldron's real rebellion is not against these people, at least not
on our reading of him. Rather, Waldron argues against the idea that
our heritage rigidly predetermines our identity so as effectively to un-
dercut the moral or ethical dimensions of whom one might be-
come.37 9 On this point, we agree with him. People must be morally
free to make sense of their identifications in their own way. Some-
times this means a brutal uprooting of oneself from one's culture and
linguistic background. Again to quote Anzaldfia:
To this day I'm not sure where I found the strength to leave the
source, the mother, disengage from my family, mi tierra, mi gente,
and all that picture stood for. I had to leave home so I could find
myself, find my own intrinsic nature buried under the personality
that had been imposed on me.380
It is precisely because the relationship among languages, cultures,
ethnicities, class, and race is complex that it is difficult to draw the
kinds of causal claims that tell us what determines what. But this diffi-
culty actually is a good thing. The intractability of grasping exactly
how these relationships affect one another leaves open a space for our
freedom to practice self-responsibility. To put the argument more
strongly, one even can understand the intractability as a result of our
freedom to re-imagine ourselves and to re-evaluate our fundamental
identifications and what they mean to us.
379 See Waldron, supra note 371, at 111-12.
380 ANZALDGA, supra note 151, at 16.
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Chandran Kukathas has defended the position that cultural
rights (including group-differentiated rights) to such things as lan-
guage, territory, and culture are necessary for the meaningful exercise
of autonomy.38 1 "Put simply," Kymlicka argues, "freedom involves
making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not
only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to
us." 38 2 For example,
[w]hether or not a course of action has any significance for us de-
pends on whether, and how, our language renders vivid to us the
point of that activity. And the way in which language renders vivid
these activities is shaped by our history, our "traditions and conven-
tions". Understanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of
making intelligentjudgements [sic] about how to lead our lives. In
this sense, our culture not only provides options, it also "provides
the spectacles through which we identify experiences as
valuable."38 3
We agree with Kymlicka on this point. He shows again that the
way in which language "activates" someone who in turn activates her
language is basic to the process of forming a unique person. But we
need to address two tensions in his formulation. The first is a techni-
cal point: Kymlicka writes of autonomy while defending the proposi-
tion that our autonomy is dependent upon the phenomenal world. In
other words, he is not using autonomy in the strict Kantian sense.384
In contrast, we address this problem with an existential re-interpreta-
tion of Kant's notion of moral freedom, the only kind of freedom
open to us, according to Kant. Second, a tension remains between us
and Kymlicka that also lies at the heart of Waldron's disagreement
with him on the question of how culture, and more specifically ho-
mogenous culture, frames our choices. If our culture effectively
bounds our choices, then the very culture that purportedly serves our
freedom limits it, regardless of the culture's contents (including, for
example, its protection of individual rights). By postulating a kaleido-
scope of cultures, Waldron in part tries to keep us from being limited
and predetermined. 38 5 Waldron does not want his national origin or
381 See WiLL KyMLxcxA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 83 (1995).
382 Id.
383 Id. (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, A MA=tER OF PRINCIPLE 228 (1985)).
384 Strictly from the standpoint of practical reason, autonomy demands that our phe-
nomenal relationships or ties do not define us. If we were to treat ourselves as constituted
by these ties then we would be treating ourselves as objects of study, controlled or con-
structed by forces that theoretical reason could grasp. For an excellent explanation of why
Kant need not defend dualisms in order to defend the self because it is a practical stand-
point and a theoretically demonstrable conception, see KORSGAARD, supra note 303, at 159-
87.
385 See Waldron, supra note 371, at 110-12.
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linguistic descent to capture his imagination 86 This predetermina-
tion is inconsistent with most strong conceptions of freedom.
Kymlicka recognizes that cultures are open-ended phenomena,
yet at times he lapses into the language of determinism: "familiarity
with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable."8 7 In
other words, because persons construct culture through their identifi-
cation with (or against) it, a "culture" always changes. Toni Morrison
describes a dynamic relationship: language activates the person, but
the person also activates language by stretching the limits of the
meaning of her identifications.88 True, language is a basic parameter
of our lives, but even if one remains monolingual, it is a cultural pa-
rameter whose meaning changes for her as she struggles to articulate
its unspoken possibilities.
Yet, like Kymlicka, we defend the connection among culture, lan-
guage rights, and individual freedom. Dworkin's distinction between
parameters and limits aids this defense. As Dworkin reminds us, our
lives are indexed; the true particularity of anyone's situation will in-
clude a whole host of limits and parameters.38 9 We argue that this
indexing occurs because given sets of identifications form all of us.
Because there should be no precise way to determine which are limits
and which are parameters, and because that "determination" is part of
a person's freedom, some people will seek to break out of their lan-
guage and national background by assimilating into another language
and culture. To make this break, some may interpret their language
as a "soft parameter."390 Others, like Borges, define their language as
a "hard parameter,139x which gives them a fundamental sense of them-
selves. Borges's definition of language as a hard parameter provides
him the most basic sense of himself as a man and as a writer. We
experience our freedom in large part through our endeavor to deter-
mine which are limits and which are parameters in our lives. Further-
more, we try to determine how we understand exactly how the
parameters bind us to a tradition and to the cultural narratives con-
tained therein and how they enable us to tell new stories, including
stories about ourselves.
386 See id.
387 KyzucKA, supra note 381, at 89 (quoting Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National
Self-Determination, 87J. PHIL 439, 449 (1990)).
388 See Morrison, supra note 350, at 146.
389 See Dworkin, supra note 335, at 69-70.
390 Id. at 70 ("Soft parameters are those aspects of assignment that, when violated,
reduce the value of the performance but do not annihilate it: they act as standards of good
performance that permit defects to be compensated by high success against other
standards.").
391 Id. ("Hard parameters state essential conditions: if they are violated the perform-
ance is a total failure, no matter how successful in other respects.").
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To confront this substantial challenge, we must have our imagi-
nary domain protected. Part of Anzaldfia's struggle to become a per-
son involved her effort to free herself from the stereotypical personas
in and through which the majority Anglo culture defined the mean-
ing of her Chicana identification. But her struggle did notjust involve
inversion, affirming the features of the stereotypical personas imposed
by Anglo culture. Instead, her struggle involved a complex re-working
of the metaphor of the borderlands in which the mestiza can recreate
the complex being that is herself. This process involved not only the
celebration of the Spanish language but also the affirmance of Span-
ish as a living tongue, which the Mexican American Spanish with
which she grew up changed and enriched. "But Chicano Spanish is a
border tongue which developed naturally. Change, evoluci6n, enri-
quecimiento de palabras nuevas por invenci6n o adopci6n have created vari-
ants of Chicano Spanish, un nuevo lenguaje. Un lenguaje que corresponde
a un modo de vivir. Chicano Spanish is not incorrect, it is a living
language."3 92
E. Equality, Language, and Rights
Chandran Kukathas suggests that the right to "exit" appropriately
resolves tensions among language, culture, and individual freedom.393
We disagree because this negative option does not provide the mea-
sure of freedom demanded here. First, the right to exit implies that
cultures have sharper boundaries than those existing in the real
world. Second, it implies that "exit" is possible. It is almost impossible
to exit a first language, like it or not. One may learn new languages,
but her "mother" tongue stays with her forever. Third, and more im-
portantly, many people do not want to exit. Instead, they want to push
against or re-interpret the meanings of their culture.
In place of the right to exit, we propose the right to the imaginary
domain. This right furnishes the person with the moral and psychic
space to come to terms with the full particularity of her situation, with
language, with culture, with gender, and with sexuality. It does so in
part by insisting that how we live with and define the parameters of
our life is basic to our freedom. People differ, and profoundly so
when it comes to their desire to be rooted in their native language
and culture. But they certainly should have the right to affirm their
language because it inevitably is, at a minimum, a basic parameter,
392 ANZALDOA, supra note 151, at 55. Similarly, a day care worker protests a supervisor's
Workplace English: "Our language is... our culture; no one can take that away from us."
Delgado & Guthrie, supra note 84, at A4.
393 Therefore, we disagree with Chandran Kukathas's argument that we do not need to
have cultural rights because the right to exit is sufficient. See Chandran Kukathas, Are There
Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORrY CULTURES, supra note 340, at 228, 251-52.
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which is crucial to how they shape an identity of their life. At the
same time, we should never undermine the freedom to re-imagine
ourselves.
Only the "degradation prohibition" limits the right to the imagi-
nary domain.3 94 The degradation prohibition forbids the characteri-
zation of someone as unworthy because of how she has constituted
herself from her basic identifications.3 95 One degrades a person in
our sense if one does not allow her to bestow value on her lan-
guage.3 96 Again we quote Anzaldfia:
So, if you want to really hurt me, talk badly about my language.
Ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity-I am my language.
Until I can take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself.
Until I can accept as legitimate Chicano Texas Spanish, Tex-Mex
and all the other languages I speak, I cannot accept the legitimacy
of myself. Until I am free to write bilingually and to switch codes
without having always to translate, while I still have to speak English
or Spanish when I would rather speak Spanglish, and as long as I
have to accommodate the English speakers rather than having them
accommodate me, my tongue will be illegitimate.3 97
This freedom to use one's own tongue is crucial to equal dignity. By
denying someone the freedom to affirm her linguistic origin as she
ethically interprets it, one robs from her the basic freedom to practice
self-responsibility for her identifications. If the State instead imposes
its evaluation of her language on her, it denies her equal worth as a
free person.
People still will ask who, as between natives and immigrants,
should have to accommodate whom? We should resolve this question
by reference to the concept of reasonableness, which helps us deter-
mine what we should expect in social relations with others, viewed as
free and equal persons. We repeat the definition of reasonableness
we offered earlier in this Article 39 8-we are reasonable when we real-
ize that we are capable of recognizing and harmonizing our pursuit of
the good with creatures having equal dignity. Applying that defini-
tion, it is unreasonable for Anglos to treat Latinos/as as anything
other than free persons who bestow value on their language. It fol-
lows that both Official English and Workplace English are unreasona-
394 CORNELL, AT THE HEART, supra note 295, at 60.
395 This means, for example, that no one can treat someone as less than worthy of her
personhood because of her lived sexuality. See id. at 3-32 (discussing sexual freedom). To
treat someone in such a manner is first and foremost to deny them their freedom by mak-
ing their sex or sexuality an imposed limit on how they can live their lives. See id. at 33-65.
396 See supra text accompanying notes 151-52 (describing the brutal punishment of
school children in parts of the United States for speaking their native languages).
397 ANZALmfA, supra note 151, at 59.
398 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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ble. We can make a similar argument by reference to Kant's own
understanding of external right. The suppression of Spanish is a
maxim that cannot be made a universal law without suppressing the
form of rightfulness. 399
Of course, some still might say that Latinos/as remain free per-
sons no matter how Anglos view their language and despite any meas-
ures Anglos take to denigrate or more directly to suppress it. A strong
Kantian answer would be that such particularistic suppression of a
creature of reason always falls afoul of the moral law, with its universal-
izability requirement. That would be the end of the story. But even if
we do not stop there, we can see how these measures impose a cost on
the exercise of that freedom. The imposition of that cost cannot be
reasonable in Rawls's sense of the word, because Anglos impose it pur-
suant to the view that the linguistic valuation that Latinos/as make is
less worthy than that which Anglos make. The State's imposing the
assimilation norm controverts the legal freedom the State must au-
thorize as the source of the evaluative design of one's life. It is unrea-
sonable to expect people to give up their freedom to affirm their lives
as they see fit to "Americanize" themselves.
Furthermore, Official English clearly degrades people because of
their linguistic descent.400 By degradation we mean a grading down-
because of ethnicity-of one's ethnic background or linguistic origin.
In a world of Official English, Spanish speakers are "picked out" be-
cause of their language and marked as not belonging to the majority
group.40 1 To belong, they have to become "American" and assume an
399 See supra note 292.
400 One commentator has attempted to subvert the courts' volition reading in Work-
place English cases, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text, by arguing that bilingual-
ism is a "disability," making it an immutable characteristic. See Miranda, supra note 17, at
103. MirandE relies on studies showing that "code switching" takes place automatically for
many bilingual speakers. &dL at 94. Code switching means at least two things. First, bilin-
gual speakers semiconsciously incorporate words from both languages when they speak.
Second, they unconsciously respond in the language in which they are addressed. That is,
if a worker addresses a coworker in Spanish on the job, she will answer in Spanish before
she has a chance to catch herself. Under this analysis, those bilingual in Spanish and
English cannot help themselves from code switching; therefore the argument goes, bilin-
gualism is both something like an immutable characteristic and a disability. See id. at 94-98.
We sympathize with Mirand6's goal of reforming the law to protect bilingual Spanish
speakers from losing their jobs for their "aberrant" speech. But we would find it sad in-
deed if we had to interpret bilingualism in Spanish in this way in order to make Workplace
English legally redressable. We offer a more direct approach to the same end.
401 See Margalit & Raz, supra note 387, at 449. They write:
It may be no more than a brute fact that people's sense of their own iden-
tity is bound up with their sense of belonging to encompassing groups and
that their self-respect is affected by the esteem in which these groups are
held. But these facts, too, have important consequences. They mean that
individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups, membership of
which contributes to one's sense of identity, be generally respected and not
be made a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution.
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identity that others imagine to be bound up with the imposition of the
English language.40 2 Workplace English similarly degrades Spanish-
speaking workers and accordingly is invalidated.
Discrimination against Spanish speakers affects the way they view
their own language. Speaking Spanish becomes an imposed limit.
This imposed limit not only violates a person's freedom, but also sub-
jects her to a serious inequality by turning her language into a mark
that determines how to meet her life prospects. Accordingly, courts
should legally mark this discrimination with the status of a "suspect
classification." In the analysis of David Richards:
In each case its irrationalist object is not some brute fact that cannot
be changed, but central features of moral personality-idenifica-
dons that make one a self-respecting member of a community that
one reasonably values. The suspectness of the underlying prejudice
in each case is its irrationalist interpretation of central aspects of
human personality and the unjust degradation of the culture
(moral slavery) with which a person reasonably identifies.40 3
Spoken language obviously is central to the identity of many Latinos/
as. We should consider steps taken to force a person to forsake that
identity altogether or significantly to repress it as "moral slavery" in
Richards's sense.40 4
CONCLUSION: ENGLISH ONLY AND THE RIGHT TO
LINGUISTIC SELF-DEFENSE
This conclusion turns first to our substantive case against English
Only. It then addresses methodology, suggesting a series of lessons
emerging from this Article's joint deployment of economic analysis
and rights theory.
Could there be a situation compelling enough to accord a group
the right to impose its language or to ask for significant state rein-
forcement of it? The Quebecois, arguing that French can survive only
if it insures that the next generation will learn it, have sought to keep
English from being taught in the schools that have a majority French
population.40 5 Can English Only statutes that demand the suppres-
sion of other languages have similar defenses?
Id.
402 One, of course, can judge this imposition as a form of denial because one just as
easily can perceive the Spanish language, particularly in the Southwest, as crucial to what it
means to be an "American" who lives in that part of the country.
403 Ricri-a)s, supra note 79, at 355.
404 I&
405 Not all claims of polyethnic right are this strong. The demand, for example, for
bilingual education for Spanish-speaking children in New York City does not include for-
bidding a language minority to have its language in the schools. The opposite is the case.
The demand is instead that the Spanish language be allowed to have a presence in the
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George Fletcher, analogizing to the criminal law doctrine ofjusti-
fication, argues that a people has a right to linguistic self-defense in
some cases. Recall that, for Fletcher, language and culture have a
close causal connection. 40 6 Fletcher further argues that given a con-
flict between two languages over which language should govern, there
can be no "neutral" perspective from which to judge which language
is better for any culture. He explains: "It is better to think of the
struggle to retain a language as an expression of a localized imperative
to survive against an external threat. Thus it seems that the principle
of self-defense provides a better framework for justifying measures of
defense than does the neutral standard of necessity."407
Fletcher emphasizes historical priority as a key factor in the deter-
mination of who should receive this right of self-defense when two
peoples and two languages fight for preeminence. Using Kant's fa-
mous example that who got on the plank first can determine who has
the right to push the other off,40 8 Fletcher argues that priority in time
should be determinate. 40 9 In addition, says Fletcher, only a serious
and demonstrable challenge to the survival of the language can trig-
ger the right to self-defense. 410 Finally, Fletcher stipulates three ancil-
lary requirements: first, the defensive measures should be effective;
second, they must be reasonably necessary, for that is the cheapest
means available for linguistic survival; and third, there must be a sense
of proportionality. 41'
We take seriously the proposition of a right of linguistic self-de-
fense.412 But, using Fletcher's standards, it is crystal clear that such a
right cannot justify English Only. No serious threat to the survival of
the English language exists because there are and will continue to be
high-powered economic incentives for immigrants to learn English.
The assimilation process of today's immigrants, like that of every pre-
vious immigrant group, indeed has triggered a Kulturkampf, but not
one that threatens the survival of our language. Under the economic
theory of language and in light of the emerging role of English as a
global lingua franca, the very suggestion of a threat is absurd.
schools, a presence needed because of the large numbers of Spanish-speaking children in
New York City.
406 See supra text accompanying note 365.
407 Fletcher, supra note 31, at 337.
408 See KANT, supra note 292, at 60-61.
409 See Fletcher, supra note 31, at 337.
410 See id.
411 See id. at 337-38. We note that although Fletcher takes linguistic patriotism very
seriously, he still questions whether it ever would be necessary to impose the majority lan-
guage in all public offices and services. See id. at 337.
412 We see this right as a group-differentiated right in Kymlicka's sense, but one that
still adheres to individuals.
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Furthermore, even if a threat caused the issue to be joined, it
would not be at all clear that English should have a priority entitle-
ment nationwide. In the Southwest, where most of the Title VII cases
have arisen, Spanish was first in time. That Anglos conquered these
Spanish-speaking areas and that the Spanish speakers gradually lost
their language rights413 presumably would create an issue under
Fletcher's standard. We would take seriously the proposition that
Spanish-speaking people in the Southwest (and Puerto Rico) have this
right to linguistic self-defense, although the articulation of that case is
beyond this Article's scope.
Absent a plausible case for a right to linguistic self-defense, no
plausible case for English Only mandates arises because they contro-
vert the equal dignity of free persons. Indeed, if the meaning of
"American" turns on identification with a political culture based on
legal recognition of the equal dignity of free persons, then to repudi-
ate English Only is to do something quintessentially American.
Three lessons emerge from this Article's joint application of eco-
nomic analysis and rights theory to the field of language rights. First,
economic analysis may be ill-equipped to identify morally defensible
policy results when one conducts it on a stand-alone basis. This is not
because it lacks moral implications, however. To pursue an efficient
outcome is to pursue the utilitarian goal of providing the greatest
good to the greatest number on the assumption that "greatest wealth"
can serve as a valid proxy for "greatest good." This assumption is de-
fensible in a world of scarcity and suffering. But problems arise if the
efficiency calculation comes to contain a broader policy inquiry. For
one thing, confronting scarcity and suffering means addressing distri-
butional as well as productivity questions. Problems remain even if we
follow the law and economics tradition and put distributional ques-
tions to one side. The normative weight of economic analysis varies
directly with the certainty of the results it yields; consequently, the
results tend to become less and less certain as the economic analysis
increases in sophistication. Economic analysis, while calculative, is not
a calculus that yields uncontestable states of nature. It yields a multi-
plicity of possible consequences-complex, contingent results that
vary with the factors one includes in the cost assessment.
Consider by way of example some of the economic propositions
and results this Article considers. Diversity entails costs, and an effi-
ciency analysis implying a world of complete segregation follows. Yet
we also have seen that this result cannot be absolutely right even as a
matter of cost analysis, for at some point diversity provides benefits.
413 This loss occurred despite a reservation of equal rights in Article IX of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922. For an account of the disappear-
ance of official bilingualism in the southwestern states, see Perea, supra note 10, at 316-23.
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We are left to speculate about the location of a tradeoff point and to
make a correspondingly ambiguous message for policy. We also have
seen in this Article that the costliness of Title VII enforcement pro-
vides only a starting point for discussion of the legitimacy of Title VII.
Further analysis may show that the costs fall on a protected class that is
manifestly willing to bear them. Similarly, even though costs are a
crucial policy concern, the mere focus on the economic costs of lin-
guistic diversity can achieve no more than very little progress toward
the articulation of the best policy regarding linguistic diversity. Mean-
while, the contingent nature of economic inquiry makes it possible to
smuggle in normative presuppositions that tilt an analysis purveyed as
"pure" cost assessment. Our point is not to bar these normative
presuppositions. They may be determinative in a world where projec-
tions of wealth effects are necessarily contingent. But they need to
acquire transparency. Expanding the context in which economic
analysis proceeds helps us to see more clearly how fact and value
interrelate.
Second, this Article's joint deployment of economics and ethics
teaches a lesson about the bearing of economics on cultural debates.
It has both heuristic strengths and limitations. The strength lies in
the ability of economics to freshen the hothouse atmosphere of Eng-
lish Only discourse. The universalized, rational economic actor enters
a stage on which nativists darkly depict immigrants as "others" and
characterize Spanish speech as threatening. By showing Anglos that
Latinos/as are doing precisely what Anglos would do if they found
themselves in the immigrant situation, the rational actor defuses the
threat. Furthermore, by directing Anglo attention away from cultural
insecurity and toward cost, economic analysis shows Anglos just how
one-sided our Kulturkampf is: English wins in the long run, period.
The weakness of economic analysis in this context lies in the fact that
the rational economic actor operates free of cultural attachments. Ac-
cordingly, it has little to tell us about cultural rights. More generally,
utilitarianism does not and cannot provide us with an adequate ac-
count of the individuation and multiplicity of persons.414 To put the
rational economic actor in the position of an ideal spectator and legis-
lator is to assess empirical costs without assessing individual, subjective
valuations of cultural attachments. Different individuals will value
English and Spanish differently. Respect for them in their multiplicity
and their individuation means we must recognize and allow for those
different valuations. Therefore, ethical evaluation must take individ-
ual consequences as well as social consequences into account.
414 See RAwLs, supra note 294, at 26-27.
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The third lesson directly follows. Economic analysis cannot take
the place of moral and political philosophy because reference to their
value to others cannot quantify and determine the worth of persons.
We all have incalculable worth as persons, and therefore we all have
equal value in a significant sense. A powerful message for legal policy
follows: freedom is the key because our worth as persons flows from
our capacity to shape an identity through the practice of ethical and
moral self-responsibility. The problem, of course, is that no real-world
legal system can realize complete freedom for every individual. Coop-
eration among free persons in societies requires constant freedom-
limiting compromises. But we strongly argue that these compromises
must be reasonable. Economic analysis comes in to assist at this point,
describing (and in some cases quantifying) the costs of protecting
freedom, which helps to inform our judgment as to what is reason-
able. In doing so, economic analysis cannot replace the need for nor-
mative standards for treating each individual as a free and equal
person.
